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PREFACE
Though they are vitally important, retirement and pensions are rarely
appraised through the lens of political philosophy. In seeking to square
the circle of increasingly adverse demographics, and serious pressures on
the public finances, policy makers have been pre-occupied with the “prac-
ticalities” of pension design and financing. Embracing a utilitarian set of
priorities, many scholars of pensions have been concerned with the ques-
tion, “what works?”—where “works” signifies capacity to improve living
standards in old age. Rarely does the literature pause to consider the
fundamentals of pension design, which are to be found in its underlying
normative principles. Still less has the field addressed retirement as a
matter of justice, as understood by political philosophers. To what extent
is “society” obligated to support people in their retirement? Is the right to
financial assistance in old age unconditional, or must such entitlements
always be contingent on obligations, including work or savings? Should
welfare states be used to pursue wider moral agendas, such as those
represented by individualism, or social solidarity? These are the funda-
mental questions that need to be answered.
To the limited extent that it has engaged with the concerns of political
philosophy, the field of pension analysis has been characterised by two
salient biases. One is represented by the tradition of neoliberal social
security analysis, as expounded by the Institute of Economic Affairs
(Booth and Niemietz 2014), the World Bank (1994) and—in the
United States—the Cato Institute (Shapiro 2007). Taking direct inspira-
tion from the ethical and economic doctrines of the Enlightenment,
neoliberal exponents of laissez faire regard the universal welfare state as
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one of the single most important threats to individual freedom. Public
pensions curtail liberty directly by forcing the economically active to
support the poor—invariably, those who fail to take sufficient responsi-
bility for their own retirement—as well as undermining individual capa-
cities for self-provisioning. Social security creates significant opportunity
costs. Much like any other public monopoly, state pensions are insulated
against market competition, and are prone to problems of inefficient
management. In spite of their emphasis on the creation of retirement
income security, public pensions tend to deliver sub-optimal benefit enti-
tlements (Shapiro 2007; Booth and Niemietz 2014).
The tradition of social policy analysis has characteristically responded to
these arguments by re-asserting a distinctive set of values and priorities
(Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990; Trampusch 2007). Taking direct
inspiration from the normative repertoire of Northern European social
democracy, scholars of social policy regard the universal welfare state as
the single most important instrument of social justice, an end that is
defined in terms of social solidarity and economic security. People are
happier when their associations are cohesive, giving expression to the
norms and values that members share in common. Reflecting this founda-
tional premise, scholars of social policy are characteristically hostile to any
suggestion that we should privatise pensions. The market, they say, creates
harmful social divisions by intensifying income inequalities. Competition
fractures the affective bonds that unite people by fostering individualism
and selfishness. Solidarity requires a universal welfare state, acting in the
interests of society as a whole, and giving financial benefits to all retirees,
irrespective of differences in social class or gender (Rothstein and Uslaner
2005; Trampusch 2007).
Reflecting the influence of these very different narratives, the “philoso-
phical” debate on ageing and pensions has become increasingly polarised,
and this has served to frustrate the emergence of a comprehensive model
of justice in retirement. Influential though it may be, neoliberalism has not
taken sufficient account of “market failure”, and cannot ensure that every-
one is able to enjoy a comfortable and secure retirement (Rothstein and
Uslaner 2005). Social policy analysis has addressed market failure at some
length, but is arguably wedded to a model of retirement provision that is
insensitive to legitimate concerns around liberty and choice (Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016). Against this background of ideological polarisation,
Hyde and Shand’s analysis of retirement and justice delivers three sub-
stantive benefits.
vi PREFACE
First, the monograph endorses the “primacy of liberty”, a principle that
has arguably been given insufficient attention by the literature of social
security and pensions. It would be fair to say that the debate around
freedom and retirement has been colonised by neoliberals, who emphasise
the importance of protection against coercion. In the real world of pension
reform, neoliberalism has informed the creation of privately managed,
fully funded retirement schemes that have intensified the risk of poverty
in old age (Borzutzky 2002, 2005). Hyde and Shand embrace a wider
conception of liberty that emphasises the importance of economic secur-
ity, and accept a prominent role for the state in ensuring that all retirees
can enjoy a satisfactory standard of living.
Second, the monograph insists that the efficacy of retirement systems
should be regarded as a matter of justice, not economic or political
expedience. Are people due any particular resources or opportunities
by virtue of their capacities for sovereign decision making, or their status
as members of the political community? How should economic and
political institutions distribute the burdens and benefits of citizenship?
Neoliberals are clear that justice is served only by the “minimal state”,
which can do no more than protect people against force, theft and
fraudulent activity (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974). This means of course
that the vast majority of statutory measures that have shaped existing
retirement systems should be regarded as morally unacceptable. Hyde
and Shand’s analysis is clear that the legitimate scope of governmental
action is wider, allowing for a range of measures to shape the distribution
of retirement income.
Third, the monograph articulates a comprehensive account of justice
that acknowledges a range of important issues. To the limited extent that
they engage with the concerns of political philosophy, scholars of social
security tend to emphasise the importance of a single principle of justice,
such as equality or liberty (Hayek 1960; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).
In contrast, Hyde and Shand highlight the importance of a range of
principles, each giving expression to the distinctive networks or associa-
tions that shape people’s lives. Need designates the resources and oppor-
tunities that are required to perform social roles and obligations in a
minimally satisfactory way, and requires a robust first pillar retirement
income safety-net. Desert refers to the legitimacy of “earnings”—the
financial rewards that track each workers’ contribution to the production
of goods and services—and requires people to save for their own retire-
ment, as acknowledged by the vast majority of second pillar pensions
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arrangements. And citizenship denotes the shared status of societal mem-
bership, conferring universal entitlements to security in retirement. While
their conception of justice is ultimately premised on the “primacy of
liberty”, Hyde and Shand acknowledge the very different contexts in
which its demands become relevant.
Ageing and retirement have become increasingly prominent issues,
reflecting growing pressures on existing pension arrangements. Its reli-
ance on fiscal transfers to finance retirement benefits means that statu-
tory social security has become increasingly vulnerable to the pressures
of demographic ageing. While they confer a degree of financial security,
public pensions have been designed in accordance with the priorities and
preferences of political elites, and give workers few opportunities to
exercise meaningful choice around work and retirement. But while it
seems to address these issues, the privatisation of pensions has intensi-
fied disparities of income and opportunity. The question is, how as a
society should we order and pursue our preferences for retirement?
Which mode of decision making is appropriate to this task? In spite of
claims to the contrary, governments typically respond to such issues as a
matter of expedience, reflecting the vicissitudes of the electoral process,
and the shifting fortunes of economic development (Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016). This monograph represents a plea for pension design
in accordance with a rationally determined set of moral priorities. As
well as articulating a coherent account of justice, Hyde and Shand
convert its demands to a detailed set of reform proposals. Echoing
other work in the field (Borzutzky 2002, 2005), the authors demon-
strate that retirement policy must address two imperatives that are
central to justice. A retirement system that promotes financial security
without liberty should be regarded as unacceptable, for people will be
unable to realise their own preferences for work and retirement. But
liberty without security is also unacceptable because, although given
protection against coercive intrusion, people may not have sufficient
means to pursue their preferences.
As always, what is required, but what cannot be sustained by any
monograph on justice, is the political will to make its demands a reality.
Silvia Borzutzky
Teaching Professor of International Relations and
Politics at Carnegie Mellon University, United States
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CHAPTER 1
Liberty, Equality, or Fraternity? A “Liberal”
Approach to the Design of Pensions?
Abstract Unlike much of the pensions’ literature, we regard the design of
retirement systems as a matter of justice, as articulated by political philo-
sophers. Characteristically, scholars of social policy endorse the deploy-
ment of state power to realise a particular conception of “the good”,
emphasising the importance of social solidarity and altruism. But liberal-
ism endorses “institutional neutrality”, a principle that rules out the
possibility of such action. The nature of “the good” should be regarded
as a private matter, subject only to each agent’s sovereign preferences.
Rather than endorsing social solidarity, justice requires the state to uphold
the primacy of liberty, including the possibility of individual choice around
matters of work and retirement. Several variants of this general argument
are explored here.
Keywords Justice  Pension design  Social policy  Social solidarity 
Liberalism  Liberty
INTRODUCTION
Population ageing presents enormous financial and ethical challenges for
the state, as well as those who are required to pay for retirement income
protection—the working generation. How should public policy decision
makers design the institutional arrangements that are responsible for sup-
porting older people financially, if they should be involved in designing
© The Author(s) 2017
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them at all? For many observers of social security, this is a matter of simple
economic arithmetic (Ginn 2004; Ghilarducci 2008; Booth and Niemietz
2014).1 Given the reality of scarce resources in any society, how may we
generate the financial means to sustain adequate income-transfer pro-
grammes for retirees? And, in this context of sustained population ageing—
amplifying demands on retirement systems—how can public or private
savings effort be arranged with the greatest effect? Unusually, but reflecting
the paucity of scholarly interest in the political philosophy of retirement, this
monograph addresses the design of pensions as a normative issue. Economic
and political institutions—including retirement systems—can be regarded as
acceptable to the extent that their design corresponds to the moral require-
ments of a compelling theory of justice.
Broadly, justice refers to notions of fairness in the way that people are
regarded and treated by legal and political arrangements (Rawls 1971;
Kymlicka 2002). Inevitably, justice has been unpacked in a variety of ways,
reflecting a range of distinctive normative premises. Not surprising when
we consider the degree of value pluralism that characterises political
philosophy, the social sciences more generally, and publicly articulated
discourses around the salient economic and social issues of the day. As we
shall see, procedural justice refers to the processes, by which rights or
obligations are instituted, not their substance (Kymlicka 2002). In a
prominent set of arguments in favour of laissez faire, for example,
Nozick (1974) endorses state involvement in enforcing the rule of law
on the grounds that private alternatives are suffused with personal biases,
and are bound to give protection against coercion in ways that are arbi-
trary and haphazard. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Fraser
(1996) regards justice as the core focus of the “politics of recognition”,
requiring equality of dignity and respect in the treatment of different
groups. This translates into the requirement for a system of government
that allows citizens to be democratically involved in public policy decision
making. In contrast, distributive justice is concerned with the substance of
rights or responsibilities, not with the processes by which they are con-
ferred (Miller 1999). In a seminal contribution to the current debate
(Rawls 1971), “justice as fairness” is represented by the highly redistribu-
tive public institutions and income transfers that risk-averse agents would
choose from behind a “veil of ignorance”. And, speaking from another
point on the ideological spectrum, classical liberals have conceptualised
distributive justice in terms of desert, arguing that resource allocation
should track performance differentials in the market (Friedman 1962;
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Carson 2007). The concern that unites these diverse perspectives is their
search for appropriate normative principles to inform the design of just
economic and political institutions.
We share this concern, for the following chapters of the monograph
focus centrally on the ethical foundations of just pension scheme design.
The questions that direct our focus can be stated formally as follows.
1. Given the wide range of perspectives and principles in political
philosophy, which are most relevant to retirement and the design
of pensions? Previous work in this area has been limited in scope,
because there has been little interest in the political philosophy of
retirement and pensions.2
2. How should the principles that are deemed to have the greatest
relevance to retirement be instantiated through pension scheme
design? Previous work in this area has been even less prolific, for
the design of retirement systems is characteristically framed without
reference to insights from political philosophy.3
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PENSIONS
To the limited extent that it has addressed retirement and pensions, political
philosophy has demonstrated salient ideological biases. Much of the field has
been colonised by classical liberal economists, ever keen to highlight the
failings of the public sector. Most prominently in the United States, The Cato
Institute has argued that the welfare state diminishes individual freedom by
denying people the opportunity to realise their sovereign preferences around
retirement, while wasting scarce resources through inefficient design and
delivery (Kelly 1998; Tanner 2004). In state-managed pension schemes,
retirement is shaped only by the preferences of public policy decision makers,
who typically act in accordance with their own interests, and those of their
preferred constituents. This theme has been amplified by public choice
theory, which regards the liberal democratic polity as a regime of unmiti-
gated rent-seeking.4 Colombatto (1997) is highly critical of statutory social
insurance, an institutional arrangement he regards as purposively designed to
facilitate predatory transfers by redistributing financial resources from the
economically active (particularly future generations of tax-payers) to retirees,
a segment of society with considerable electoral leverage. This arrangement
was initially premised on an “implicit contract” whereby the “working (and
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voting) population agreed to satisfy the policy-makers’ request to run the
rent-seeking game by means of an over-grown welfare state. In return, the
median voter asked for a disposable income over his lifetime higher than the
value justified by his productivity” (1997, p. 8). In effect, if not by design,
public pensions have created a “fiscal commons”, where “one generation can
vote itself benefits to be paid for by future generations who cannot vote and
may not even have been born” (Booth and Niemietz 2014, p. 31). For
exponents of public choice theory, “political rent-seeking” can be eliminated
by replacing statutory social insurance with a fully funded pension scheme,
requiring plan participants to save for their own retirement (Colombatto
1997; Shapiro 2007).
A second salient bias in the debate has favoured publicly managed pen-
sion arrangements to realise an egalitarian vision of justice, one that would
minimise the degree of retiree income inequality, while protecting the least-
advantaged. Although it has been embraced by scholars across the ideolo-
gical spectrum of political philosophy (Shapiro 2007; Etzioni and Brodbeck
2010), this normative emphasis is illustrated here with reference to the
ideological mainstream of social policy analysis, the field of academic study
that is concerned centrally with evaluating income-transfer programmes
(Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Reflecting its roots in Fabian
socialism (Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981), and the continuing influence of
Northern European social democracy (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and
Palme 1998; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005), social policy analysis tends to
reject any substantive role for the private sector in delivering retirement
income protection. As well as creating vast disparities of income and wealth,
the market is widely regarded as accentuating egoism and selfishness, which
erode the affective bonds and mutual obligations that give cohesion to
society (Titmuss 1974; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Social solidarity
requires strong public institutions with the capacity to plan and execute
income redistribution on the scale that would eliminate extremes of eco-
nomic and social disadvantage. When considered in terms of retirement, this
critique requires a distinctive approach to the design of statutory income-
transfer programmes. The social insurance schemes of Northern Europe5
have several salient characteristics that give expression to this egalitarian
vision of justice, notably inclusive access, redistributive and generous income
transfers, and solidarity between the generations (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).
Ultimately, both approaches tend towards a monist conception of
justice, that is, one which gives priority to a single normative principle
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(Miller 1999). While they address a broad range of concerns, classical
liberal scholars of retirement assert the primacy of liberty, defined in
negative terms as the absence of coercion by other human agents. But
social policy analysis evaluates economic and social institutions against the
requirements of fraternity, which can be thought of as the functional and
affective integration of people in society. In contrast, this monograph
embraces a pluralist conception of justice, one which highlights the impor-
tance of three normative principles.
• Need. All human agents need access to designated resources and
opportunities if they are to function optimally as members of asso-
ciations and networks (Doyal and Gough 1991; Miller 1999). In
retirement systems, need requires redistributive income transfers to
address financial impoverishment.
• Desert. Workers should be rewarded financially in accordance with
their performance at work, and this justifies earnings differentials
(Olsaretti 2004; Wolff 2007). Pensions should be regarded as an
extension of the labour market, giving workers the opportunity to
plan and save for their own retirement.
• Citizenship. Public policy should acknowledge the salient character-
istics that people share in common—e.g., membership of commu-
nities, a common cultural heritage, human capacities—by conferring
universal rights or obligations (Rawls 1971; Armstrong 2006).
Pensions should distribute resources or opportunities in ways that
reflect this emphasis on universality.
Although these principles are compatible with a wide range of perspec-
tives in political philosophy, the following chapters develop an account
of just pension design that is informed by liberalism, which emphasises
the primacy of liberty (Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000; Kymlicka
2002). The justification for this focus, as well as its principal normative
characteristics, can be illustrated by way of contrast with social policy
analysis.
THE NORMATIVE BIASES OF SOCIAL POLICY ANALYSIS
A close inspection of the corpus of social policy analysis—particularly
work on retirement income protection (e.g., see Titmuss 1974; Vail
et al. 1999; Minns 2001; Rowlingson 2002; Ginn 2004; Trampusch
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, OR FRATERNITY? A “LIBERAL” APPROACH . . . 5
2007; Lorey 2015; Macnicol 2015)—would reveal salient ideological
biases, notably a foundational endorsement of social solidarity as a
mode of human association, a strenuous objection to the role of the
market in retirement provision, and a commitment to extensive govern-
mental action as a means of securing justice. At the same time, it is
clear that scholars of social policy have demonstrated indifference—
even outright hostility—towards philosophical perspectives that are
tolerant of voluntary exchange and individualism (Esping-Andersen
1990; Armstrong 2006). Some of these biases have manifested in the
following ways.
Bias in Favour of Social Solidarity
In articulating the nature of justice, and the legitimacy of institutional
arrangements for allocating resources and opportunities, the main-
stream of social policy analysis has characteristically demonstrated a
commitment to the ideal of social solidarity (Titmuss 1974; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005;
Thelen 2014). The cohesiveness of societies has been a recurring
theme of the discipline, particularly its analysis of the impact of eco-
nomic and political institutions on social welfare. Arguably the most
prominent exponent of the universal welfare state, Titmuss (1968,
1974) regards fraternity as a function of the cultural and affective
bonds that make human association possible, particularly altruism—a
willingness to help others including strangers. Others have conceptua-
lised solidarity as “generalised trust”—deeply entrenched cultural
expectations of reciprocity (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Such con-
fidence helps to sustain the “social conscience”, the notion that differ-
ent groups in society have a shared fate, with an obligation to help
each other. Defined in these ways, social solidarity is able to generate
several key benefits. At the level of the individual, people with high
expectations of reciprocity are “inclined to have a positive view of their
democratic institutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more
active in civic organisations”. At the societal level, cohesive commu-
nities “are likely to have better working democratic institutions, to
have more growth in their economy, and less crime and corruption”
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, p. 6). Just as the market is deemed to be
responsible for a multitude of sins, social solidarity is responsible for a
wide range of benefits.
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Hostility Towards the Market
The issue that arises at this point concerns the choice of model that can
optimise the pursuit of normative ends, including the principles that
should inform the design of income transfer programmes. Scholars of
social policy typically assert that social cohesion is best pursued by means
of the universal welfare state, a model that relies on public monopolies to
confer equal entitlements and opportunities (Titmuss 1974; Townsend
1993; Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). This
approach is exemplified by Esping-Andersen’s highly influential work of
comparative social policy, which evaluates retirement systems in terms of
their “decommodification potential”—their capacity to diminish the rela-
tionship between work and welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990). Considered
in terms of pension design, decommodification requires:
• Ease of access. Social security design should eliminate legal and insti-
tutional barriers to eligibility, particularly scheme rules that require a
threshold of prior work or savings’ effort (Esping-Andersen 1990;
see also Korpi and Palme 1998). Such inclusiveness can be optimised
by providing a universal retirement system, giving entitlements to all
retirees as a condition of citizenship.
• Benefit generosity. While it may appear to waste scarce resources, the
universal welfare state is a more effective means of generating out-
come-equality in old age, a precondition for social cohesion (Esping-
Andersen 1990; see also Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).
Politically, universality generates wide electoral support for redistributive
income transfers by giving everyone a vested interest in the welfare system.
In rejecting targeting and means-testing, the universal welfare state treats
all retirees with dignity and respect.
Reflecting the same set of concerns, the mainstream of social policy
analysis typically rejects alternative models of pension design, particularly
those that are tolerant of private sector involvement in the retirement
system. Characteristically, the “liberal” welfare state relies on the market
to provide for the economically active, with targeted statutory income
transfers for the least advantaged. Internally, private pensions have few if
any redistributive design features, making benefit entitlements wholly or
very substantially dependent on individual savings’ effort. Externally, pri-
vate pensions impact adversely on the retirement system as a whole,
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diminishing its redistributive impetus. While they generate a powerful
constituency of support that is hostile to egalitarian concerns, private
pensions depend substantially on taxpayer subsidies, directing scarce fiscal
resources away from provision for the financially impoverished. The selec-
tive public pillar commands little electoral support, and exposes workers to
degrading means-tests, forcing them to “feel that they are apart from
others in society” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, p. 24). For a variety of
reasons, then, the mainstream of social policy analysis is highly intolerant
of the “liberal” welfare state, which is incapable of sustaining fraternity.
Where people are unable to “see themselves as part of the same moral
community, they will not have the solidarity that is essential for building
up social trust” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, p. 24).
Mischaracterisation of Liberalism
A third prominent theme of social policy analysis has been its negative
characterisation of liberalism as a political project in pursuit of free market
fundamentalism, prioritising the interests of corporate elites, while making
workers fully responsible for their own financial well-being (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Armstrong 2003, 2006). According to one of its promi-
nent critics, the “liberal” project is premised on the assumption that:
the market is emancipatory, the best possible shell for self-reliance and
industriousness. If not interfered with, its self-regulatory mechanisms will
ensure that all who want to work will be employed, and thus be able to
secure their own welfare. Private life may be wrought with insecurity,
danger, and pitfalls; and poverty or helplessness is in principle not unlikely
to occur. Yet, this is not the fault of the system, but solely a consequence of
an individual’s lack of foresight and thrift (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 42).
For another set of critics, liberalism found its fullest flowering in the laissez
faire of the nineteenth century, but has subsequently pursued a growing
role for the state on the grounds of “market failure”—that is, the argu-
ment that the state may step in to modify resource allocation under
circumstances where the market is unable to supply goods or services
according to some designated optimum (Goodin et al. 1996). One of its
most enduring solutions to market failure, we are told, has been statutory
social assistance based on the Poor Law principle of “less eligibility”,
requiring stringent means-tests and parsimonious benefit entitlements.
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For the vast majority of people in a just society, liberals endorse the pursuit
of welfare through voluntary self-provisioning including work, saving and
insurance to cover contingencies of interrupted earnings such as unem-
ployment, disability and retirement (Esping-Andersen 1990; Anderson
1999; Armstrong 2003, 2006). This characterisation has been developed
in several related ways, each reinforcing a portrayal of liberalism as a close
analogue to the “neoliberal” emphasis on individualism and free markets.
Reinforcing Individualism
This refers to the liberal premise that inequalities of outcome are morally
acceptable only where they arise from the sovereign choices of each agent
(Rawls 1971; Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000). Where appropriate statu-
tory measures to protect liberty are in place, “any outcomes due to
voluntary choices whose consequences could reasonably be foreseen by
the agent should be borne or enjoyed by the agent” (Anderson 1999,
p. 295). This emphasis on personal responsibility is regarded by the critics
as deeply problematic. As well as providing little consolation to those who
are made to suffer because of their own defective decisions, liberalism has
failed to “demonstrate a clear method for ascertaining which part of an
individual’s life is the result of his or her own choices and which part is
not” (Armstrong 2003, p. 414). Its critics deny that this is even possible,
arguing that the scope of genuine sovereignty in a capitalist society is
negligible. In effect, if not by intent, liberalism ends up blaming the
least advantaged for their misfortune.
Disparaging the Least Advantaged
Just beneath the surface rhetoric of equal respect and concern for citizens,
liberals deploy a language of justice that demonstrates a deep contempt for
people whose diminutive opportunities and financial resources place them at
the margins of society. Their disregard for the “imprudent”—those deemed
responsible for their own misfortune—echoes the logic of the 1834 Poor
Law, particularly the principle of “less eligibility”, which shaped a highly
punitive architecture of public assistance for the “idle” and “feckless”
(Anderson 1999; Armstrong 2003). The liberal disdain for the least-advan-
taged becomes even clearer when we turn to consider the reasons given for
targeting redistributive effort towards the victims of involuntary incurred
dis-welfares. To disabled people, liberals say: “your defective native
endowments or current disabilities, alas, make your life less worth living
than the lives of normal people”. To the “stupid” and untalented:
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“unfortunately, other people don’t value what little you have to offer [ . . . ]
Your talents are too meagre to command much market value”. And to the
“socially backward”: “how sad that you are so repulsive to people around
you that no-one wants to be your friend or lifetime companion” (Anderson
1999, p. 305). For liberals, the least-advantaged lay claim to the resources
directed by redistributive effort by virtue of their inferiority, not any relation
of equality with others in society.
Diverting Attention Away from “Social” Injustice
Although we may not realise it, liberals are responsible for articulating a
normative theory that diverts public attention away from the “social”
causes of injustice. In a seminal contribution to the debate, Armstrong
(2003) reminds us that liberalism lacks an explanatory theory of economic
and social inequality, one that is able to highlight the “systemic” asymme-
tries of power that confine the least-advantaged to the margins of society.
The obstacles to be overcome in securing distributive justice are addressed
by liberals “as if they were deposited by forces of nature rather than being a
product of human interaction” (p. 416). In a more recent contribution,
Armstrong (2006) asserts that liberalism has failed to acknowledge “the
‘structural’ inequalities that characterise economic life, and/or the domes-
tic division of labour” (p. 107). The “rich” derive disproportionate ben-
efits from public institutions, yet they refuse to contribute financially to
their upkeep. The vitality of the market is sustained “on a day-to-day level
by the unpaid labour of carers and volunteers” (Armstrong 2006, p. 109),
who are condemned to financial impoverishment. The failure of liberalism
to take sufficient account of the “structural” gives a spurious legitimacy to
the market by suggesting that extremes of wealth and disadvantage are
somehow “deserved”, rather than imposed involuntarily. And, most
importantly, it impairs the possibility of addressing injustice through
public means. If it is to stand any chance of success, a programme of
governmental action to realise justice requires a “theoretically developed
account of what it is about such a system that throws up relations of
inequality with such regularity; otherwise we shall be powerless to combat
it” (Armstrong 2003, p. 416).
Imposing a Narrow Conception of Human Nature
Fundamentally, according to its critics, the liberal endorsement of inequalities
of circumstance, income and wealth is premised on a distorted conception of
human nature—one which regards people as narrowly selfish and egoistic,
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driven only by the cash nexus, and unable to demonstrate regard for others
(Kohn 1986; Layard 2005; Armstrong 2006). Or, as neoclassical economists
might put it, human agents are “rational, desirous, consistent, and self-inter-
ested with a known and consistently ordered set of preferences that allows
them to allocate their scarce resources to maximise their well-being” (Dixon
1999, p. 66). Though they claim to prioritise the impaired circumstances of
the least advantaged, egalitarian liberals accept that the resilience of redistri-
butive income transfers requires institutional arrangements that work with the
grain of human nature by permitting wide disparities of earnings. If the
winners of the distributive game “were made to share their winnings with
losers, no-one would gamble” (Dworkin 2000, p. 185), and tax revenue
would be insufficient to support redistribution. The persistence of disadvan-
tage in any liberal scheme of justice is an artefact of a flawed conception of
human nature that generates a remarkably high tolerance of socio-economic
inequalities. These characteristics mean that liberalism provides an unaccep-
table normative framework for the design of pension institutions. Its tendency
to blame the least advantaged for their predicament is at odds with the stark
reality of impoverished choice at the bottom of society. Rather than dispara-
ging them by deploying the Poor Law rhetoric of “less eligibility”, the least
well-off would be better served bymeasures that enable them to associate with
their peers as equals (Anderson 1999). People are at their happiest when they
are able to benefit from affective bonds with others—“on average, happier
than those who are more preoccupied with themselves” (Layard 2005, p. 72).
A LIBERAL APPROACH TO PENSION DESIGN?
In view of this critique, is it possible to sustain an adequate liberal con-
ception of justice? In reality, liberalism is made distinctive in the field of
political philosophy only by its commitment to the primacy of individual
freedom, conceptualised in terms of the capacity of human agents to
define and act on their sovereign preferences (Rawls 1971; Nozick
1974; Conway 1995; Kymlicka 2002; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
Everyone counts equally, which means that all should have the opportu-
nity to frame and act on their own conception of “the good”.6 And yet
even a cursory inspection of the liberal corpus would suggest that liberal-
ism is a very broad church, encompassing a range of distinctive
approaches. While all assert the primacy of liberty, and a prominent role
for the state in protecting individual rights,7 liberals have embraced very
different positions with regard to three issues.
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Justifying the Foundational Importance of Liberty
The first concerns the mode of deliberation by which the foundational
importance of freedom can be justified. Why should we give priority to
liberty, as opposed to some other normative principle such as fraternity?
The corpus of liberal political philosophy has articulated at least three
responses to this question.
• Natural rights theory. The requirement for liberty is derived from the
Enlightenment premise that human agents have capacities that dis-
tinguish them from all other known species (Rand 1967; Nozick
1974; Kelly 1998; Machan 2006). Each person should be regarded
as an entity “with the ability to regulate and guide its life in accor-
dance with some overall conception it chooses to accept” (Nozick
1974, p. 49). Defined against this background, the “separateness of
persons” requires people to be treated as ends in their own right, not
merely as means to the ends of others.
• Consequentialism. A substantial “subjectivist” strand of liberalism
maintains that normative principles such as liberty are “arbitrary,
and cannot be derived authoritatively from either the nature of
man or objective natural law” (Barry 1998, p. 101). Liberty must
be justified by other means, such as its role in augmenting welfare.
Utilitarians contend that the possibility of individual freedom incen-
tivises innovation and efficiency in the production of goods and
services, and intensifies work effort, generating economic develop-
ment that benefits everyone (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Conway
1995).
• Contractarianism. Alternatively, but no less prominently, some lib-
erals have sought to determine the importance and scope of liberty
by deliberating around the substance of some hypothetical social
contract, agreed to by people in a state of nature (Rawls 1971;
Buchanan 2000).8 In his seminal account of “justice as fairness”,
Rawls articulates a distinctive variant of the contractarian method
where those who are expected to deliberate must do so behind the
“veil of ignorance”—that is, “no-one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities” (Rawls 1971, p. 12).
Liberty is what remains once the scope of state authority and the
demands of distributive justice have been agreed.
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As we shall see, the mode of deliberation by which the importance and
scope of liberty are determined has important implications for the design
of economic and political institutions, including income transfer
programmes.
The Nature of Liberty
A second issue is concerned with the substance of individual freedom, parti-
cularly the distinction between two salient concepts. Negative liberty—or
“freedom from”—can be defined as the absence of external constraints on
people, such that they are able to act according to their sovereign preferences.
What is the “areawithinwhich the subject—a person or a group of persons—is
or should be left to do or be without interference” (Berlin 1969, p. 121)? This
emphasis has been a salient feature of classical liberalism, which defines coer-
cion narrowly as the deployment of force by other human agents. If liberty is
to be preserved, “no man or group of men may aggress against the person or
property of anyone else” (Rothbard 1973, p. 23; see also Friedman 1962;
Machan 2006). Egalitarian liberals have extended the scope of negative liberty
to include freedom from impersonal external restrictions such as diminutive
opportunities to participate in economic activity, or financial impoverishment.
“Real freedom” is not only amatter of “having the right to dowhat onemight
want to do, but also a matter of having the means to do it” (Van Parijs 1995,
p. 4; see also Rawls 1971; Dworkin 2000).
Positive liberty—or “freedom to”—can be defined in terms of the actions
that agents are able to perform, or the ends that they are able to realise by
virtue of exercising sovereignty. For one authoritative formulation (Fromm
1944), this approximates to “self-realisation”—the “realisation of man’s
[ . . . ] personality by the active expression of his emotional and intellectual
potentialities” (p. 222). Positive liberty rests on the notion of the “divided
self”—the argument that human agents are comprised of two selves; the
“lower self”—the empirical self of “passions, of unreflecting desires and
irrational impulses”; and the “higher self”—the rational reflecting self, cap-
able of moral action and self-direction (Carter 2012, p. 5). This emphasis on
the realisation of individual capacities has been highly characteristic of
Marxism which proposes a conception of the good life as one of unimpeded
autonomy—the “full and free actualisation and externalisation of the powers
and abilities of the individual” (Elster 1989, p. 131). The autonomous
development of agents in the present is circumscribed in a variety of ways,
each attributable to the asymmetries of wealth and power that pervade the
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capitalist mode of production. Although characteristic of socialist collectivist
accounts, we should note that positive liberty has been embraced by some
scholars of liberalism. Objectivism—a perfectionist variant of the natural
rights tradition—conceptualises liberty as “eudemonia”, a state of human
flourishing, of excellence, where the individual’s capacities have devel-
oped to the fullest possible extent (Rand 1967; Machan 2006). This
depends not on collective action to reduce asymmetries of wealth and
power, as Marxists suppose, but on voluntary exchange, where our
ideals are instantiated through self-driven engagement with the external
environment.
In certain respects, it could be argued that the distinction between
positive and negative liberty is misleading since freedom always
involves constraints, and actions that people wish to perform. In an
important contribution to the debate, MacCallum demonstrates that
liberty involves a “triadic relationship”, taking the form “x is (is not)
free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z” (1967, p. 34),
where:
x is the agent whose freedom is in question;
y is the restrictions that may impair freedom, whether internal of
external; and
z is the substance of liberty.
According to MacCallum’s argument, positive and negative liberty should
be thought of not as two entirely different approaches, but as incomplete
references to the same underlying conception of freedom. In reality,
“proponents of positive and negative freedom argue not over alternative
conceptions but only over the proper emphasis within one and the same
fundamental conception” (Goodin 1982, p. 152).
Liberal Justice
Though they may disagree on these important issues, all liberals converge
around the primacy of liberty, defined in terms of the capacity of agents to
deliberate and act in accordance with their sovereign preferences. Liberal
justice restricts the scope of governmental action to the measures that are
necessary to protect individual freedom, and no more. In re-affirming the
importance of “institutional neutrality”, Dworkin (2000) insists that
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political decisions—including those that might shape retirement—should
be “independent of any conception of the good life, or what gives value to
life” (p. 127). This means that ethical principles and values, such as egoism
and altruism, must be chosen by agents on the basis of their own delibera-
tive activity, not imposed by public officials. At the same time, liberal justice
requires the state to take an active role in distributing the resources that are
necessary to protect and sustain individual liberty. Any failure to distribute
such resources, in any way they might be defined, could result in substantial
restrictions on liberty, and would be incompatible with justice. In the words
of one prominent exponent of liberal political philosophy, the correct “role
of the state is to protect the capacity of individuals to judge for themselves
the worth of different conceptions of the good life, and to provide a fair
distribution of the rights and resources to enable people to pursue their
conception of the good life” (Kymlicka 2002, p. 218). Legal and political
institutions may be regarded as just to the extent that they give expression
to the principle of equal regard for the liberties of all citizens. In exploring
the relevance of liberal justice to appropriate pension scheme design, this
monograph adjudicates between several prominent approaches in the reper-
toire of liberal political philosophy.
Distinctive Liberalisms
The reasons for emphasising the importance of liberalism, rather than focuss-
ing on the broader repertoire of political philosophy should be clear. First,
liberal political philosophy has been marginal to the scholarly debate on
appropriate pension scheme design, particularly its normative founda-
tions. While utilitarians have articulated an extensive critique of public
pensions (Barry 1986), other variants of liberalism have largely ignored
matters of ageing and retirement. The social democratic “philosophers”
of social policy analysis, on the other hand, have generated a substantial
body of literature around the dynamics of inequality and disadvantage in
old age, as well as the design of retirement systems (Esping-Andersen
1990; Goodin et al. 1996). This means of course that the field is biased in
favour of a particular conception of “the good”—a vision of socially
engineered fraternity, coalescing around “other-regarding” values such
as altruism and equality. In addressing these biases, the monograph
broadens the debate on the dynamics of injustice. Rather than assuming
that all income differentials are an artefact of external economic forces, for
example, liberals maintain that agents can be responsible for their own
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circumstances, given just laws and institutional arrangements. The mono-
graph also sensitises readers to the “possibility” of diverse ends—reflect-
ing variation in people’s sovereign preferences—instead of assuming prior
agreement around any particular set of values, including the value of
retirement. In articulating these concerns, it draws consistently on the
insights of four perspectives, situated at different points across the ideo-
logical spectrum of liberal political philosophy.
It would be fair to say that perceptions of classical liberalism have been
mixed. For some observers, its roots can be traced back to the
Enlightenment, a period when scholars of political philosophy articulated
a direct frontal challenge to feudal systems of power and authority, wealth
and privilege (Van Parijs 1995; Kymlicka 2002). But for others, classical
liberalism should be regarded as a deeply conservative political project,
endorsing principles and policies that would intensify social and economic
inequalities. Informed by the precepts of “neoliberalism”, governments
have embarked on programmes of reform that have redistributed
resources and power away from civil society to the corporate sector,
intensifying inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth and oppor-
tunity (Glennerster and Midgley 1991; Deacon 2002). Putting these
external characterisations to one side, a closer inspection of the classical
liberal corpus (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Nozick 1974; Conway
1995; Machan 2006) would highlight distinctive deontological and con-
sequentialist doctrines, each articulating a trenchant critique of collecti-
vism, but very different visions of the role of government in realising
justice.
• Natural rights libertarianism. Libertarianism insists that all agents
have rights that can never be violated by other people, including
agents of the state (Nozick 1974; Kelly 1998; Machan 2006).
Everyone is entitled to exercise discretionary control around their
physical and psychological capacities, as well as any external objects
that have been acquired by legitimate means. State intrusion in eco-
nomic and social life is invariably coercive, and morally unacceptable.
In effect, this makes people responsible for their own retirement
futures by whatever means they deem appropriate, provided that this
does not involve coercion. That is, if they want to cease their involve-
ment in economic activity at all, for retirement can only be voluntary, a
lifestyle choice. The minimal state would refrain from the intrusive
regulation that is characteristic of modern retirement systems.
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• Utilitarianism. A second and perhaps more influential variant of
classical liberalism, utilitarianism rejects this emphasis on protecting
individual rights in favour of a focus on outcomes (Hayek 1960;
Friedman 1989; Conway 1995). While voluntary exchange is gen-
erally conducive to economic and technological development,
growth and prosperity, the market cannot be relied on to optimise
the production and distribution of goods and services, at least not
consistently. Market failure manifests in a variety of ways, but princi-
pally the defective decision making that arises when agents have too
much freedom. Emphasising the importance of financial well-being
and security, the state must protect liberty where the market is able
to augment welfare, but take action to circumscribe voluntary
exchange where it is not. This approach generally upholds a free
market in pensions, but endorses considerable state intrusion in the
retirement system.
Perceptions of egalitarian liberalism have also been mixed, manifesting in
at least two distinctive ways. For some, egalitarian liberals endorse a deeply
conservative political project, no different to “neoliberalism” in its aim to
confer economic and social advantages on corporate actors (Armstrong
2006). Egalitarian liberalism is dismissed as an ideological rationale for a
system of resource allocation that gives disproportionate benefits to the
wealthy and powerful. But for others, egalitarian liberalism should be
regarded as a collectivist political project, promoting a vision of “the
good” that is permissive with regard to tax-payer financed largesse and
public morality (Kekes 1997). Egalitarian liberals endorse measures to
generate substantial outcome equality, oblivious to the possibility of
adverse economic and moral consequences. In reality, a detailed inspec-
tion of the corpus of egalitarian liberalism would suggest that neither of
these negative characterisations is adequate. Like classical liberalism, its
exponents give priority to liberty, which enables people to define and
pursue their own conception of “the good”. But, unlike classical liberal-
ism, egalitarian liberals regard access to material resources as a precondi-
tion for individual freedom, and unregulated markets as creating barriers
to sovereign decision making. The egalitarian liberal rationale for govern-
mental action has been articulated in two prominent ways.
• Prioritarianism. The priority view recognises that liberty can be
circumscribed by a range of contingencies, including financial
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impoverishment (Rawls 1971; Kangas 2000; Costa 2011). In this
respect, Rawls (1971) makes the vital distinction between the
“scope” of liberty and its “worth”, an artefact of individual
capacities, and a function of access to resources and opportunities.
As well as protecting all agents against coercive intrusion by other
people, justice should give priority to the least advantaged by aug-
menting their resources and opportunities. To the limited extent that
they have engaged with ageing and retirement, Rawlsians typically
endorse a substantial role for the state in shaping the pension system.
• Luck egalitarianism. While it may accept some prioritarian insights,
luck egalitarianism is distinctive in vitally important ways (Van Parijs
1995; Dworkin 2000). Its exponents insist that redistributive
transfers should be directed only towards those whose capacities for
sovereign decision making have been impaired by circumstances
that are not of their choosing—or what might be thought of as
bad “brute luck”. This refers to internal obstacles to self-direc-
tion, including impaired rationality, and external barriers to
autonomy such as financial impoverishment. Once these basic
inequalities have been addressed, voluntary exchange should be
sufficient to expedite sovereign decision making. This approach
could involve the state substantially in the design and manage-
ment of pensions.
THE MONOGRAPH
Turning to the particular concerns of the monograph, our central aim is to
articulate and justify a distinctive liberal account of justice that can be
deployed to inform the design of pensions, or to evaluate existing retirement
systems. In approaching this task, we have drawn on and synthesised the
insights of two disciplinary traditions. Political philosophy is concerned
primarily with the legitimacy of economic and political institutions, particu-
larly their normative foundations (Miller 1999; Kymlicka 2002; Schmidtz
2005). According to one prominent political philosopher, the discipline
“tells us what we ought to think about justice” (Miller 1999, p. 32), by
engaging with, and evaluating the relevance of normative principles to
institutional design. Political philosophers have not characteristically been
concerned with developing concrete programmes of welfare reform that can
instantiate justice, and have therefore been subject to the criticism that their
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work has little relevance to the “real” world of policy making. In contrast,
social policy has been concerned with the dynamics of injustice—as manifest
in particular national jurisdictions—including the design, societal impact,
and sustainability of income transfer programmes (Titmuss 1974; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). In principle, this applied focus
has considerable relevance to those with responsibility for designing or
working in economic and political institutions, but is vulnerable to the
objection that it lacks a critical or coherent normative rationale. According
to Miller, this omission reflects a tendency to “bracket off the question of
what justice really is”, and to investigate “justice beliefs and justice behaviour
without the theoretical presuppositions” (1999, p. 43). Our analysis in the
following chapters reflects the assumption that an adequate account of just
pension design must draw on the strengths of both traditions. If it is to
articulate elements of design that are compatible with justice, social policy
requires an appropriate normative theory. But if it is to generate principles
that can—reliably and sustainably—be instantiated by reformers, political
philosophy requires a concrete understanding of the dynamics of injustice.
These challenges are addressed by the monograph in the following ways.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the relevance of need to pension design.
Defined in terms of the minimum threshold of resources or opportunities
that are necessary for agents to function optimally in a social context
(Doyal and Gough 1991; Schmidtz 2005), need is widely regarded as the
responsibility of the retirement income safety-net (World Bank 1994;
Dixon 1999; Hyde et al. 2006). Our analysis starts by highlighting the
normative foundations of the needs-focussed first pillar pension arrange-
ment. Although libertarianism acknowledges the importance of collec-
tive action to address extremes of disadvantage (Conway 1995; Kelly
1998; Machan 2006), the efficacy of libertarian justice as a means of
addressing unmet need is limited by its reliance on voluntary exchange.
While financial impoverishment is universally disadvantageous, philan-
thropic and charitable effort have proven to be uneven, and have failed to
address unsatisfied need in an equitable way. Utilitarianism justifies the
importance of liberty in terms of its role in generating and diffusing the
benefits of economic prosperity (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962).
Moreover, their emphasis on the primacy of outcomes9 would suggest
that utilitarians are tolerant of statutory measures to aid the least advan-
taged, particularly means-tested social assistance. Yet utilitarianism is
flawed in its assumption that a free market in pensions will optimise the
economic circumstances of retirees, including the poorest. And, for a
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variety of reasons, residual safety-net transfers are one of the least effec-
tive means of targeting poverty relief. Though acknowledging the role of
morally arbitrary contingencies10 in shaping patterns of disadvantage in
old age, Rawls’ account of justice is limited by its failure to articulate a
concept of need that could resonate with policy makers and the public at
large (Doyal and Gough 1991). We find that luck egalitarians have
articulated such a concept, endorsing governmental action to augment
the circumstances of the least advantaged. Reflecting these normative
foundations, Chapter 2 evaluates several approaches to the design of the
first pillar social security safety-net. Though it might seem to waste scarce
fiscal resources, a “universal citizen’s pension” is judged to be the most
effective means of targeting poverty in retirement (Van Parijs 1995;
Hyde and Dixon 2009).
Chapter 3 is concerned with the relevance of the desert principle to the
design of retirement systems, particularly the second pillar pension
arrangement. Defined in terms of the degree of correspondence—or
“fittingness”—between differentials of economic activity and financial
remuneration (Miller 1999; Olsaretti 2004), desert is widely regarded as
the defining moral impetus of work-related retirement schemes, which
redistribute each worker’s earnings horizontally across the lifecourse
(Hyde and Dixon 2009). Where it regards desert as a cardinal virtue
(Rand 1967; Smith 2006), libertarian justice is rendered problematic by
its emphasis on the efficacy of voluntary exchange. Before their perfor-
mance can be appraised, desert requires each agent to exercise responsi-
bility for their actions, but the “free” market generates extremes of wealth
and disadvantage that make distributive outcomes dependent on circum-
stantial luck. This applies in equal measure to utilitarian exponents of
voluntary exchange, who fail to acknowledge the role of the market in
circumscribing opportunity and well-being. In spite of his emphasis on the
importance of individual sovereignty, Rawls’ analysis is limited by its
dismissal of “agent-responsibility”, and the very possibility of desert.
Along with others (Sher 1987; Miller 1999), we believe that Rawls over-
states the role of native endowments as a source of arbitrariness in the
distribution of opportunities and rewards. Unlike these variants of liberal-
ism, luck egalitarianism acknowledges both the possibility of agent-
responsibility, and the beneficial role of the state in arranging institutions
to ensure that deserts are rewarded, reliably and consistently. Building on
this discussion of normative foundations, Chapter 3 evaluates several
models of second pillar retirement provision. Our analysis finds that an
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appropriately crafted “defined benefit” pension scheme11 is most likely to
satisfy the requirements of the desert principle.
Chapter 4 addresses the relevance of universal human capacities for sover-
eign decision making to the design of just pensions. Defined in terms of
governmental action to impose binding rights or duties (Rawls 1971;
Kymlicka 2002), citizenship is arguably the responsibility of the retirement
system as a whole. Our analysis finds that libertarianism endorses an arbitrary
selection of the public transfers that can make citizenship a reality. While
insisting on the importance of “negative rights” to justice, libertarians reject
outright the notion of “positive rights” to redistributive income transfers
(Kelly 1998; Machan 2006). The repertoire of governmental action to
instantiate citizenship is exhausted by its role in enforcing the rule of law.
While utilitarianism permits the state to be actively involved in directing
economic affairs, this role is not articulated as a function of citizenship, and
does not give rise to constitutionally binding entitlements. Reflecting their
ideational roots in utilitarian political philosophy, “liberal” retirement systems
are characteristically less-than-inclusive (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein
and Uslaner 2005). Prioritarians address this issue directly by highlighting
the vital importance of compulsory redistributive measures to ensure that all
citizens can access “primary goods”,12 but tend to over-emphasise the role of
collective decision making in determining the substance of governmental
action (Rawls 1971, 2003). Looking beneath the rhetoric of universal suf-
frage, the liberal democratic polity is suffused with untrammelled self-interest,
which intensifies political rent-seeking (Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). Luck
egalitarians address these issues by emphasising the role of individuals in
crafting their own lives, and the role of the state in ensuring that this is
possible. Reflecting several of these insights, Chapter 4 highlights a range of
pension design features that would augment individual capacities for sovereign
decision making around work and retirement.
Chapter 5 concludes the monograph by asserting the distinctiveness and
importance of the liberal justice to the design of retirement systems. As we
shall see, our understanding of the “liberal” approach to retirement and
pensions is fundamentally different to the mischaracterisations that are so
prevalent in the literature of social policy analysis. We also note that the
critics typically endorse perspectives that are dismissive of individual free-
dom. Taken together, these observations reinforce the case for institutional
neutrality regarding rival conceptions of “the good”. If justice is to be
served, governmental action should be restricted to the measures that are
necessary to protect individual sovereignty around work and retirement.
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NOTES
1. The consequentialist mainstream of classical liberal economics, for example,
tends to criticise the welfare state on the grounds that it is financially
unsustainable, increasingly incapable of supporting people in their old age
(Tanner 2004; Booth and Niemietz 2014). Collectivists have rejected this
negative appraisal, arguing that the issue of financial support for older
people is merely one of political will. As a society, do we put people before
private gain? The state has the power and authority to make this a reality,
what it lacks is the commitment—or so we are told (Ginn 2004; Ghilarducci
2008).
2. But see a special edition of the Journal of European Social Policy, particu-
larly the lead article by Schokkaert and Van Parijs (2003), which develops
and applies an egalitarian liberal theory of distributive justice to pension
reform. Sunstein and Thaler’s seminal work on “libertarian paternalism”
(2003) makes the case for automatic enrolment in terms of liberty, which
has become increasingly prominent in public debate around pension
reform. Kelly (1998) develops a compelling set of arguments in favour of
laissez faire—premised on natural rights—while Barry (1986) argues the
case for limited state intrusion in retirement planning on utilitarian
grounds.
3. One of the best scholarly works on the instantiation of normative principles
through pension design has been Shapiro’s 2007 monograph, although it is
limited by its emphasis on egalitarian principles, and defined contribution
pensions. Esping-Andersen (1990) discusses different approaches to the
design of retirement schemes, but his exposition fails to consider private
pension schemes in sufficient detail. Perhaps the most thorough treatment of
pension scheme design is Dixon’s cross-national comparative analysis of retire-
ment provision (1999), but it is largely devoid of philosophical content. Our
own work in this area has of course been ongoing (Hyde et al. 2006, 2007;
Hyde and Dixon 2009), including two Special Editions of the Journal of
International & Comparative Social Policy (2009, 25/2; 2012, 28/2).
4. Where people’s economic fortunes depend substantially on their capacity to
generate preferential treatment by the state at the expense of their fellow
citizens (Tullock 1976).
5. Or at least those that existed for much of the twentieth century. Several
Northern European countries have introduced compulsory fully funded
pensions, which are anathema to the mainstream of social policy analysis
(Hyde et al. 2006).
6. Following Rawls (1971), we may define “the good” as an “ordered family of
final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is of value
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in human life, or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life”
(Rawls 2003, p. 19).
7. Though we should acknowledge that “anarcho-capitalists” reject any role
for the state in public life (Rothbard 1973; Friedman 1989). Public officials
and political leaders cannot be trusted to take appropriate action in pursuit
of justice, only their own immediate interests. The business of protecting
liberty should be left to the market.
8. That is, pre-political society.
9. Which means of course that it does not endorse the “primacy” of liberty,
merely its pivotal importance.
10. Factors that agents cannot control through their own effort, such as unequal
starting points, prejudice, discrimination and differences of natural ability.
11. Defined benefit pensions confer retirement income security by giving plan
participants a “promise” of entitlements in the future (Hyde and Borzutzky
2016).
12. The resources and opportunities that are necessary for people to define and
pursue their own conception of “the good” (Rawls 1971; Kymlicka 2002).
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CHAPTER 2
Need and Just Pension Design
Abstract Inevitably, there has been considerable disagreement around
the means by which unsatisfied need should be addressed. Classical liberals
insist that such action should be voluntary, confined only to philanthropic
and charitable effort. But egalitarian liberals are highly tolerant of state
involvement in directing ameliorative transfers to those at the bottom of
society. Accepting the principle of compulsory collective responsibility for
the worst-off, our analysis evaluates several models for the design of the
first pillar retirement income safety-net. Selective social security pro-
grammes target financial assistance on the poor, but are blighted by low
take-up and parsimonious benefit entitlements. While they appear to waste
scarce resources, universal first pillar pensions maximise the flow and
generosity of transfers to the least advantaged.
Keywords Need  Financial impoverishment  Retirement income safety-
net  Selectivism  Universalism  Universal citizen’s pension
INTRODUCTION
More than any other principle of justice, need is associated in the public
mind with the development and consolidation of the modern welfare state
(Forma and Kangas 1999; Bode 2007). Following others (Doyal and
Gough 1991; Hyde and Dixon 2009), need can be defined for the
purposes of our analysis of pension design in terms of the “minimum
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threshold” of resources and opportunities that are necessary for agents to
function optimally in a social context. For a range of influential commen-
taries, the propriety of need as an element of justice rests on the claim that
social organisation embodies a sense of the minimum “standards that an
adequate human life must meet”. As a matter of justice, each member of
society is “expected to contribute to relieving the needs of others in
proportion to ability” (Miller 1999, p. 27). Consistent with our focus
on the distribution of retirement income, this chapter is concerned with
the challenge of addressing financial impoverishment in old age.
While need is widely regarded as a cornerstone of retirement systems,
its status as a moral justification for claims on the societal distribution of
resources has been vigorously disputed (Nevitt 1977; Plant et al. 1980;
Doyal and Gough 1991). As we shall see, classical liberals reject need on a
variety of grounds, but particularly the foundational argument that the
imposition of compulsory income transfer programmes violates people’s
rights to non-interference. Libertarianism rests on the contentious asser-
tion that only the minimal state can protect people against coercive intru-
sion, and allow them to live their lives according to their sovereign
preferences (Nozick 1974; Machan 2006). In direct contrast, egalitarian
liberals insist that financial impoverishment is integral to the circumstances
that can impair individual capacities for sovereign decision making.
Voluntary exchange is the essence of individual freedom, but laissez faire
is unable to optimise the supply of appropriate needs-satisfiers. The reality
of “market failure” justifies an active role for the state in arranging satis-
factory income transfers to the least advantaged (Rawls 1971; Dworkin
2000). Yet beneath these public differences, both approaches seem to
concur that extremes of economic disadvantage are morally unacceptable.
The question is, how, and to what extent, should the state be involved in
designing and instituting redistributive income transfers. Chapter 2
addresses this question in two ways.
1. First, we highlight the distinctive ways in which liberals of different
ideological hues have approached the problem of extremes of eco-
nomic disadvantage—particularly financial impoverishment in old
age—and the legitimate scope of governmental action to sustain
retirement income security.
2. Second, we tease out the implications of this excursion into political
philosophy for the design of pensions, particularly the first pillar
retirement income safety-net. There are those who insist that need
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is irrelevant to such deliberation, since it generates public policy
initiatives that are incompatible with liberty, the core value of liber-
alism (Rand 1967; Machan 2006). Others maintain that extremes of
disadvantage constrain freedom in unacceptable ways, and must be
addressed through ameliorative governmental action (Rawls 1971;
Van Parijs 1995).
For a variety of reasons, our analysis concurs with the principle of
compulsory collective responsibility for the well-being of the least
advantaged, stewarded by the state. The failure of laissez faire to
optimise the satisfaction of unmet need gives a powerful justification
for public involvement in arranging the first pillar retirement income
safety-net.
APPROPRIATE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
The broad understanding of need that is deployed in this chapter refers to
the adequacy of each agent’s financial resources—where “adequacy”
denotes an income that is sufficient to realise a minimally satisfactory
quality of life. We should note that much of the literature in the field is
concerned with the status of need as a satisfactory descriptor of “objec-
tive” human characteristics that manifest in universally determinate ways.
Some have denied this very possibility, portraying need as a discursive
phenomenon that reflects the particular circumstances or preferences of
different groups or individuals (Nevitt 1977; Walzer 1983). Inevitably,
any characterisation of need as “relative” would complicate the possibility
of agreement on the substance of appropriate needs-satisfiers. Others have
insisted that “basic human needs can be shown to exist” in ways that could
be regarded as objective and universal, and “that individuals have the right
to the optimal satisfaction of these needs” (Doyal and Gough 1991, p. 2).
Our own position with regard to this important debate is largely shaped by
our focus on the efficacy of pension arrangements. The consolidation of
retirement systems should generally be regarded as are an artefact of
industrialisation, which creates the possibility of the “surplus” that
would enable people to subsist after disengaging from economic activity.
By extension, the consequences of irregular or insufficient income in
retirement are universally negative, manifesting as diminished choice,
impaired access to goods and services and, ultimately, a lower quality of
life. Naturally, our focus on liberalism suggests that “quality of life”
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should be understood in terms of individual capacities for sovereign
decision making.
Considered superficially, it would be difficult to discern a unified liberal
position regarding the concept of need, or appropriate governmental
responses to financial impoverishment. Still less is it possible to identify a
common liberal understanding of financial disadvantage in old age. To the
limited extent that liberal political philosophy has even considered the
importance of retirement and pensions, its exponents have endorsed
divergent themes and perspectives on the causation of income deprivation,
and the nature of the ameliorative action that is required for justice (Kelly
1998; Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003; Shapiro 2007). Yet a more careful
appraisal of the literature reveals a deep attachment to the belief that the
economic plight of the worst-off in society is objectionable, and requires a
considered response.
Classical Liberalism
Even a superficial glance at the vast literature of classical liberalism would
highlight substantial disagreement around the legitimate scope of govern-
mental action to addressfinancial impoverishment.Unlikemany other public
philosophies, natural rights libertarianism rejects the very idea of state
intrusion to aid the economically disadvantaged, including those who have
disengaged from work on the grounds of retirement (Nozick 1974; Kelly
1998; Machan 2006). As its designation suggests, libertarian justice requires
the state to treat people in accordance with their “nature”, which is indicated
by universal capacities for self-directed action (Rand 1967; Rasmussen and
Den Uyl 2005). Self-ownership rights give all agents absolute discretionary
control over salient attributes of “the self”, particularly capacities for con-
scious deliberation, and purposive engagement with the external environ-
ment. Similarly, but with a more specific focus, property rights give people
the same authority around any external objects that have been acquired by
legitimatemeans—principally“voluntary exchange”, or transfers that involve
consent. Considered in this context, the right to save for retirement is simply
an extension of property rights in earnings (Kelly 1998; Skoble 2005).
Crucially for the focus of this chapter, liberty takes priority over all
other concerns, including the possibility of financial impoverishment in
old age. The requirements of justice are satisfied by the “minimal
state”, responsible only for enforcing the constitutional rights that
give protection against coercion (Nozick 1974; Machan 2006).
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Libertarians reject any role for government in addressing the unsatis-
fied needs of the least advantaged in favour of voluntary exchange and
self-provisioning. The primacy of liberty suggests that all agents should
be regarded as the sole architects of their own lives, with sole respon-
sibility for their financial futures. In giving expression to this ethos of
personal independence, justice is intended only to protect the “possi-
bility” of self-sustaining action, not to secure any particular outcomes
(Kelly 1998; Machan 2006). Given these premises, it would not be
surprising to learn that libertarians are highly sceptical about the wel-
fare state, an arrangement that supplants voluntary individual with
compulsory collective responsibility. Consider how the social insurance
schemes that are typical of publicly managed retirement systems oper-
ate: “you do not choose whether to participate; you have no say in
how the money is to be invested; and you cannot withdraw in response
to poor performance” (Skoble 2005, p. 9). “The welfare state
diminishes individual capacities by fostering passive dependence on
the effort of others, while libertarian justice gives everyone the right
to learn prudential savings and investment habits” (Skoble 2005, p. 9).
At this point, we should note that libertarianism is characterised by an
apparent ambivalence regarding extremes of economic disadvantage. Like
liberalism in general, libertarians regard the moral repertoire of “the
good” as a private matter, subject only to each agents’ sovereign prefer-
ences and values. Some have interpreted this stance as demonstrating a
callous indifference to the circumstances of those at the bottom of society
(Olsaretti 2004; Armstrong 2006). The possibility of voluntary exchange
trumps all other concerns, including the adversity of financial impoverish-
ment. Yet it is clear that the burgeoning literature of libertarianism is
suffused with the conviction that extremes of disadvantage are morally
unacceptable, particularly involuntarily incurred dis-welfares (Kelly 1998;
Shapiro 2007). This concern differs from the compulsory altruism of
socialist-collectivism in its insistence that aid to the least advantaged
should be directed through charitable and philanthropic effort. By dis-
criminating in favour the involuntarily impoverished, and those who are
able to demonstrate habits of thrift and self-reliance, voluntary collective
aid is conducive to the sense of personal responsibility that is at the heart of
self-ownership.
While these arguments have been articulated persuasively and
cogently, can we really be this confident in the efficacy of voluntary
exchange and individualism? Several concerns might suggest that the
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answer is negative. For a start, some agents may find themselves in a
position where their disadvantage is so overwhelming that it creates
insurmountable barriers to the possibility of self-provisioning, even
where they are consistently and sufficiently motivated to pursue a better
life (Olsaretti 2004). There is little evidence to suggest that the scale of
philanthropic effort under laissez faire would be sufficient to fill the
void created by the dissolution of the welfare state (Heelas and Morris
1992). And, even if voluntary aid could maximise the aggregate flow of
resources to the least advantaged, it cannot do so in ways that are
compatible with the principle of need. Financial impoverishment is
universally disadvantageous, yet philanthropic effort is likely to be
patchy and uneven, reflecting problems of insufficient coordination,
bias, and inconsistency of treatment—a possibility acknowledged by
the libertarian critique of privately administered criminal justice systems
(Nozick 1974; Machan 2006), but conveniently ignored in other con-
texts. Though voluntary exchange is vital to libertarian justice, it may
prove insufficient for the liberty of those at the bottom of society.
A second strand of classical liberalism has articulated the case for liberty
through the lens of utilitarianism, for the propriety of any system of justice
would be questionable if it didn’t routinely optimise people’s well-being
(Friedman 1962; Friedman 1989; Conway 1995). Economic and political
institutions should be evaluated and endorsed only in terms of their con-
sequences for welfare, not their capacity to give protection against coercion.
Characteristically endorsed by political elites as an instrument of distributive
justice, statutory income transfer programmes of the kind that are so pre-
valent in Continental Europe represent the least effective means of addres-
sing economic disadvantage. Several elements of defective design impair the
retirement prospects of all workers, intensifying the risk of poverty after they
have disengaged from economic activity.
• Insufficient benefits. The diminutive performance of statutory social
insurance is accentuated by its peculiar method of financing—“pay-
as-you-go” (PAYG), as highlighted in Chapter 3. Unlike the fully
funded retirement schemes that are typical of private pension mar-
kets, benefit entitlements in a social insurance scheme are deter-
mined politically, and are financed by means of compulsory payroll
taxes. Persuasive research suggests that welfare state provision has
become increasingly unsustainable, incapable of meeting its obliga-
tions to workers in the future (World Bank 1994; Friedman 2004).
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• Impaired flexibility. The sheer scale of coercive intrusion that is
required to sustain the welfare state has drastically impaired liberty,
the single most important driver of economic growth and prosperity
(Conway 1995; Friedman 2004). Rather than permitting choice
from a range of supply-side actors, offering meaningful variation of
pricing and performance, workers are assigned to a public monopoly
which provides no opportunities for sovereign decision making.
• Opportunity cost. Inevitably, the consolidation of large public mono-
polies in retirement provision has stifled the emergence of the volun-
tary alternatives that would optimise welfare. Commenting on this
issue several decades ago, Hayek warned, “when we commit our-
selves to a single comprehensive organisation because its immediate
coverage is greater, we may well prevent the evolution of other
organisations whose eventual contribution to welfare might have
been greater” (1960, p. 250).
Overwhelmingly, classical liberal exponents of utilitarianism insist that
liberty—defined only as the absence of coercion—maximises economic
and social welfare, in aggregate, and for groups such as the least advantaged
(Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Conway 1995). Negative rights must be
prioritised, not because they are consistent with universal attributes of
human nature—which are regarded as highly improbable—but because
their enforcement sustains the institutions that are able to maximise welfare.
But, at the same time, this emphasis on the importance of outcomes
suggests that liberty may be sacrificed where this would yield greater utility.
In this respect, classical liberal economists have long recognised the possi-
bility of goods or services that are vital for compelling practical reasons, but
which will not be supplied in sufficient quantities by the market because of
their salient characteristics: “non-rivalry”—one person’s consumption is not
affected by another’s; and “non-excludability”—no one can be prevented
from consuming the good, even if they haven’t paid for it, and “there is a
temptation for everybody to become free riders” (Barry 2004, p. 13). In a
much cited passage of his prominent defence of capitalism, Friedman
(1962) highlights compelling grounds for regarding poverty relief as a
public good.
I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am equally benefitted by its
alleviation; but I am benefitted equally whether I or someone else pays for
its alleviation; the benefits of other people’s charity accrue to me. To put it
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differently, we might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of
poverty, providing everybody else did (1962, p. 87).
Articulated in this way, the value of poverty relief as a public good is
psychological, eliminating the discomfort that people would feel when in
close proximity to the least advantaged. In contrast, Hayek (1960) high-
lights the importance of poverty relief by focussing on the protection it gives
against the desperate acts of the financially impoverished, as they struggle to
survive with their meagre resources. For both accounts, the “residual”
welfare state can make such protection a reality, providing a targeted retire-
ment income safety-net that is sufficiently generous to meet basic needs, but
not so generous that it will undermine work or savings effort (Hayek 1960;
Friedman 1962; Murray 2006).
When considered in terms of our focus here on need, this distinctive
juxtaposition of public and private action has several advantages over the
minimal state. As well as seeking to preserve voluntary exchange—historically,
the most reliable means of securing economic and technological development
(Frankel Paul et al. 2003)—classical liberal exponents of utilitarianism endorse
purposive and coordinated governmental action to address income depriva-
tion. Most accept the proposition that the free market system minimises the
prevalence and intensity of unmet need in retirement. Yet this utilitarian vision
is contradicted by the reality of substantial reservoirs of economic insecurity
and financial impoverishment in retirement. Rather than lifting all boats in a
rising tide of opulence, the free market system intensifies the risk of income
deprivation for some. The evidence of cross-national comparative welfare state
research is clear, ranking fully funded pensions as the least effective means of
sustaining retirement income security. And, instead of maximising the flow of
redistributive transfers to the least advantaged, the residual welfare state
accentuates their economic marginality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and
Palme 1998; Ginn 2004). This distinctive classical liberal endorsement of
collective responsibility for needs satisfaction has proven to be insufficient.
Egalitarian Liberalism
A glance at the literature of egalitarian liberalism would similarly highlight
considerable disagreement around the substance of need, and the role of
the state as arbiter of justice. As well as endorsing governmental action to
protect everyone against coercion, prioritarians have articulated powerful
arguments for compulsory redistributive transfers to those at the bottom
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of society (Rawls 1971, 2003; Kangas 2000; Costa 2011). Consistent
with liberalism in general, Rawls’ exposition of “justice as fairness” rests
on the primacy of liberty, which gives all agents the opportunity to frame
and act on their own conception of “the good”. Much like classical
liberalism, Rawls’ analysis defines freedom negatively as the absence of
coercive intrusion by other people. While this enormously influential
contribution to the debate does not refer explicitly to the concept of
need, its normative impetus is reflected in the vital distinction between
the scope of liberty—as indicated by the “action spaces” that remain
once the possibility of coercion has been taken care of—and its “worth”,
a “measure that depends both on the ability that a citizen has to make use
of that liberty, and on the degree to which the exercise of that liberty is
useful or essential to the realisation of that citizen’s plan of life” (Costa
2011, p. 75). The worth of liberty, in turn, is an artefact of each agent’s
access to “primary goods”,1 a range of resources and opportunities that
are vital to their pursuit of “the good”. Inevitably, says Rawls, those who
lack any or all of these “all-purpose means” are less likely than others to
realise the outcomes and achievements that are embedded in their life-
plans, though there may be no discernible differences in the scope of
liberty. While Rawls claims neutrality between capitalism and socialism,
his analysis is clear that voluntary exchange generates distributive out-
comes that circumscribe the worth of liberty, particularly extremes of
financial impoverishment. Justice requires measures to address unsatis-
fied need, this much is clear, but how should their substance be deter-
mined, and what would they look like?
Rawls approaches this in several ways, though his distinctive variant of
the contractarian method has arguably been the most prominent. The
legal and institutional architecture of justice are derived from a hypothe-
tical contract involving agents who are deprived of information about their
salient economic and social characteristics, creating a degree of uncertainty
about the future. Behind the “veil of ignorance”, people are invited to
“choose together in one joint act the principles that are [to be] used to
assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social
benefits” (Rawls 1971, p. 11). According to this analysis, rational delib-
erators in the “original position” will concur on the importance of three
principles of justice.
1. Equal basic liberties. Above all, justice requires laws, constitutional
rights, and institutional arrangements to protect individual
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freedom. The priority assigned to liberty behind the veil of ignor-
ance is an artefact of people’s “concern to protect their freedom to
choose, change and pursue their own conception of the good”
(Mulhall and Swift 1992, p. 8).
2a. Fair equality of opportunity. Access to opportunities that confer
disproportionate benefits must be open to all “under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 2003, p. 42). This require-
ment derives from concern generated by the possibility that people
might turn out to have economically valued capacities.
2b. The difference principle. Inequalities of advantage are acceptable
only to the extent that they are able to maximise the resources of
the worst-off in society. Knowing that their fates are uncertain,
deliberators behind the veil of ignorance will seek to ensure that
their circumstances are as good as they can be, even if they end up
at the bottom.
The lexicographical ordering of these principles might seem to contradict
the implicit emphasis of justice on addressing unsatisfied needs. Rawls gives
priority to liberty, which can never be sacrificed for any other end—including
improved benefits for the least advantaged—yet the redistributive impetus of
the difference principle would seem to belong to a class of measures that are
inherently coercive. This apparent conflict between principles one and two
becomes less salient if we turn to consider the distinctive way that freedom is
framed. Where classical liberals conceptualise liberty generally as the possi-
bility of voluntary exchange, Rawls presents uswith a list of designated “basic
liberties”, including the right to “personal property”. The imposition of a
parsimonious definition of property rights diminishes the possibility of con-
flict between the demands of negative liberty, and the taxation that is
required to finance redistributive transfers.
Though some regard this variant of prioritarian justice as ultimately
compelling (Kangas 2000; Costa 2011), there are lingering doubts about
its efficacy as a means of addressing unsatisfied need. Doyal and Gough
(1991) insist that Rawls has little to say about the specific nature of the
relationship between primary goods and individual welfare, nor is there any
attempt to “get behind his general redistributive rules to determine the
typical needs that are visible in modern societies” (Barry 1998, p. 88).
Arguably, this imposes an unacceptable degree of ignorance on those who
are required to endorse distributive justice, on whose decision making
much depends (Doyal and Gough 1991). Participants in the original
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position might, for example, be tempted “to gamble their futures in the
hope that they will be among the better off”, instead of endorsing the
difference principle. If they are to be clear “that their best interests will be
served no matter where they find themselves”, they must be able to “define
‘best interest’ in relation to the optimal health and autonomy which they
will require to compete fairly, or cooperate with those who have been more
fortunate” (Doyal and Gough 1991, pp. 131–132). In the real world, of
course, the failure to articulate a meaningful concept of need may under-
mine the willingness of taxpayers to finance the statutory services and
income transfers upon which the least advantaged depend. It has been
argued further that the relevance of Rawls’ account to the applied focus of
policy design is limited by salient ambiguities. In a trenchant critique of the
egalitarian liberal tradition, Armstrong maintains that the “difference prin-
ciple can only be safely discussed at a very high level of generality, and that
while it gives some shape to a broad intuition, it does not provide enough
shape to securely generate a specific policy programme” (Armstrong 2006,
p. 35). In a similar vein, others believe that the notion of the “least
advantaged” is not sufficiently determinate to enable governmental actors
to develop appropriate needs satisfiers. Who are they, and which of their
circumstances require remedial governmental action? In a seminal contri-
bution to the debate, Ronald Dworkin has justifiably declared that “the
concept of the worst-off group is too malleable to generate any detailed
welfare scheme” (2000, p. 330).
This challenge has been taken up by luck egalitarianism, a variant of
liberalism that regards unsatisfied need as an artefact of adverse circum-
stances that are beyond each agent’s conscious control (Van Parijs 1995;
Dworkin 2000). A prominent exponent of this variant of liberalism, Van
Parijs (1995) defines liberty as “real freedom”, which should be distin-
guished from “formal freedom”, which can:
can only be restricted by coercion, broadly understood as the (threat of a)
violation of a person’s rights, her ownership of herself included. But real
freedom can be further restricted by any limit to what a person is permitted
or enabled to do. Both a person’s purchasing power and a person’s genetic
set-up, for example, are directly relevant to a person’s real freedom. (Van
Parijs 2000, p. 4)
Unlike formal freedom, which requires the right to exercise sovereignty,
real freedom designates and requires the means to do it. Thus defined,
NEED AND JUST PENSION DESIGN 37
liberty can be circumscribed in several ways, resulting in unsatisfied need
(Van Parijs 1995, 2000).
One is diminished opportunities for involvement in economic activity,
the means by which most people are able to generate the financial
resources that are necessary for liberty. Even if agents can exercise choice
around the acquisition of skills and capacities, their opportunities to
deploy them can be curtailed by a lack of sufficient and suitable work.
Van Parijs (1995, 2000) rejects the argument that free labour markets
clear at full employment. In the real world of economic development, the
absence of perfect competition creates joblessness and under-employment,
depriving people of the opportunity to sustain themselves. Furthermore,
this departure from the market-clearing ideal enables those in work to
generate “employment rents”—above market earnings—at the expense of
the unemployed.
Echoing Rawls (1971, 2003), a second way in which real freedom can
be diminished is where individual capacities are impaired by diminutive
native endowments. In this respect, we might note that people are not:
unequally equipped or equally under-equipped by the lottery of nature.
Some people are healthy and athletic and others are sickly; some are very
intelligent [ . . . ] and others are slow-witted; some are highly sexually attrac-
tive and others are even repulsive; some enjoy impeccable functioning of
their bodies while others suffer serious impediments.
Van Parijs (1995, 2000) is clear that agents whose social functioning is
impaired by some “disability” will enjoy fewer opportunities to exercise
liberty than others. Articulated in this way, unsatisfied need should be
regarded as a matter of injustice, requiring “targeted” statutory income
transfer programmes.
But the more substantial reform proposed by this seminal contribution is
the introduction of a universal basic income—an income paid by the state to
citizens irrespective of their employment status, their income or wealth, and
their cohabitation arrangements. Unlike many existing social security pro-
grammes, the rationale for this proposal is not the amelioration of poverty as
a means of sustaining social cohesion. The principal aim for its liberal
architects is to address the possibility of unsatisfied need, which can be
thought of as a lack of resources that are necessary to exercise sovereignty
around “the good”. The “real freedom” that we are concerned with here is
“not only the freedom to purchase or consume. It is the freedom to live as
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one might want to live” (Van Parijs 2000, p. 30), however this might be
defined, and subject only to the legitimate claims of others. Where we are
concerned about realising real freedom, “what we have to go for is the
highest unconditional income for all consistent with security and self-own-
ership” (Van Parijs 2000, p. 33). This emphasis on the deployment of
governmental action to address the possibility of impaired capacities and
opportunities is revisited in the development of our rationale for the reform
of the retirement income safety-net, a matter to which we now turn.
APPROPRIATE PENSION DESIGN
How might these reflections around appropriate normative foundations
translate into requirements for the design of just pensions? Given its focus
on financial impoverishment, the first pillar of the retirement system is
widely regarded as the appropriate administrative locus of collective action
to address unsatisfied need (Dixon 1999; Hyde et al. 2006; Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016). In spite of significant variation in their institutional
architecture, all social security safety-nets are designed in some way to
sustain a minimum threshold of financial well-being in old age. In evalu-
ating the performance of such arrangements, Esping-Andersen (1990,
pp. 47–54) highlights the importance of two concerns.
• Access. This refers to the rules and procedures that determine access
to retirement benefits. Social security schemes are acceptable to the
extent that their design permits “ease of access”.
• Adequacy. This is concerned with the generosity of first pillar retire-
ment benefits. Social security programmes are acceptable to the
extent that the benefits they are responsible for distributing corre-
spond to some justifiable notion of income “adequacy”.
Both concerns may usefully be illustrated with reference to the debate
around the efficacy of two broad approaches to the design of the social
security safety-net.
A Selective Welfare State?
The selectivist case for social security reform is directed by the conviction
that financial impoverishment requires vertical income redistribution in a
targeted income transfer programme (Hayek 1960; World Bank 1994;
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Shapiro 2007). Arguably the most prevalent variant, targeted social assis-
tance (TSA) is financed from general taxation, paying benefits to those
who are first able to demonstrate unsatisfied need. Its exponents insist that
TSA has at least two advantages over rival and more inclusive approaches
to the design of the retirement income safety-net.
• Efficiency of targeting. TSA makes the best use of scarce fiscal
resources by restricting financial assistance to households below a
designated income threshold—arguably those who need it the most.
Such targeting is made possible by means-testing, where household
income is evaluated by social security administrators.
• Internal coherence. Unlike statutory social insurance (see below),
which graduates benefits according to prior contributions, access to
transfers in a TSA scheme is a function of need only. This internal
coherence makes it possible to graduate benefits in accordance with
the intensity of financial impoverishment.
Taken together, these arguments seem to suggest that TSA is the most
effective means of ameliorating poverty in old age. And yet looking
beneath the surface of this rhetoric, the evidence around existing TSA
schemes highlights several salient flaws, each detracting from their effec-
tiveness as a means of addressing financial impoverishment. Alcock (1985)
regards “stigma”—a loss of self-respect and personal dignity—as the
inevitable consequence of means-testing, an arrangement suffused with
the suspicion that people who do not need benefits are somehow mana-
ging to get them. Stigma is associated with “non-take-up”, because
“ignorance, fear, and in some cases, pride mean that many who are
entitled to benefits do not claim them” (Alcock 1985, p. 31). At the
same time, its emphasis on targeting means that TSA commands little
public support, and retirement benefits are likely to be parsimonious
(Walker 1993; Hyde and Dixon 2009).
Alternatively, the World Bank (1994) has endorsed the minimum
pension guarantee (MPG), a form of means-tested statutory income trans-
fer programme that could only work effectively alongside a mandatory
second pillar pension arrangement—particularly a fully funded private
pension. If income from the contributory scheme is below a state-desig-
nated standard of living, the publicly managed MPG transfers the differ-
ence to retirees. In effect, this involves an “automatic means-test”, based
on records maintained by the public authority responsible for supervising
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the mandatory second pillar, where the only means tested are those that
are derived from other pension income. In addition to expediting take-up,
this approach seems to address the perverse incentives that are typically
associated with selective income transfer programmes. In theory at least, it
eliminates some of the negative effects on “saving, since saving is manda-
tory [ . . . ] and it encourages compliance with the mandatory savings plan
by providing a bonus in the form of a guarantee” (World Bank 1994,
p. 242). In spite of powerful institutional backing, it is clear that this
variant of selectivism has failed to address financial impoverishment in
old age satisfactorily. The effectiveness of such guarantees is a function
of several contingencies. Most require a threshold of prior contributions,
but if the bar is set too high, the poor will be unable to qualify for the
transfers that they need to survive, and will be forced to rely on TSA. Such
failure is exemplified by the desultory performance of Chile’s retirement
income safety-net, including the intensified redistributive effort that fol-
lowed the 2008 reform of the first pillar. Reflecting the imposition of very
stringent contribution requirements, many low income retirees have been
unable to qualify for financial assistance under the aegis of Chile’s MPG
(Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). This is compounded by the coverage exemp-
tions that are typical of mandatory second pillar pensions, generating a
substantial reservoir of retirees without entitlement to guarantees. Even in
the unlikely event of universal employment coverage, high levels of infor-
mal working and contribution evasion disqualify entitlement to transfers
from the MPG. While the characteristic design of guarantees is able to
eliminate non-take-up for designated groups of retirees, it cannot elim-
inate the need for TSA. We should also acknowledge convincing evidence
of parsimonious MPG supplements, reflecting a lack of popular support
for selective social security safety-nets (Leiva 2006; Hyde and Borzutzky
2016).
While the rhetoric of selectivism around efficiency of targeting can be
seductive to those of us who regard need as integral to justice, then, its
reality is plagued by problems of non-take-up and benefit inadequacy,
highlighting the need for a more inclusive approach to the design of the
retirement income safety-net.
A Universal Welfare State?
Exponents of universalism would address these concerns by dispensing
with targeting entirely, giving all retirees access to the same basic
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entitlements (Esping-Andersen 1990; Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003;
Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). For one prominent variant, financial impov-
erishment in old age should be addressed by extending access to statutory
social insurance, an arrangement that was originally created for those in
“work”, and which excluded the “economically inactive”. For much of the
late twentieth century, scholars of social policy characteristically responded
to this marginality by endorsing universal social insurance (USI), a model
of statutory social security that integrates the redistributive impetus of the
needs-focussed safety-net with the savings function of self-provisioning—
or vertical and horizontal redistribution. In effect, the USI model posits a
single retirement pillar to address two very different moral imperatives—
the legitimacy of differentials in savings effort, and adverse variation in the
intensity of need. Its principal design attributes might suggest two dis-
tinctive advantages over selectivism.
• Access. Where government relies on USI to address financial impov-
erishment in old age, everyone qualifies automatically for income
transfers when they reach retirement. According to its exponents, the
absence of means-testing and other substantive bureaucratic hurdles
accentuates “ease of access” to the retirement income safety-net, and
higher take-up (Hills 2003; Ginn 2004).
• Adequacy. One of the most compelling reasons for embracing uni-
versalism concerns the generosity of publicly managed services and
benefits. Paradoxically, the beneficial involvement of the non-poor
increases popular support for the welfare state, translating into higher
benefits for those who need them the most (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Kangas 2000).
These benefits are very compelling indeed, and suggest that USI is pre-
ferable to social security safety-nets that rely on targeting. But its char-
acteristic design is suffused with internal contradictions, reflecting the
juxtaposition of very different normative principles. A defining feature of
statutory social insurance, the contributory principle serves “politically,
morally, and psychologically to vest the person’s subsequent entitlements
to benefits” (Goodin 1990, p. 536), embedding eligibility in the moral
repertoire of desert. This emphasis on the importance of self-provisioning
suggests that workers should expect to take financial responsibility for
their own retirement futures. And yet its reliance on universal coverage
to augment the flow of income to the least advantaged makes entitlement
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an artefact of collective responsibility, mediated by compulsory redistribu-
tive transfers. The evidence of empirical research around the efficacy of
social insurance suggests that this ambivalence has generated substantive
negative impacts.
• Impaired responsibility. The possibility of entitlement without effort
can create perverse incentives that diminish the force of the contrib-
utory principle. Why bother saving when the same outcome could be
realised by depending on the “goodwill” of taxpayers (World Bank
1994).
• Impaired sustainability. The failure to graduate entitlements accord-
ing to differentials of savings effort could stifle the willingness of
taxpayers to finance the system. In articulating a trenchant critique of
the United Kingdom’s first pillar basic pension, Hills is clear that
there is little, if any, “connection between contributions and bene-
fits, either at the individual or the aggregate level, and the links that
exist are incomprehensible to most”. If taxpayers are “less unhappy
about paying national insurance, that is more a product of folk
memory than of current reality” (2003, p. 12).
• Impaired legitimacy. Above all perhaps, this juxtaposition of these
very different principles gives transfers to the least advantaged a
spurious and fragile legitimacy. If individual contributions are insuf-
ficient to finance benefits, in what meaningful “sense are benefits
claimed as a right because they have been paid for? And in what sense
are [ . . . ] contributions any more than part of general taxation for
social security expenditure?” (Alcock 1985, p. 38).
We could conclude from these developments that the contributory prin-
ciple has “outlived its usefulness and should be swept away” (Hills 2003,
p. 12), by converting existing social insurance schemes to programmes of
vertical income redistribution, financed from general taxation, but uni-
versal in scope. Or, alternatively, we might re-affirm the importance of the
contributory principle, and take steps to differentiate the retirement
income safety-net from the desert-prioritising savings function of the
second pillar (see Chapter 3). If benefits in the first pillar are to be claimed
as of right, then surely that right should be linked in some way to need,
not “mythical contribution conditions” (Alcock 1985).
This brings us conveniently to a second variant of universalism, the
universal citizens pension (UCP), a form of basic income scheme for
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retirees only (Van Parijs 1995; Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003). Financed
from general taxation, the UCP is unconditional, giving all retirees an
entitlement to benefits irrespective of any variation in need, and prior work
or savings effort. When evaluated as a means of addressing financial
impoverishment in old age, the advantages of the UCP model are twofold.
• Access. Its emphasis on universal coverage eliminates any require-
ment for degrading means-tests. Benefits are paid to people auto-
matically when they reach retirement, which makes it unnecessary for
them to take action to advance a claim. According to exponents of
basic income, these features optimise access to transfers, and max-
imise take-up (Van Parijs 1995).
• Adequacy. Because they are universal, political support for UCP
schemes should be widespread, reducing the possibility of parsimo-
nious benefit entitlements, and the risk of income inadequacy.
Inevitably, some will object to the UCP model on the grounds that there
is no legitimate moral justification for the beneficial involvement of the
non-poor in a retirement income safety-net, which should prioritise the
circumstances of the least advantaged. Compared to social security safety-
nets that exclude the vast majority from eligibility, however, the UCP
model is technically proficient at delivering retirement income to the
financially impoverished. It might also be argued that the absence of strict
eligibility conditions in the UCP model condones “free-riding”, enabling
the worst-off to exploit the labour of taxpayers (White 2004). Some insist
that entitlement to state support during periods of disengagement from
economic activity should be grounded in a “minimum work require-
ment”, which could manifest in two ways; “strict reciprocity”—the
requirement that entitlements should be determined in accordance with
prior contributions, as reflected in the second pillar pension arrangement;
or “baseline reciprocity”—the requirement for a “decent minimum” of
lifetime engagement with work (White 2004). But while such proposals
may have intuitive appeal, work testing is clearly incompatible with the
moral impetus of needs satisfaction. Crucially, the disqualification from
entitlement of those who fail to satisfy work tests would convert UCP to a
form of selective social insurance, where retirement income is allocated in
accordance with prior work or savings effort. Those who fail to qualify for
transfers under this arrangement would be forced to rely on social assis-
tance, which is characterised by uneven take-up and benefit inadequacy.
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Ultimately, the adequacy of the first pillar retirement income safety-net
should be evaluated only in terms of its capacity to address unmet need,
suggesting that reciprocity is an irrelevant concern.
Evaluating Alternative Designs for the Retirement Income Safety-Net
This speculative appraisal of different approaches to the design of the
retirement income safety-net is given considerable support by empirical
research around the prevalence of retiree poverty. We can start by noting
that TSA is widely acknowledged to be the worst-performing model,
reflecting substantial evidence of non-take-up, and benefit inadequacy
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Walker 1993; Gilbert 2004; Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016). This indictment is reinforced by cross-national com-
parative research around the performance of statutory social security.
Drawing on empirical evidence of the prevalence of retiree poverty2
from the mid to late 1980s, Korpi and Palme’s seminal and highly influ-
ential analysis (1998) found that financial impoverishment was highest in
countries that relied on TSA (the “targeted model”) to deliver the retire-
ment income safety-net (for example, Australia—5.2 percent of retirees in
poverty). Universal social insurance (the “encompassing model”) per-
formed significantly better, generating some of the lowest rates of retiree
poverty among the countries selected for comparison (e.g., Sweden—1.4
percent; Norway—2.6 percent). Echoing our analysis above, the UCP
model proved to be the most effective approach to the design of the
retirement income safety-net. According to their own ranking, but con-
trary to their narrative, Korpi and Palme found that the Netherlands
achieved the lowest incidence of retiree poverty (0.2 percent). Even
more recently, Meyer and her colleagues (2007) compared the perfor-
mance of six pension systems with distinctive configurations of first and
second pillar provision.3 All were evaluated by simulating the living stan-
dards4 of different groups of the working age population deemed to be at
risk of poverty in old age. Again, the lowest incidence of estimated retiree
poverty5 was realised by the Netherlands—the only country in the study
with a UCP scheme—followed closely by retirement systems with USI.
At this point, it could be argued that the force of this evidence is
diminished by a failure to consider an adequate sample of countries with
a UCP, and sampling that is biased in favour of high income countries.6
In addressing this objection, Willmore’s analysis (2006) compared two
models of first pillar provision—TSA and UCP—focussing on a range of
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low and high income countries, including 11 with a UCP. The most
striking difference concerned “ease of access”, as suggested by column
one in Table 2.1, which reports the percentage of retirees in each
country in receipt of safety-net transfers. As we shall see, the consis-
tently higher “realised” coverage of UCP schemes reduces the prob-
ability of income deprivation arising from non-take-up. A casual
observer might object to this unfavourable comparison by highlighting
the wide coverage achieved in South Africa and Australia, but both are
highly untypical of the TSA model, which endorses targeting as a means
of restricting access to benefits. In both countries, means-testing has
been designed to exclude members of the richest stratum from what is,
in most essentials, a universal retirement income safety-net. We should
also highlight evidence of inefficient targeting, where transfers are
directed towards affluent households, but withheld from the most
impoverished.7 Turning to benefit adequacy, column two in Table 2.1
permits comparisons of the generosity of transfers in the retirement
income safety-net—expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita. Even
a cursory inspection of these differences would suggest that first pillar
transfers have been consistently higher in countries that rely on a UCP
to address financial impoverishment in old age. New Zealand and
Kosovo stand out as the most successful, delivering benefits equivalent
to around half of per capita GDP. Echoing our discussion of idiosyn-
cratic design above, the generosity of the first pillar safety-nets of South
Africa and Australia should be regarded as an artefact of their inclusive-
ness, not the parsimonious emphasis of targeting that is characteristic of
the TSA model. On balance, the evidence of cross-national comparative
research supports our endorsement of the UCP model.
Designing a Just Universal Citizen’s Pension
Given this evidence, how might the design of a UCP be optimised to
address financial impoverishment in old age? Any consideration of stan-
dard work on social security design would highlight several challenges
(Hyde et al. 2006; Willmore 2006).
First, how should access to needs-focussed transfers be determined?
Our emphasis on inclusiveness as a means of optimising the flow of income
to the least advantaged suggests that eligibility for transfers under the aegis
of the UCP should involve as few restrictions as possible. In particular,
such design would emphasise:
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• Age (2A, Table 2.2)—to differentiate retirees from other population
groups. All citizens would be eligible for the UCP at the normal
retirement age (NRA)—the retirement age designated by the state
(see also Chapter 4).
• Residence (2B)—to differentiate “citizens” from “others”. We
should note that stringent residence requirements will diminish
ease-of-access, which could divert resources away from the least
advantaged (Meyer et al. 2007). And yet policy-makers would not
be thanked for introducing a first pillar retirement income safety-net
that ultimately proved to be financially unsustainable.8
Table 2.1 “Ease of access” and “benefit adequacy” in the first
pillar retirement income safety-net, 2003
Country Accessa Benefitsb
Universal citizens pension
New Zealand 93 46c
Mauritius 103 16d
Namibia 93 16
Botswana 96 10
Bolivia 105 26
Nepal 77 10
Samoa 100 22
Brunei 87 10
Kosovo 100 50
Mexico City 94 5.5
Social assistance
South Africa 87 29
Australia 67 29e
Chile 15 14
Costa Rica 21 10
United States 6 17f
India 4 5
a Beneficiaries as a percentage of the age-qualified population.
b Benefit entitlements as a percentage of per capita GDP.
c Single person only.
d For those aged 60–89.
e Single person only.
f Single person only.
Sources: Selected government departments responsible for managing the first pillar
retirement income safety-net; United States Social Security Administration; Hyde et
al. 2006; Willmore 2006.
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Second, what is the appropriate form of benefits? This question arises in
part because several of those who endorse the liberal discourses from which
the UCP model is derived insist that transfers should be distributed as one-
off grants or, in the language of social security analysis, “lump-sum pay-
ments” (Hyde et al. 2006). Van Parijs (1995) rejects this argument on the
grounds that it might result in the creation of a “crowd of elderly destitutes
who are paying a heavy price for squandering their one-off endowments”
Table 2.2 Need and just pension design
Design feature Justice imperative
Ease of access
2A. Age. Eligibility for the UCP given at
the normal retirement age (NRA).
Differentiates retirees from other
population groups, ensuring that transfers
are appropriately targeted.
2B. Residence. Eligibility is a function of
citizenship, defined in terms of residence
within the geographical boundaries of the
nation state.
Ensures that financial resources are
transferred to all citizens.
Adequacy of entitlement
2C. Periodic payments. Payments made at
regular intervals.
Addresses the possibility of unsatisfied need
by maintaining purchasing power across the
span of each agents’ retirement.
2D. Flat-rate benefits. Benefit entitlements
the same for all recipients, but see 2F.
Protects the basic liberties of all citizens in
an equivalent way.
2E. As generous as possible. As a general rule, insures against the risk of
insufficient income.
2F. Variable, needs-focussed supplements.
A needs-focussed supplement to the
general scheme.
Addresses the circumstances of those with
exceptional needs, but within a framework
of universality.
2G. Appropriate benefit indexation.
Uprating in accordance with earnings or
inflation, whichever is deemed appropriate.
Preserves purchasing power across the span
of each agents’ retirement.
Sustainability
2H. Stringency of residence requirements.
Graduate eligibility in accordance with
duration of residence.
Augments sustainability, but could result in
insufficient income.
2I. Progressivity of tax treatment of UCP
income.
Maintains the principle of universality, but
graduates entitlement according to the
intensity of need.
2J. Inclusive TSA. A social assistance
programme that excludes the most wealthy,
not the vast majority.
A possible substitute should the UCP prove
to be unsustainable.
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(p. 31). “Periodic payments” ensure that purchasing power is spread evenly
across the span of each persons’ retirement, and should be the characteristic
benefit modality in the first pillar pension arrangement (2C).
Third, how should policy-makers determine the value of income trans-
fers in a UCP? For its egalitarian liberal exponents (Van Parijs 1995),
the primacy of liberty requires a foundation of equivalent treatment, man-
ifesting as a legal right to flat-rate benefits (2D) (see also Chapter 4),
and yet it is clear that unmet need is experienced with variable intensity.
In this respect, we might note that the case for first pillar transfers was
initially developed in terms of the income that is necessary to ameliorate
“absolute poverty”—a lack of resources that are required for basic subsis-
tence, such as shelter and food. Not surprisingly, egalitarian liberals object
that this emphasis does not take account of the importance of individual
capacities to function in socially desirable ways. Policy-makers are con-
fronted by an uneasy tension between ease-of-access and benefit adequacy,
for universality distributes available resources among a larger pool of
recipients. One solution to this dilemma is to insist that universal entitle-
ments should be at least sufficient to facilitate subsistence, and as generous
as possible above this threshold (2E). A second possibility is highlighted
by a prominent liberal exponent of universalism (Van Parijs 1995), who
argues that the “basic” entitlements of the UCP should be supplemented
by variable transfers to address acute disadvantage (2F). Van Parijs insists
that additional needs-focussed benefits should be graduated in order to
rectify disproportionate financial impoverishment. When pursued under
the auspices of a universal social security scheme, such targeting minimises
the possibility of regulatory-induced stigma and, ultimately, the income
deprivation that is generated by non-take-up. Given the emphasis of the
first pillar retirement income safety-net on the satisfaction of unmet need,
the value of all UCP transfers should be preserved across time by appro-
priate benefit indexation (2G)—pegged, for example, to average earnings
or price inflation, whichever proves to optimise the circumstances of the
least advantaged.
As might be anticipated, any proposal for a social security reform on this
scale is likely to raise legitimate concerns regarding sustainability. The fact
that a social institution is “well-ordered” in the sense that its design
corresponds to the requirements of a normative principle such as justice
does not mean that it has the capacity to endure over the long-term.
Following Rawls (1971), we might regard social institutions as sustainable
if their design generates forces that support their endurance. As we have
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noted, a UCP is likely to generate an enormous reservoir of electoral
support, augmenting its political sustainability. But any approach to social
security that confers unconditional entitlements is likely to generate enor-
mous financial costs, raising serious questions about the capacity of the
state to sustain transfers over the long-term.
The sustainability of the UCP model in high income countries can be
illustrated with reference to the Netherland’s retirement income safety-
net, which has conferred a universal entitlement to transfers for more than
half a century (Meyer et al. 2007). The value of the full UCP is linked to
the state-designated “social minimum”, an income deemed sufficient to
eliminate retiree poverty. However, this juxtaposition of benefit adequacy
and stability is realised, in large measure, by the imposition of stringent
residence requirements. Inevitably, the entitlements of “partial residents”
fall short of the statutory poverty threshold, increasing the probability of
dependence on TSA, and exposure to the risk of non-take-up.
Governmental action to address this—perhaps by relaxing residence
requirements—could impair the stability of the UCP.
The sustainability of the UCP model in low income countries could be
indicated by its adoption and endurance in handful of countries—Mauritius,
Bolivia, Namibia, Botswana, Nepal, Samoa—and Mexico City. But, as we
have noted in our analysis above, the realised coverage of these schemes has
been uneven, ranging from 77 percent inNepal to a recorded 105 percent in
Bolivia (Willmore 2006). Furthermore, our analysis suggests that their capa-
city to address unmet need satisfactorily is variable. Looking back to
Table 2.1, it is clear that few of these arrangements could be thought of as
“extravagant”, but entitlements in Mauritius and Namibia—16 percent of
per capitaGDP in 2003—have been sufficient “to ensure that few experience
extreme poverty or deprivation in old age”. In contrast, UCP entitlements in
Nepal and Mexico City—around 10 percent of per capita GDP in 2003—
were “clearly inadequate” (p. 11). Again, this highlights the possibility of a
trade-off between design that is able to optimise needs-satisfaction, and
sustainability.
Not surprisingly, several exponents of the UCP model have expressed
considerable optimism about the possibility of realising both aims, even in
low income countries. In particular, Willmore (2006) argues that a UCP
arrangement could be sustained by redistributing the considerable public
resources that currently subsidise second pillar retirement schemes to
transfers for the least advantaged (2H). Alternatively, the fiscal sustain-
ability of an adequate needs-focussed UCP arrangement could be
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augmented by introducing a degree of progressivity in the tax treatment of
retirement income (a form of ex post means-testing), so that each citizen is
entitled to a flat pension upon reaching the age of eligibility, but is also
required to return part or all of it (2I). The advantage of this approach is
that the taxation of retirement income is voluntary, since it can be legally
avoided by choosing not to take-up UCP entitlements. Nevertheless, if the
UCP model ultimately proved to be fiscally unsustainable in any particular
national jurisdiction, it could be worth considering more inclusive forms
of targeting, as realised by South Africa and Australia (2J). While these
alternatives do not eliminate the problem of non-take-up, or the possibi-
lity of parsimonious benefit entitlements, they could be preferable to the
Poor Law heritage of less eligibility.
CONCLUSION
Under any serious reckoning, need is a vitally important principle of
justice, designating the minimally satisfactory conditions that must be
satisfied if people are to function optimally in their day-today lives (Plant
et al. 1980; Doyal and Gough 1991). Considered in terms of retirement,
the possibility of unsatisfied need takes on an added urgency, reflecting
disproportionately high rates of poverty among older people (Hyde et al.
2006; Willmore 2006).
While its importance has been acknowledged across the ideological
spectrum of political philosophy, the concept of need has a special signifi-
cance for liberals. Where many other perspectives embed need in some
wider conception of “the good”—as shaped by shared norms and values
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Etzioni and Brodbeck 2010), for example—liber-
als tie need to the possibility of sovereign decision making (Kelly 1998;
Kymlicka 2002). Extremes of economic disadvantage are morally unaccep-
table because they impair individual capacities for conscious deliberation,
and purposive engagement with the external environment. But while this
antipathy towards financial impoverishment is shared, liberals disagree
about the causation of unsatisfied need, and the legitimate scope of govern-
mental action to address it. In emphasising the over-riding importance of
voluntary exchange, classical liberal scholars of social security neglect its role
in circumscribing individual sovereignty. Egalitarian liberals have taken issue
with this endorsement of laissez faire, though some have failed to articulate
a determinate, policy-relevant concept of need (Rawls 1971, 2003). Unlike
classical liberals, they endorse highly redistributive statutory measures to
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augment the circumstances of those whose liberty is impaired by financial
impoverishment. On balance, our analysis accepts this judgement, which
has informed our account of liberal justice.
The importance of need has also been acknowledged by the vast majority
of retirement systems, which have instituted a variety of measures to ame-
liorate poverty. Yet their success in achieving this goal has been highly
uneven, reflecting very different approaches to the design of the retirement
income safety-net (Hyde et al. 2006; Hyde and Dixon 2009). Although
highly prevalent in the real world of retirement provision, targeting is
rendered problematic by its lack of inclusiveness, which ultimately generates
low take-up, and inadequate benefit entitlements. Our survey of the field is
clear that countries which rely predominantly on means-tested social assis-
tance to protect the least advantaged have the highest rates of retiree poverty.
Social insurance systems perform better, but are blighted by internal inco-
herence, reflecting the juxtaposition of very different values. For a variety of
reasons, our evaluation of several reform options finds in favour of a dis-
tinctive variant of compulsory collective responsibility for addressing unsa-
tisfied need in old age, though several challenges remain to be addressed.
NOTES
1. Echoing Doyal and Gough’s “thick” conception of need (1991), the term
“primary goods” refers to a range of assets and opportunities that are vital to
autonomy: “natural primary goods”—physical and psychological capacities;
and “social primary goods”—resources and opportunities, including desig-
nated liberties, income, and wealth (Rawls 2003).
2. Defined as household income below 50 percent of the median income for
each country included in the study (Korpi and Palme 1998).
3. This means of course that Meyer and her colleagues are concerned with the
performance of the retirement system as a whole, which includes, but is not
exhausted by the first pillar retirement income safety-net.
4. On the basis of entitlements conferred by different elements of the retire-
ment system (Meyer et al. 2007).
5. The poverty threshold was defined as 40 percent of average earnings.
6. See Hyde and Borzutzky (2016, Chapter 5) for a more detailed exploration
of these methodological issues.
7. A 1994 study of Chile’s “Welfare Pension” (Valdés-Prieto 2002) found that
around 60 percent of beneficiaries did not belong to households in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution; while many recipients were in
the top two quintiles. It has similarly been estimated that 40 percent of
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beneficiaries in Costa Rica’s social assistance safety-net belonged to house-
holds classified as “non-poor”; while 32 percent of the financially impover-
ished failed to qualify at all (Durán Valverde 2002).
8. It may well be, as some have suggested (Williams 1990), that the nation
state is an outmoded unit of political sovereignty, and that publicly managed
services and income transfers should be accessible to citizens of “the world”.
But for the time being, the nation state remains the most prevalent form of
political organisation.
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CHAPTER 3
Desert and Just Pension Design
Abstract Inevitably, there has been considerable disagreement around
the substance of the laws and institutional arrangements that are compa-
tible with desert. To the limited extent that they endorse the desert
principle, classical liberals insist that voluntary exchange is sufficient to
ensure that market actors are appropriately remunerated for their contri-
bution to production. Egalitarian liberals reject this assertion, insisting
that the market is suffused with asymmetries of power and opportunity
that diminish individual capacities to be deserving. Acting on this percep-
tion, our analysis evaluates several models for the design of the second
pillar pension arrangement. Only defined benefit pensions have the capa-
city to ensure a consistent relationship between work and savings effort,
and flows of retirement income.
Keywords Desert  Agent-responsibility  Second pillar pensions  Social
insurance  Defined contribution pensions  Defined benefit pensions
INTRODUCTION
While the financially impoverished circumstances of the least-advantaged
are a vitally important issue, need does not exhaust the moral repertoire of
justice, or the concerns that have shaped the design of retirement systems.
An inspection of existing pension arrangements would suggest that their
institutional architecture is much wider in scope and purpose than the
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retirement income safety-net, giving expression to diverse aims, financing
methods, and regulatory requirements (Dixon 1999; Hyde et al. 2006;
Bode 2008; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). We can simplify this bewilder-
ing programmatic diversity here by emphasising the core theme of this
monograph—the normative foundations of pension scheme design. As a
principle of justice, desert generally requires us to evaluate and respond
to other agents—positively or negatively—in terms their performance in
socially valued activities (Miller 1999; Olsaretti 2004; Hyde and Dixon
2009). Our focus here on the distribution of retirement “income”
necessarily means that we are concerned with economic desert—the degree
of correspondence between the distribution of financial rewards, and
differentials of performance at work. For one prominent exponent of
the desert principle, justice is served when each agent receives “back by
way of reward an equivalent to the contribution he [sic] makes” (Miller
1999, p. 28). Where desert is the relevant principle of justice, pensions
should be regarded as an extension of the world of work, redistributing
each agents’ earnings horizontally across the lifecourse—not to others.
While need is integral to the design of the first pillar retirement income
safety-net, desert takes priority in the second pillar, providing a moral
point of reference for its architects, and serving as a means of justifying
inequalities in the distribution of retirement income.
Building on insights from relevant works of political philosophy,
Chapter 3 addresses the yawning gap in the literature that has been created
by a failure to address desert, satisfactorily. As well as articulating a defence
of the desert principle, we explore and articulate its requirements for the
design of pensions. This is approached in two ways.
1. First, we highlight the normative foundations of appropriate pen-
sion scheme design in the second pillar. A review of the burgeoning
literature suggests that there has been considerable disagreement
around the substance and importance of desert, particularly the
notion of agent-responsibility—the requirement that agents should
be sufficiently responsible for the performance that generates their
own earnings (Olsaretti 2004, 2007; Hyde and Dixon 2009). Even
where they accept the importance of desert, classical liberals typically
fail to acknowledge the range of conditions that can give legitimacy
to income inequalities (Friedman 1962; Nozick 1974). As we shall
see, prioritarians deny that agent-responsibility is even possible,
leading some to reject the desert principle entirely (Rawls 1971,
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2003). Reflecting several of the insights of luck egalitarianism
(Dworkin 2000; Vallentyne 2007), our analysis accepts the premise
that agents can be regarded as sufficiently responsible, and appro-
priately rewarded, for differentials of performance at work.
2. Second, and by extension, our analysis deliberates around the
requirements of justice in second pillar retirement schemes. It iden-
tifies a range of measures to ensure that worker’s pensions can
operate in ways that are compatible with the requirements of the
desert principle. This is developed against the requirements of three
dimensions of pension design: (1) security—the probability that
workers will receive as retirement benefits the earnings they defer
when economically active; (2) inclusiveness—the proportion of the
labour force who are permitted to participate in the second pillar
pension arrangement; and (3) fittingness—the degree of correspon-
dence between worker’s deserts, as indicated by attributes of their
involvement in economic activity, and the distribution of second
pillar retirement income.
It would be fair to say that the desert principle has been marginal to the
scholarly debate around the design of pensions. Chapter 3 rectifies this
omission in distinctive ways, drawing on the normative repertoire of liberal
political philosophy. As well as reiterating the importance of desert, we
articulate a concrete programme of pension design that is able to satisfy
the requirements of justice.
APPROPRIATE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
Although the deployment of desert as a principle of justice involves a range
of complex issues, its substance gives expression to a simple insight that
has enduring appeal. People should be treated—appraised, rewarded,
censured—according to what they have achieved through their actions
(Miller 1999; Hyde and Dixon 2009). For much of the literature, the
circumstances where desert is relevant are comprised of a three-place
relationship involving an agent (the deserving subject), the grounds upon
which she might be regarded as deserving (the desert basis), and the
treatment she deserves (the deserved good) (Olsaretti 2004; Schmidtz
2005). Beyond these general features, there has been much controversy
around the importance and substance of desert, focussing on a range of
issues (Friedman 1962; Rawls 1971; Smith 2006).
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Classical Liberalism
There is considerable disagreement among philosophers of classical liber-
alism about the nature and importance of desert as a principle of justice
(Friedman 1962; Rand 1967; Nozick 1974; Smith 2006). A review of the
burgeoning literature of libertarianism would highlight two salient per-
spectives on desert, particularly its relevance to economic activity in a free
market. Some are highly sceptical of the assertion that diverse transactions
under the aegis of voluntary exchange can be represented by a single
normative principle (Nozick 1974; Schmidtz 2005). In practice, eco-
nomic activity in the market gives rise to a range of distributive patterns,
some remunerating performance at work, but others ignoring people’s
merits—“inheritance, gift-giving, and philanthropy [ . . . ] all conferring
goods on recipients who may have done nothing to deserve” (Schmidtz
2005, p. 161). Where it is unimpeded by governmental action, the market
distributes rewards to those who are able to satisfy consumer preferences—
“successful and efficient producers of what consumer want” (Nozick 1986,
p. 137)—and the “amount it distributes depends on howmuch is demanded
and how great the alternative supply is” (Nozick 1986, p. 139). Alongside
this irrelevance to diverse transactions, the libertarian insistence on the
inviolability of individual rights rules out the possibility of coercive intrusion
to satisfy any principle of distributive justice. The legitimacy of a distribution
can only arise from a “just process of voluntary exchange of honestly
acquired property and services. Whatever the outcome, it will be just, but
there is no particular pattern the outcome must fit” (Nozick 1986, p. 139).
In short, the libertarian analysis is permissive with regard to the moral
impetus of voluntary exchange.
Yet some libertarians are troubled by the possibility of undeserved
remuneration in the market. In this respect, a prominent variant of liber-
tarianism (Rand 1967; Machan 2006) has articulated a formulation of
justice that seems to cohere around salient attributes of the desert princi-
ple. For one exponent of objectivism, justice is:
the application of rationality to the evaluation and treatment of individuals
[ . . . ] A portion of justice consists in acting on one’s objective assessments
and treating others as they deserve [ . . . ] Desert is becoming worthy of
recompense, ie., of reward or punishment according to the good or ill of
character or conduct. A person does something, in other words, in order to
deserve certain responses from others. (Smith 2006, p. 138)
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Thus conceptualised, the importance of justice lies in its respect for the
“law of causality”, a principle of association that enables agents to take
action to survive and prosper. By evaluating and responding to others
consistently in terms of the consequences of their actions, we increase the
probability of realising our own conception of “the good”, including the
development of our capacities. When a person responds justly, “by reward-
ing or punishing as a person’s actions deserve, he is recognising the
positive or negative nature of actions and their likely effects on him”
(Smith 2006, p. 140). Any failure to maximise performance could be
equally troubling for those concerned, for they will “pay dearly” by
becoming “less happy, less fulfilled [and] less excellent” as human beings
(Machan 2006, p. 140). Yet even though desert is a vital element of
personal conduct, it has no substantive implications for governmental
action, and is regarded as subservient to the protection of liberty. As
long as a person possesses rights, “he is entitled to have them respected,
and his deserts are immaterial” (Smith 2006, p. 173). Although desert is a
morally compelling principle of justice, it should be regarded as a matter of
voluntary exchange, not public responsibility.
Taken together, these perspectives are rendered problematic by their
refusal to acknowledge the range of conditions that make each agent’s
sovereign pursuit of “the good” possible. The protection of negative
rights, they say, enables us to live our lives in accordance with our volun-
tary choices, giving us ultimate responsibility for our actions. At the same
time, it is clear that any reliance on voluntary exchange can involve
transactions that are fundamentally coercive (Olsaretti 2004; Hyde and
Dixon 2009). The dull compulsion of financial impoverishment may
prevent the least advantaged from optimising action in pursuit of “the
good”, impairing the possibility of sovereign choice by making their
fortunes dependent on the blind play of market forces. Though it may
involve “consent”, “voluntary” exchange can deprive people of the oppor-
tunity to exercise the responsibility that must ground desert claims. By
extension, it could be argued that governmental action to diminish the
intensity of such inequalities is one of several conditions that enable all
agents to exercise sufficient responsibility for the performances that gen-
erate earnings differentials (Miller 1999; Olsaretti 2004). If desert is so
important, why doesn’t it command the same priority as the protection of
negative rights?
An examination of the literature of utilitarianism would highlight
similar disagreement among consequentialist exponents of laissez faire
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(Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962). For much of the utilitarian mainstream,
the desert principle is irrelevant to the production of goods and services in
a free market. If nothing else, we should acknowledge the possibility of
insurmountable epistemological barriers to reliable judgements about
differences in individual deserts. Like others, Hayek (1960) accepts the
argument that merit requires appropriate motivational foundations—“act-
ing from good motives” and “overcoming difficulties” (p. 93). But, in the
decentralised economic environment of a free market, it is virtually impos-
sible to infer people’s motives from what is known about their perfor-
mance. This would require perceptual skills that are sufficiently acute to
discount the impact of native endowments, and to take account of cir-
cumstantial luck. People do not typically have such skills, or the informa-
tion that makes such judgements possible. By extension, Hayek rejects the
belief that market valuations reflect performance differentials among mar-
ket actors. At best, prices convey information about elasticities of supply
and demand, and relative scarcities of different factors of production.
While we should embrace liberty as a means of optimising economic
development, we will struggle to legitimate voluntary exchange on the
grounds of desert, and we should not be overly concerned with its role in
evaluating economic transactions.
While this antipathy towards the desert principle has been influential, it
has not been universally accepted by classical liberal economists. Most
prominently perhaps, exponents of Austrian economics insist that free
markets reward economic actors in direct proportion to the value of
their productive contribution, which carries more weight than concerns
about effort and responsibility (Hayek 1960; Mises 1936). In this respect,
the value of each factor-suppliers’ marginal product is a:
measure of its contribution to production; thus each individual factor-supplier
receives an income strictly equivalent to the value of the productive contribu-
tion that he makes (where “his” contribution includes the contribution of the
non-labour factors that he happens to own). (White 2004, p. 52)
The key to understanding this proportionality is market competition,
which ensures that realised incomes cannot depart substantially from
what is merited by performance. In free labour markets, employers must:
bid competitively for the services of workers, just as they must bid competi-
tively for all other factors of production. If an employer attempts to pay
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wages that are lower than his workers can obtain elsewhere, he will lose his
workers and thus be compelled to change his policy, or go out of business.
(Branden 1967, p. 84)
This characterisation of market-driven transfers as meritorious is echoed
by Friedman (1962), who insists that voluntary exchange gives practical
expression to the principle, “to each according to what he and the instru-
ments he owns produces” (p. 166). This delivers two important benefits.
One is concerned with economic efficiency, for the proportionality that
characterises transfers in a free market optimises the supply of goods and
services, including labour. Unless a worker receives the:
whole of what he adds to the product, he will enter into exchanges on the
basis of what he can receive rather than what he can produce. Exchanges will
not take place that would have been mutually beneficial if each party
received what he contributed to the marginal product. Payment in accor-
dance with product is therefore necessary in order that resources be used
most effectively. (Friedman 1962, p. 166)
Or, to put it another way, desert is integral to the incentives that drive
economic activity, for the purpose of earnings differentials is to “give
people the reason and the opportunity to race for the finish line”
(Schmidtz 1998, p. 85). A second benefit is concerned with the sustain-
ability of human association, which requires adherence to organising
norms and principles. No society can be “stable unless there is a basic
core of value judgements that are unthinkingly accepted by the great bulk
of its members” (p. 167). Friedman believes that “payment in accordance
with product” is one of these accepted principles.
Though it provides a convenient justification for intense income inequal-
ities, this analysis of desert is rendered problematic by its failure to acknowl-
edge the importance of agent responsibility. For several influential critiques
of themarket (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 2000), the willingness and opportunity
to participate in economic activity, and the capacity to deliver performance,
are shaped in large measure by highly asymmetric patterns of inherited
advantage. Though differentials in performancemust be regarded as integral
to desert, its utilitarian exponents have failed to discriminate between out-
comes for which agents are genuinely responsible—which are the proper
focus of desert—and those that reflect arbitrary contingencies, such as
circumstantial luck. Recognising that effortless achievement and useless
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effort are both possible and problematic, an adequate account of desert must
acknowledge the importance of performance and responsibility.
Egalitarian Liberalism
Any consideration of the corpus of egalitarian liberalism would suggest a
similarly mixed response to the desert principle (Rawls 1971; Dworkin
2000; Olsaretti 2007; Vallentyne 2007), highlighting two distinctive
perceptions. The prioritarian view rejects the desert principle outright—
at least for the purposes of distributing resources and opportunities. This is
exemplified by the seminal work of John Rawls (1971), whose acceptance
of desert is highly conditional. Reflecting our “settled and considered
judgements” (Rawls 1971, p. 103), any disparities of remuneration must
be grounded in “agent- responsibility” for the circumstances that generate
performance at work. Where people cannot be regarded as sufficiently
responsible for such actions—in the sense implied by notions of sover-
eignty and autonomy—their differential circumstances must be regarded
as “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (Rawls 1971, p. 104) and
therefore, unacceptable. A Theory of Justice illustrates the “argument
from moral arbitrariness” with reference to resource allocation under
different socio-economic systems, demonstrating that inequalities of
income and wealth, resources and assets—indeed, well-being and life-
chances—can never be regarded as meritorious, for agents can never be
regarded as fully responsible for their actions.
• Arbitrary social contingencies. In feudal (and caste) societies, access
to privileges and other significant opportunities is restricted to mem-
bers of the self-perpetuating “nobility”. The industrial system of
laissez faire that replaced feudalism—relying on voluntary exchange,
and formal equality of opportunity—addressed this injustice by giv-
ing people the formal right to take action to compete for economic
resources and opportunities. But, in practice, the free market system
has continued to bias remuneration in favour of those from “good
family backgrounds”—the middle classes (Rawls 1971, 2003).
• Arbitrary native endowments. But can everyone be in a position to
compete for opportunities on equal terms? Rawls thinks not. While it
might work to perfection in “eliminating the influence of social
contingencies”, a fair meritocracy would continue to allow “the
distribution of income and wealth to be determined by the natural
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distribution of abilities and talents” (Rawls 1971, p. 24)—or native
endowments. Short of inducing a levelling-down equality by taking
steps to disable people with natural advantages, the influence of
morally arbitrary contingencies on the remuneration of economic
activity would seem to be inevitable.
The implications of this analysis are clear, suggesting that “no-one deserves
his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one
deserves one’s initial starting place in society [ . . . ] The notion of desert
seems not to apply to these cases” (Rawls 1971, p. 104). Yet this does not
mean that agents cannot be remunerated in accordance with some notion of
performance. In this respect, Rawls draws our attention to the vital, if
subtle, distinction between “moral desert” and “entitlements to legitimate
expectations”—echoing the distinction between pre-institutional and insti-
tutional desert (Olsaretti 2004, 2007).1 Unlike the former, which Rawls
rejects, entitlements to legitimate expectations can arise only after the
relevant principles of justice have been instituted by the state—that is,
principles 1 to 2b, as highlighted in Chapter 2. Once justice is in place,
people are entitled to the remuneration that is specified by its rules, which
permit income inequalities. But, at the same time, the terms of social
cooperation demanded by justice require workers to pay taxes to finance
redistributive income transfers, particularly those that serve to augment the
absolute position of the least well-off (Rawls 1971, 2003).
Libertarians have responded to Rawls’ apparent determinism by
dismissing it out of hand, insisting that human agents routinely exercise
responsibility for their actions, including those that generate work
performance (Machan 2006). Others (Miller 1999; Schmidtz 2005)
have responded by asserting the importance of desert, but denying
any requirement for agent-responsibility. Irrespective of the degree to
which people can be regarded as the sovereign authors of their actions,
differential rewards are integral to the incentives that drive labour force
participation. On a different note, but with a similar emphasis, Miller
(1999) observes that people can and do assign attributions of desert
without any regard for agent-responsibility. When we “admire the
superlative skill of a musician”, for example, “we do not ask about
the conduct which led to its acquisition before granting our admira-
tion” (p. 96). While these are important arguments, their neglect of
agent responsibility suggests that they are incapable of sustaining the
legitimacy of desert claims. A more satisfactory response might lead us
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to question the significance of native endowments as a source of work
performance and remuneration. The reality of variation of native
endowments does not represent an absolute barrier to acknowledging
and remunerating people’s deserts, reflecting differentials of agent-
responsibility. Equally, it could be argued that Rawls has neglected
the important role of public policy in rectifying the influence of arbi-
trary contingencies on earnings differentials. As well as compensating
the least advantaged for their misfortune, governmental action should
be directed towards the creation of circumstances that enable agents to
exercise responsibility for performance at work.
Perhaps the most convincing response to Rawls’ is represented by luck
egalitarianism which also presumes that outcome-inequality is morally unac-
ceptable in the absence of agent-responsibility (Dworkin 2000; Olsaretti
2004). While they acknowledge the veracity of the insight that informs
Rawls’ objection to desert, luck egalitarians insist on the possibility of a
substantial degree of sovereign engagement with economic activity. Rawls’
main error, they say, lies in his presumption that outcomes of reward are
alwaysmorally arbitrary, just because some are. Unlike the liberal philosophers
of the Enlightenment, Rawls appears to neglect the special features that
differentiate human agents from all other known species—namely, that they
are able to deliberate and exercise responsibility for their choices. Dworkin
(2000) develops this insight by distinguishing two very different forms of luck,
as highlighted in Chapter 1. Brute luck refers to contingencies that are beyond
people’s conscious control, but may still shape their lives in significant ways,
including any involvement in economic activity. Brute luck can manifest as
“desert hierarchies in which certain individuals are held to be more deserving
simply because of their birth status” (Vallentyne 2007, p. 173). It also
describes events that people are unable to influence, and which diminish the
link between agent-responsibility and outcomes—prejudice and discrimina-
tion in education and employment, for example, or the unexpected shocks of
economic development. Because it is involuntary, brute luck is regarded as
morally unacceptable, and incompatible with justice. In contrast, option luck
refers to distributive outcomes that arise from people’s voluntary choices—the
calculated gambles that people take in their daily lives. Echoing our emphasis
on the importance of agent-responsibility, luck egalitarians accept the legiti-
macy of any earnings differentials that are generated by option luck.
Though not accepted by all liberals, it could be argued that liberty and
desert are linked in a common project that requires agents to determine
their own conception of “the good”. While people’s values and moral
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principles should be regarded as a private matter, there is substantial
evidence to suggest that that a majority of national publics endorse desert
on matters of work and pay (Miller 1999; Kangas 2007). This should not
be surprising, since the desert principle focusses on action that is funda-
mental to anyone’s conception of “the good”, whatever its particular
substance—that is, the means by which people choose to sustain them-
selves, economically. Desert simplifies this challenge by facilitating a
rational basis for engaging with economic activity. As a source of self-
motivation, desert holds out the promise of reward for differentials of
agent-responsibility. And, as a principle of association, desert requires us
to appraise others in terms of expected utility, which is a function of their
performance. This suggests that desert and liberty should be regarded as
complementary. The rights that secure each individual’s freedom acknowl-
edge our status as “separate” agents, but the desert principle recognises
that we are “active” agents. A free society cannot “work without a ‘rule of
law’ system that secures people’s savings and earnings, thereby enabling
them to plan their lives. [But] neither can a rule of law function properly in
the absence of an ethos that deeply respects what people can do to be
deserving” (Schmidtz 2005, p. 70). Luck egalitarians maintain that this
symmetry has compelling implications for the scope of governmental
action to realise justice.
Unlike classical liberalism, they reject the assertion that the “voluntary”
exchange of laissez faire is sufficient to optimise agent-responsibility for
distributive outcomes. Unfettered markets perpetuate asymmetries of
power and opportunity that stifle voluntary choice. Economic develop-
ment under laissez faire is inherently unstable, exposing people to the
possibility of “unexpected shocks” that may impair their financial well-
being (Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003). And the minimal state gives
people the freedom to treat others in a morally arbitrary way, irrespective
of their deserts. Agent-responsibility requires appropriate governmental
action, not to impose any particular conception of “the good”, but to
enable people to realise a substantive element of their own. This require-
ment translates into three priorities for the design of justice.
1. Neutralising brute luck. A defensible principle of desert “that can justify
differential rewards recognises that individuals should have fair oppor-
tunity to deserve more or less than others” (Olsaretti 2004, p. 165).
Inherited economic advantages can be tackled through the tax-system,
while bad brute luck can be compensated by the provision of welfare
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state programmes such as universal compulsory education, or redistri-
butive income transfers (Dworkin 2000).
2. Optimising option luck. Agents can be regarded as sufficiently
responsible for their income shares when their actions are “neither
tainted by force nor when their choices are wholly outside of their
control” (Olsaretti 2004, p. 166). This could be facilitated by
statutory measures that make outcomes sensitive to people’s volun-
tary choices, such as pension market deregulation, which augments
consumer sovereignty (Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
3. Ensuring consistency of treatment. A robust principle of desert
requires consistency of reward for the economically active—that is,
remuneration that “people of a similar kind could have [ . . . ]
expected under similar circumstances” (Kristjánsson 2006, p. 61).
Such consistency incentivises agent-responsibility by ensuring that
all economic actors get their due, as indicated by their performance.
APPROPRIATE PENSION DESIGN
The question is, how can the moral repertoire of desert be relevant to the
determination of income in retirement, a period when people are not
working? One answer might suggest that desert is irrelevant to retirement
because the market rewards “scarce skills only insofar as they are actually
employed” (Goodin 1990, p. 546). But, contrary to these superficial
appearances, the characteristic design of second pillar pensions suggests
that they should be regarded as an extension of the work-based system of
remuneration (Hyde et al. 2006; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). While the
desert principle doesn’t “require” workers to affiliate to a second pillar
pension, it does require them to save for their own retirement. This
commodifying impetus has been instantiated by the contributory principle,
deployed by the state and pension plan operators to determine benefit
entitlements. In the language of insurance, the “larger the premiums you
have paid (or the greater the contributions you have made more gener-
ally), the more you are entitled to receive” (Goodin 1990, p. 536).
Underlying the argument that “benefits should be earnings-related
because contributions have been is the deeper claim that people should
get all that they pay for and only what they pay for” (p. 536, our
emphasis). In the language of economic theory, pensions should be
regarded as one element of “total compensation package”. This means
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that incomes during the individual’s working life should be “adjusted to
compensate for the value of pension benefits” (World Bank 1994, p. 186).
So retirement benefits “would affect the mix of wage and non-wage
components of the total compensation package. But they would not affect
the individual’s total income or the distribution of income overall”
(p. 186). Rather than characterising it as a flow of financial resources
that is separate from the economic activity of its recipients, retirement
income should be regarded as deferred earnings for the work that they
have already done. Fundamentally, desert is the relevant principle of
justice where pension schemes are designed as an extension of the labour
market, because they redistribute workers’ earnings horizontally across the
lifecourse.
In practice, any evaluation of second pillar pensions against the require-
ments of the desert principle may be complicated by the range of revenue
streams that can generate each worker’s retirement assets or entitlements,
and the different sources from which they are derived. Briefly this can
include:
• Normal contribution revenue. The main source of revenue, this is
represented by each person’s regular savings. This emphasis on income
deferral means that the relevant desert base is unambiguous—the
work-performances for which agents can be regarded as responsible.
• Investment income. Savings in a funded pension scheme are invested
in financial securities, and any interest is credited to each member.
Since investment income is generated by savings effort (rather than
work-performance), the relevant desert base may be unclear.
• Exceptional contribution revenue. This is relevant to the excep-
tional circumstances of pension schemes that are in deficit, unable
to meet all financial liabilities (Blake 2006).2 Who should be
regarded as responsible for arranging “deficiency payments” to
rectify such shortfalls, given the emphasis of entitlement on
income deferral?
The logic of the desert principle requires all flows of income to be
grounded unambiguously in relevant attributes of each beneficiaries’ eco-
nomic activity, as argued in our discussion of appropriate normative
foundations. If they cannot be so grounded, there can be no entitlement.
The importance of desert is also derivative of its historically prominent
role as a justification for pension reform (Freeden 1991; Bode 2008;
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Kangas 2007). In this respect, we may note that second pillar retirement
schemes have been regarded by their architects as a “reward for services
rendered to society by its members over their lifetimes” (Freeden 1991,
p. 33). Their introduction signalled that “some rights could be earned,
and by implication, could fail to be earned” (p. 33). Several other histor-
ical surveys of pension reform have highlighted the salience of desert as the
unifying principle of second pillar pension arrangements, linking entitle-
ment to aspects of prior economic activity, thereby instantiating “‘to
everybody according to his/her merits’ thinking” (Kangas 2007, p. 3).
In spite of significant differences of programmatic architecture (Hyde et al.
2006; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016), it is clear that the design of the vast
majority of second pillar pensions has given expression to the moral
repertoire of desert, emphasising the importance of individual responsi-
bility and self-provisioning.
Our distinctive emphasis on desert as appropriate remuneration for
economic activity has relevance to the design and evaluation of pension
institutions to the extent that they are responsible for distributing
deferred earnings. The following analysis expands on this core theme
by developing arguments for appropriate design in terms of three
benchmarks. From this we derive a set of appropriate design features
that could be used to inform the design or evaluation of second pillar
pensions.
Security
The first benchmark is security, which may be defined generally as a
“condition of stability or permanency, where individuals have reliable
expectations of continuity in their surroundings and relationships” (Vail
1999, p. 7). The object of security in second pillar pensions is the relation-
ship between savings effort and entitlements, which must be consistent
(Hyde et al. 2007). Given the long period of gestation between initial
affiliation to a pension and the point at which workers typically cease their
economic activity,3 security must be regarded as a vitally important con-
cern. Can workers be confident that they will receive as retirement benefits
the earnings that they have deferred while working? Considered only in
terms of desert, a “secure” retirement scheme is one that converts each
worker’s savings to retirement income in a reliable and consistent way.
Not surprisingly, in view of its deep attachment to paternalist intrusion,
social policy analysis characteristically endorses statutory social insurance as
70 M. HYDE AND R. SHAND
a means of optimising retirement income security in the second pillar
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Kangas 2000;
Trampusch 2007). Its reliance on payroll taxes4 to finance benefits elim-
inates the possibility of “investment risk”, an artefact of financial services
industry involvement in the management of pensions, and a salient source
of retirement income insecurity (see below). Only the state has the power
and authority to impose the binding directives around social security
design that can make the “inter-generational contract” a reality (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Trampusch 2007). Looking beneath the rhetoric of its
exponents, however, it is clear that the modal design and management of
existing social insurance arrangements generate considerable insecurity for
workers. The absence of legally enforceable property rights5 gives govern-
mental actors unacceptable discretionary authority around contributions
and entitlements, as highlighted by historical research on the evolution of
social security pensions—particularly Shapiro’s seminal contribution,
which highlighted a “typical universal life-cycle” that is defined by its
arbitrary treatment of successive cohorts of retirees (Shapiro 2007). The
“early stage” is made distinctive by its juxtaposition of generous benefits
for retirees—“much higher than they would have received had they
invested their contributions in the market” (Shapiro 2007, p. 156)—and
low payroll taxes. In direct contrast, the “mature stage”—where we are
today—is marked by the juxtaposition of diminishing benefits and escalat-
ing payroll taxes, as governments adjust to increasingly adverse demo-
graphics. Where the substance of entitlements is shaped only by the
vicissitudes of electioneering, or economic expedience, we can have little
confidence that it is able to track people’s deserts.
The alternative to social insurance is to rely on a funded pension to
deliver the second pillar, an arrangement that has been dominant in several
national jurisdictions (Hyde et al. 2006; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
Considered in terms of retirement income security, funded pensions
have several advantages over statutory income transfer programmes. In
principle, the requirement for workers to save for their own retirement
should eliminate any epistemological constraints on the determination of
benefit entitlements. Each workers’ accumulated assets are protected by
legally enforceable property rights and—in theory at least—cannot be
eroded by predatory intrusion (Impávido et al. 2010; Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016). Funding presumes a consistent relationship between
savings effort and entitlements, ensuring that workers receive as retirement
benefits the assets that they have accumulated during the active stage.
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Though they share these attributes, defined contribution (DC) pensions
seem to be the least satisfactory approach to funding. Much of the
reported uncertainty around DC pensions is an artefact of their distinctive
method of determining entitlements, which are enumerated at the point
when workers disengage from economic activity, and are graduated
according to the financial assets that have been realised (Blake 2006;
Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). Inevitably, accumulation is impaired by
poor investment returns, a consequence of sub-optimal portfolio selec-
tion, and market adversity. At the same time, entitlements can be eroded
by the imposition of excessive management charges, an increasingly pre-
valent feature of the DC sector, reflecting intense pension fund manage-
ment industry concentration (Hyde and Borzutzky 2015). Not
surprisingly, such contingencies—so “arbitrary from a moral point of
view” (Rawls 1971, p. 103)—have diminished the intensity of the rela-
tionship between savings effort and entitlement. Instead of giving them
security, DC pensions give workers a “lottery ticket” which makes “aver-
age final wealth for given contributions a function of conception date and
date of birth” (Modigliani and Muralidhar 2005, p. 58). What is required
is an approach to pension design that is able to mitigate the impact of
morally arbitrary contingencies.
This challenge is arguably addressed by defined benefit (DB) pensions,
which specify a legally enforceable promise of entitlements at the start of
the accumulation process (Blake 2006; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). In
principle, its capacity to generate predictable horizons around the relation-
ship between savings effort and entitlements suggests that the DB princi-
ple must be a foundational element of just pension design (3A, Table 3.1).
And yet several characteristics of existing DB schemes seem to detract
from this stability.
Reflecting substantial shortfalls of scheme assets to meet the DB promise,
“under-funding” has become an increasingly prevalent source of retirement
income insecurity (Hyde and Dixon 2004; Ghilarducci 2008; Maurer et al.
2012). Our emphasis here on the importance of desert—particularly con-
cerns around “agent-responsibility” (Rawls 1971)—could suggest several
responses.Where it is clear that they have neglected their own responsibilities
(eg., by taking “contribution holidays”, or permitting sub-optimal adminis-
tration), sponsoring employers should be required to take appropriate ame-
liorative action, such as “deficiency payments” (3B) (Blake 2006). But in
circumstances where it is difficult to assign blame or credit for outcomes,6 we
should adopt a default rule of “equality” (Miller 1999),7 where the costs of
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Table 3.1 Desert and just pension design
Design feature Justice imperative
Security
3A. Defined benefit principle. The benefit is
defined at the start of the accumulation
process, serving as a promise of entitlement.
Generally protects the accumulation of
entitlements against adverse contingencies,
such as investment and longevity risk.
3B. Employers should be held responsible
for deficits that reflect their own
negligence.
Desert requires the distribution of benefits
and burdens to track agent-responsibility.
Scheme sponsors should be given
responsibility for rectifying any deficits that
they have created.
3C. An appropriate risk-sharing mechanism
that permits appropriate adjustments to the
affiliated individual’s contributions in the
event of scheme underfunding, as indicated
by unanticipated increases in life-
expectancy or sub-optimal investment
performance.
Where it is difficult to determine who is
responsible for under-funding, we should
adopt a default rule of “equality”—which
means shared responsibility.
3D. Shared responsibility for financing
insurance against scheme insolvency.
The locus of responsibility for
unanticipated contingencies cannot be
known in advance. In such circumstances,
the costs of insurance should be shared.
3E. Obligation on employers to arrange
DB coverage for all employees who want it.
This ensures that all workers are given the
opportunity to defer their earnings, if they
want to.
Inclusiveness
3F. Universal right to participate a DB
scheme.
Giving all workers a meaningful option to
save for their retirement
3G. State subsidised contributions for those
in unpaid domestic care work.
Where domestic workers are delivering
benefits to society, their remuneration
should be financed by tax-payers—at least
to some degree.
3H. Uniform NCR based on an index of
remuneration for salaried care workers.
Where it is difficult to assign responsibility
for the benefits that are generated by
domestic labour, the default rule of equality
requires uniformity of entitlement.
Fittingness
3I. Unit of entitlement: the affiliated
individual only.
Desert is concerned with the performance
of individuals. This means that
remuneration—whether immediate or
deferred—should track differentials of
individual performance.
(continued )
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remedial action to address under-funding are shared by employers and work-
ers. The design of an appropriate “risk-sharing mechanism” (3C) should
provide for the imposition of upper and lower limits for the “realised funded
ratio” (RFR)—the ratio of scheme assets to liabilities. If the RFR at yearend
falls within the acceptable range of values, no action is taken. But if the RFR
falls short of the “lower trigger, the [shared] contribution of the next year will
be increased” (Modigliani and Muralidhar 2005, p. 211), such that the
scheme is “fully funded”. This emphasis on risk-sharing could be extended
to meet the costs of payment protection insurance (3D), which protects
workers’ entitlements in the event of scheme insolvency. While some might
regard this emphasis on the importance of “shared” responsibility with dis-
may,8 it is clear that such arrangements are compliant with the DB principle
which,while fixing entitlements at the start, allows for variable contributions.9
Staying with security, we might also be sceptical about pension design
that permits inconsistent treatment with regard to the opportunity to
accumulate entitlements. This applies with particular force to the growing
prevalence of “healthy terminations”, where solvent DB schemes are
“frozen” (closed to new employees, with the cessation of accruals for
existing members) and replaced with workplace DC arrangements,
which are typically less generous, and expose scheme members to con-
siderable investment risk (Maurer et al. 2012; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
As well as diminishing security, this involves an arbitrary adjustment of
entitlements, for the retirement prospects of later cohorts of workers are
substantially impaired relative to those who were able to rely entirely on
the DB arrangement—irrespective of underlying contribution profiles.
One way to address this potential anomaly is to make the responsibility
to provide a workplace DB scheme, or to facilitate participation in a wider
DB arrangement such as an occupational or industry scheme, compulsory
Table 3.1 (continued)
Design feature Justice imperative
3J. A requirement imposed on pension
funds to demonstrate, periodically, how
investment activity generates societal
benefits.
Reflecting the requirement that
remuneration should track differentials in
the creation of value.
3K. Progressive taxation of interest income
to ensure that it tracks individual sacrifice.
The degree of sacrifice involved in saving
and investing varies in inverse proportion to
income and wealth.
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for employers—as is accepted in several continental European countries
(3E). The burden of compliance with this requirement could be a legit-
imate concern, but would certainly be eased by the risk-sharing mechan-
ism that we have endorsed.
Inclusiveness
A second benchmark to inform the design of second pillar pensions is
inclusiveness—the proportion of active workers who are permitted to
participate in the DB arrangement. As a matter of distributive justice,
the desert principle does not require workers to defer their earnings by
affiliating to a second pillar retirement scheme. What matters is the degree
of correspondence between the distribution of earnings and appropriate
desert bases. Even so, feminist scholars of income transfer programmes
such as pensions have asserted a pivotal role for the second pillar in
addressing the deserts of women, who are disproportionately involved in
unpaid domestic labour. Ginn reminds us that this work is of vital impor-
tance to society because it “brings a double contribution to welfare
systems: it increases the availability of men for paid work; and it relieves
the state of its obligation to children, the elderly and the sick” (Ginn
2004, p. 15). In spite of the considerable value-to-society that is delivered
by women through their involvement in unpaid domestic work, their
deserts are not satisfactorily addressed by supplementary pensions, which
exclude those who are deemed to be “economically inactive”.
Nancy Fraser’s seminal work (1996) around this problem illustrates the
potential importance of inclusiveness as a desert-relevant issue. As amatter of
principle, we could insist that the central focus for policy-makers should be
the injustice of the work-based system of remuneration that is failing to
distribute income in accordance with desert. In terms of developing an
appropriate policy response, this would require a programme of “transfor-
mative redistribution” to ensure that all who are engaged in work in the
informal, private and public sectors, are remunerated according to their
deserts.10 According to this analysis, it is the work-based system of remu-
neration that should be made inclusive, not the second pillar pension
arrangement. But feminist writers such as Ginn are troubled by this
approach, not because they deem it undesirable, but because it seems to
postpone the immediate task of addressingwomen’s diminutive entitlements
as retirees. They seem to concur with the central thrust of Fraser’s second
response which seeks to “redress mal-distribution by altering end-state
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patterns of allocation without disturbing the underlying mechanisms that
generate them” (Fraser 1996, p. 45). Where second pillar pensions are
regarded as a prominent means by which the deserts of unpaid care workers
are addressed, the degree of inclusiveness becomes a vitally important issue.
The problem of access to a scheme could be approached by giving all
workers a right to participate in a DB pension arrangement, regardless of
the form their work takes, its sectoral locus, or the number of hours it
involves (3F). The only condition that must be satisfied is the definitional
requirement that an activity can count as “work” only if it results in the
production of goods or services that have value to others, either because
they are demanded by consumers, or because they are deemed by the
public authority to contribute to the common good (Millar 1999; White
2004). If there is no employer, or if it is otherwise impossible for such
workers to arrange affiliation to an DB scheme, the state could act as the
provider-of-last-resort.
The importance of women’s work in the home to “societal” well-being
could suggest that the state should be involved in some way in its remu-
neration. As far as the deferral of earnings in the DB pension arrangement
is concerned, this could manifest as tax-payer-financed contributions for
all who are engaged in such work (3G). But how can the value of such
contributions be determined when there are no earnings from which they
can be derived? To the extent that this has been addressed by existing
retirement systems, the most prevalent approach is to derive a notional
contribution rate (NCR) from an index of earnings in formal employment,
such as the affiliated individual’s earnings prior to their involvement in
domestic labour (Gillion et al. 2000). This could be justified in terms of
opportunity cost, or the sacrifice involved in giving up the advantages of
paid employment, but is vulnerable to the objection that earnings at earlier
points in people’s working lives are irrelevant to any appraisal of their
current involvement in unpaid work (Ginn 2004). And what happens if
there has been no prior economic activity?
Recall that our conceptualisation of economic desert requires remu-
neration to track the work-performance for which individuals are respon-
sible. In principle, this might require us to determine a NCR in terms of
some index of performance differentials that are realised through unpaid
domestic labour, but such an enterprise could be hampered by intractable
epistemic difficulties. There are potentially enormous problems in distin-
guishing domestic labour that counts only as “private” activity from work
that may properly be regarded as delivering value-to-society: “depending
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on what view the community has [if it has one], having and raising
children does become, beyond a point, a purely private good” (White
2004, p. 111). Furthermore, the performance that is realised through
unpaid domestic labour may not be knowable until a substantial period
of time has elapsed—when for example children make the transition to
adulthood and become the next generation of citizens. If the productive
achievements that are generated by such work cannot be known with any
degree of precision, on what basis can they be legitimately remunerated, at
least for the purposes of generating an appropriate schedule of state-
financed contributions? Recall Miller’s default rule of “equality” to
address circumstances where it is difficult to assign blame or credit for
outcomes, since this is likely to minimise the degree of injustice (Miller
1999). If this is accepted, the fairest approach would be to apply a uniform
NCR to workers who are involved in unpaid caring responsibilities, linked
perhaps to some index of the remuneration of salaried care workers (3H).
Fittingness
The third benchmark is the degree of fittingness that is likely to be
generated by DB pensions (Olsaretti 2004, 2007). Does the achieved
distribution of retirement income correspond to the deserts of benefici-
aries, or is retirement income allocated irrespective of differentials in their
work-performance? As we have suggested, the desert principle requires the
elimination of transfers that cannot be grounded unambiguously in the
individual’s own economic activity.
Fundamentally, this means that individuals should be rewarded for their
own performance, not the performances of other agents. This requirement
could give rise to serious doubts about the legitimacy of “derived benefits”
such as survivors’ pensions, which are commonly provided for the spouses
of deceased DB scheme members. This arrangement has hitherto been
justified on the grounds that the labour force participation of married
women is impaired by their responsibilities for unpaid domestic labour,
and this should be acknowledged financially through entitlements under
their partner’s pension. But entitlements to a derived pension apply irre-
spective of any prior involvement in unpaid domestic labour, which means
that they cannot be justified unambiguously—if at all—in terms of the
beneficiary’s own work-performance. Following one prominent analysis,
we question whether derived benefits remain “justifiable, given the social
changes of the twentieth century. Instead, it would be simpler and fairer to
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‘individualise’ pensions—phasing out derived benefits and replacing them
with improved pension protection for those with caring commitments”
(Ginn 2004, p. 5) (3I), as highlighted by our discussion of inclusiveness.
But the legitimacy of derived benefits does not exhaust the issue of
fittingness with regard to work-related pensions.
Recall that retirement assets in a funded pension scheme are generated in
two salient ways; normal contribution revenue is represented by the deferral of
earnings from work; while investment income manifests as the interest that
tracks capital ownership. Up to this point, Chapter 3 has largely been con-
cerned with the deserts of plan participants as “workers”, but now we turn to
their role as “savers”, investing their accumulated assets in financial instru-
ments—such as corporate equities, bonds, and derivatives. Can the distribu-
tion of investment income ever be regarded as just, because it corresponds to
the deserts of beneficiaries? For a prominent critique of financial markets in the
corporate economy,11 the answer to this question must be negative because
capital-ownership does not contribute directly to the production or distribu-
tion of goods or services, and fails to generate the value that could ground
legitimate claims to remunerative transfers. The owners of financial securities
sit there enjoying a life of opulence that was ultimately generated by the
productive labour of others, and thus have a parasitical relationship to the
“real” economy. Although this critique of financial markets has gained con-
siderable traction in recent years, desert theorists insist on the possibility of an
appropriate justification for interest income, but only where certain conditions
are in place. This can be illustrated in two ways.
Looking first at outcomes, interest income may be considered legiti-
mate where investment generates value-to-society in some recognisable
form. In a recent contribution to the debate, White (2004) defines this
“generative contribution” as investment activity that augments society’s
production possibilities and horizons beyond what they would otherwise
have been. Inevitably, there is considerable disagreement regarding the
value of the outcomes that are generated by investment activity in existing
financial markets. On the one hand, it has been argued by critics of the
financial services industry that investment activity typically gives rise to
adverse economic consequences for workers and the communities in
which they live, reflecting the myopic investment horizons of professional
asset managers, as well as excessive greed (Baker and Fung 1999). On the
other hand, those who endorse minimally regulated financial markets
insist that free enterprise delivers value-to-society over the long term by
generating and diffusing the benefits of economic prosperity. In this
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context, the role of pension funds in facilitating economic development is
virtuous because they ensure that financial resources flow to efficient and
competitive firms, rather than companies whose market performance is
sub-optimal. This highlights the possibility that capital ownership can
generate benefits for others, a prerequisite for justifying interest income
against the requirements of the desert principle. In a DB scheme that is
desert-prioritising, pension fund managers should be required to demon-
strate the positive economic impact of their investment decisions and
strategies at periodic intervals (3J) (Hebb 2008). While the realisation of
such benefits is a necessary condition for regarding remunerative transfers
as just, however, it cannot be sufficient.
Turning to effort, it could be argued that interest income is not justifiable in
termsof thedesert principle because individual investors are not responsible for
the societal benefits that arise from investment activity. As owners of capital,
they act only as gatekeepers to a particular productive asset, not as producers of
goods or services. This means that interest should be regarded only as “the
price that others pay him to open the gate and let them use the asset” (White
2004, p. 120), not as legitimate remuneration for productive activity. While
this is an important concern, we should acknowledge the argument that direct
involvement in the work that produces goods or services does not exhaust the
possibilities for contributing to beneficial economic activity. For White, an
appropriate justification for returns to “earnings-derived saving” could be
developed in terms of the “sacrifice” that is involved in postponing immediate
consumption. Following the logic of the desert principle, which requires
earnings’ differentials to track individual performance, the level of return to
savings should be proportional to the degree of sacrifice that is made in
deferring immediate consumption. The problem with existing arrangements
for generating such returns is their failure to “discriminate between savers
making a genuine sacrifice and those not: in a perfectly competitive market,
all get the same rate of interest”.12 This failure to track differentials in sacrifice
might in turn suggest that it falls to the state to take appropriate action, if justice
is to be served. This could be addressed through the imposition of a regime of
progressive taxation for interest income (3K).13
CONCLUSION
While it is not universally endorsed, the desert principle has been salient in
recent debates about the substance of distributive justice, and for very
compelling reasons. As reported elsewhere (Miller 1999; Bode 2008), the
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notion that people should be rewarded in accordance with their merits is
widely endorsed by the people, and is deeply embedded in the culture of
the market. While this much is clear, there has been substantial disagree-
ment among scholars of political philosophy around the meaning and
importance of desert, as well as its implications for the legitimate scope
of governmental action. Many reject the desert principle outright, arguing
that agents can never be responsible for the circumstances that generate
inequalities of reward (Rawls 1971, 2003). In contrast, a small but grow-
ing band of political philosophers insist that people are able to exercise
such responsibility, and should be rewarded for their efforts (Olsaretti
2004; Hyde and Dixon 2009). Our analysis of liberalism ultimately
accepts this endorsement of desert, though its implications for the design
of income transfer programmes are not immediately obvious.
While need has been central to the design of the retirement income safety-
net, the desert principle has figured prominently in debates about the institu-
tional architecture of supplementary work-based pensions. Where the first
pillar redistributes financial resources vertically from the economically active
to the least advantaged, the retirement schemes of the secondpillar redistribute
each worker’s earnings horizontally across the lifecourse (Blake 2006). And,
although the social security safety-net emphasises compulsory collective
responsibility for retirement, the second pillar requires individual responsibility
and self-provisioning. And yet a careful appraisal of existing second pillar
pensions would highlight variable capacities to address people’s deserts.
Publicly managed pensions have been influenced by the moral repertoire of
desert, but distribute benefits in accordance with economic and political
expedience (Shapiro 2007; Hyde and Dixon 2009). Increasingly prevalent in
the world of pension reform, fully funded retirement schemes are subject to
morally arbitrary contingencies such as predatory charging, and investment risk
(Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). In principle, we find that the security conferred
by the DB “promise” is able to sustain a consistent relationship between
earnings deferral and benefit entitlements. Unusually for the literature of
pension design, our analysis has given considerable substance to the measures
that are able to sustain compliance with the demands of desert.
NOTES
1. “Pre-institutional desert” refers to desert claims that are based on some prior
normative imperative, independently of the institutional arrangements in
which desert claims arise. By contrast, and as the designation suggests,
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“institutional desert” is an artefact of institutional arrangements (Olsaretti
2004, 2007).
2. This may be because a scheme has been improperly managed by its sponsors,
or any other authorised decision makers, or because managers have acted in
a fraudulent way (Blake 2006).
3. Which could be more than 45 years, given evidence of increased life-expec-
tancy (Macnicol 2015).
4. Under “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) financed retirement schemes, benefits are
paid for by imposing a social security tax on workers, with the expectation
that they will be similarly supported when they reach retirement (Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016).
5. When legal scholars discuss “property”, they are referring to a bundle of
rights defined by law, not physical objects. If there are no rights, there is no
property (Rounds 2004).
6. It may be difficult to assign responsibility for deficiencies that result from
market-driven fluctuations of investment income, or growing life-
expectancy.
7. Under conditions of uncertainty, where an array of causes are equally probable
(or difficult to disentangle), a default rule of “equality” minimises “the max-
imum possible injustice done to any one individual” (Miller 1999, p. 235).
8. Socialist-collectivists regard DB pensions as a means of vertical income
redistribution, transferring financial resources from employers to workers,
and statutory measures to share the costs of pension financing are dismissed
as “regressive” (Minns 2001; Blackburn 2002). Yet when their institutional
architecture is shaped in accordance with desert, DB pensions should be
regarded as a means of horizontal income redistribution, giving workers the
opportunity to save for their own retirement.
9. Given the characteristic design of DB pensions, this emphasis on risk-
sharing represents a substantial departure from the status quo. Across a
range of national jurisdictions, employers are given disproportionate
responsibility for rectifying under-funding (Hyde et al. 2006; Maurer
et al. 2012).
10. This would of course empower workers, financially, to affiliate to a second
pillar pension.
11. Tawney dismisses share ownership as “functionless property”, generating
income for shareholders without augmenting societal wealth. See R.H.
Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (1921). This has been echoed by more
recent contributions to the debate (for example see Baker and Fung
1999).
12. In a DB pension scheme, contributions are invested on behalf of its mem-
bers as a group, not individually, which means that realised rates of return
are applied uniformly.
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13. Since the “discrepancy between interest and sacrifice is likely to be greatest
for high-income, wealthy savers, we can assume as a general matter people
are entitled to a greater proportion of the interest income they receive, the
less income and wealth they have” (White 2004, p. 123).
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CHAPTER 4
Citizenship and Just Pension Design
Abstract As a principle of justice, Citizenship designates the universal
rights and obligations that are required to protect liberty. While all liberals
assert the importance of individual sovereignty, there has been substantial
disagreement around the legitimate scope and substance of citizenship.
Classical liberals maintain that liberty is optimised only where governmen-
tal action is directed towards the possibility of coercive intrusion by other
people. While accepting the requirement for an appropriate regime of
negative rights, egalitarian liberals insist that liberty requires access to
external resources, such as those made possible by redistributive income
transfers. Considered only in terms of citizenship, a just retirement system
must address the reality of financial insecurity, as well as the possibility of
coercion.
Keywords Citizenship  Negative rights  Positive rights  Right to retire-
ment  Right to work  Non-specific freedom
INTRODUCTION
A salient characteristic of the normative principles examined in the previous
chapters is their focus on the circumstances of particular groups of retirees.
Need is premised on the notion of a minimally acceptable standard of living,
and demands appropriate governmental action to ameliorate financial
impoverishment (Doyal and Gough 1991; Schmidtz 2005). Desert gives
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expression to the conviction that earnings should track performance at work,
and requires state intervention to ensure thatmarkets reward success, reliably
and consistently (Olsaretti 2004, 2007). Citizenship departs from these
concerns in two important respects. Justice requires equality of entitlement
to designated resources and opportunities, such as protection against coer-
cive intrusion, the possibility of involvement in collective decisionmaking, or
financial security (Marshall 1950; Kelly 1998). Reflecting this emphasis on
inclusiveness, citizenship demands universality of access to goods, services, or
income transfers. By whatever legal or institutional means are deemed
appropriate to the task, justice gives designated legal rights to all citizens
(Carter 1999; Machan 2006). The question is, what do these characteristics
imply for the design of retirement systems, or any constitutive elements?
Even a cursory glance at the literature of social security would highlight the
salience of concerns around citizenship in shaping the evolution of existing
retirement systems. A broad commitment to laissez faire during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries signified an endorsement of the
Enlightenment project, particularly its emphasis on the importance of negative
rights—in terms of retirement, the right to take action to participate in
economic activity, and to accumulate property in an environment that is free
of predatory intrusion (Kelly 1998;Machan 2006). Formuch of the twentieth
century, retirement systems were shaped by a dirigiste mode of governance
that conferred positive rights of citizenship—essentially, a right to redistributive
income transfers and other benefits (Marshall 1950; Armstrong 2006). Even
more recently, social security policy has embraced a concernwith citizenship as
obligation, particularly individual responsibilities around work and self-provi-
sioning (Hyde et al. 1999; Etzioni and Brodbeck 2010). In a variety of ways,
citizenship has been an enduring ideal in the world of pension reform.
Characteristically, social policy analysis has been highly critical of the
“liberal” welfare state, particularly its emphasis on individualism, the cash
nexus, and free market competition (Esping-Andersen 1990; Armstrong
2006). Although privately managed pension arrangements give consumers
a degree of choice around the means of self-provisioning, their commodify-
ing impetus is incompatible with retirement income security, a cornerstone
of the universal welfare state (Titmuss 1974, Layard 2005; Rothstein and
Uslanner 2005). While we are sceptical about this characterisation of “lib-
eral” retirement provision—and liberalism more generally—its critique of
the market usefully highlights the possibility of economic barriers to liberty,
because sovereign decision making invariably requires the financial means to
act (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 2000). In amplifying these concerns, our analysis
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here in Chapter 4 articulates a distinctive variant of egalitarian liberal citizen-
ship as equal regard for the basic liberties of all, with particular reference to
the design of pensions. This is approached in two ways.
1. First, we develop an appropriate normative foundation for pension
design by engaging with liberal discourses around the substance of
citizenship entitlements, as well as their underlying philosophical
rationale. While all liberals assert the importance of statutory protec-
tion against coercion, only some regard inequalities of income,
wealth, and power as salient barriers to liberty. Classical liberalism
is characterised by a narrow focus on entitlements to protection
against involuntary interference by other people. In highlighting
the adverse consequences of economic and political inequalities for
liberty, egalitarian liberals articulate a more comprehensive account
of the statutory measures that are necessary to sustain citizenship.
2. Second, and reflecting this normative foundation, we explore the
requirements of justice as citizenship for the design of retirement
income protection. Our analysis finds that citizenship requires a
range of statutory measures to protect individual capacities for
sovereign decision making around salient aspects of “the good”,
particularly the balance between work and leisure. Significantly,
this includes the right to statutory income transfers, and state invol-
vement in shaping the design of the retirement system.
APPROPRIATE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
For much of the relevant literature (Marshall 1950; Kelly 1998; Carter
1999; Armstrong 2006), citizenship refers to the shared status of societal
membership. In a seminal contribution to the debate, Duhamel and Mény
(1992) regard “citizens” as members of a wider “territorial political com-
munity, independently of belonging to particular collectives” (p. 46), or
day-to-day associations. García-Inda (2008) emphasises citizenship as a
political relationship, conferring societal membership by means of govern-
mental action to enforce shared rights and responsibilities. Thinking about
this in terms of our emphasis on the primacy of liberty, a “free citizen” is a
“member of a free society [ . . . ] who shares the rights in this society, and
enjoys its privileges” (p. 26). In a classic formulation that has considerable
relevance to our analysis of just pension design, TH Marshall (1950)
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defines citizenship as a relationship of equality within the nation-state,
requiring protection against coercion, as well as statutory rights to ser-
vices, income transfers and opportunities.
Inevitably, the argument that public laws and institutions should be
deployed as means of sustaining equality of status can be unpacked in very
different ways, reflecting substantial disagreement around the ends of
justice. Many public philosophies define citizenship with reference to
some specific conception of “the good”, giving expression to the primacy
of shared norms and values (Titmuss 1974; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005;
Etzioni and Brodbeck 2010). Crucially, liberalism differs from these
approaches in its refusal to endorse a role for the state in articulating and
taking action to realise any vision of “the good”. To the very significant
extent that they endorse citizenship, liberals define its underlying norma-
tive impetus as equal regard for each agent’s liberty. Not surprisingly, in
view of our understanding of liberalism (Chapter 1), freedom is necessary
to enable them to realise their own conception of “the good”—“to do
what they want to do” (Carter 1999, p. 4)—requiring the absence of
illegitimate constraints on the scope of individual action. According to its
liberal exponents, justice consists in a “distribution of freedom that is
either maximal [ . . . ] or a ‘minimal freedom for all’” (Carter 1999, p. 4).
In conferring rights to protect individual freedom, citizenship is the public
means by which justice can be realised. Beyond these general features,
there has been considerable disagreement around the legitimate scope of
governmental action to protect basic liberties.
Classical Liberalism
Unlike several influential perspectives on citizenship (Rawls 1971;
Anderson 1999; Armstrong 2006), classical liberalism has demonstrated
a remarkable disregard for political rights, democratic decision making,
and the political process more generally. Fundamentally, this reflects the
foundational belief in the priority of individual over collective decision
making (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974; Machan 2006). Liberty is given
primacy because it gives all agents the opportunity to determine and
pursue their own conception of “the good” as a private matter, not an as
an object of public concern. The minimal state is endorsed across the
spectrum of classical liberal political philosophy, though its normative
foundations have been articulated in very different ways, with very differ-
ent implications for the design of income transfer programmes.
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As the designation might suggest, the natural rights libertarian con-
ception of citizenship rests on a distinctive understanding of human
nature, emphasising salient capacities for sovereign engagement with the
external environment in pursuit of “the good”. Some libertarians empha-
sise the importance of universal capacities for conscious choice, irrespec-
tive of its substance (Kant 1965; Nozick 1974). Unlike all other known
species, “human” agents are able to deliberate, and take action to shape
their circumstances in accordance with their sovereign preferences. For the
intellectual architects of the Enlightenment, a “person”—unlike a
“thing”—has the capacity to choose on the basis of “reasons”. Kant
(1965) extends this characterisation by linking these capacities to notions
of dignity and respect, for the only entity that has “absolute worth” is that
which is capable of deliberative action. By refraining from coercive inter-
ference in other people’s affairs, we regard them as an end in their own
right, not merely as a means to our own ends. Thus conceived, liberty has
intrinsic value, and our plans and projects would have little internal
resonance unless we chose them, and had some substantial role in shaping
them. Alternatively, some libertarian accounts of justice assign instrumen-
tal value to freedom, emphasising the importance of universal human
capacities for self-sustaining engagement with the external environment
(Rand 1967; Smith 2006). Unlike other species, it is clear that human
agents cannot survive and prosper by relying solely on instinctive action.
Everything that “man needs has to be discovered by his mind and pro-
duced by his effort” (Rand 1967, p. 8), but people do not “come with a
book of instructions. Though biology and culture give us various ends,
we need to order these ends, figure out the best way to pursue them,
evaluate whether that are really worth pursuing, and—since we are all
quite fallible—very likely revise some of them” (Shapiro 2010, p. 49).
People are born naked into the world, and must use their minds to take
and adapt resources from the external environment. Liberty is regarded as
important by both accounts because it gives agents the opportunity to
deploy their capacities for sovereign decision making.
Given our focus here on citizenship, it is important to emphasise the
conceptual distinction between “moral” and “political” rights (Kelly 1998).
Foundationally, the legitimacy of self-ownership and property rights is
derived from distinctly human capacities for conscious deliberation and
self-sustaining action. Given what is known about fallibilities of perception
and decision making (Long and Machan 2008), however, there can be no
guarantees that these moral rights will be taken for granted and respected.
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For much of the academic mainstream of libertarianism, the legal and
institutional repertoire of citizenship is exhausted by a statutory regime of
negative rights to protect individuals against coercive intrusion—not positive
rights, which give people access to designated goods, services, or income
transfers (Kelly 1998; Machan 2006). In the words of one prominent
exponent of laissez faire, negative rights “guarantee freedom from interfer-
ence by others”, while positive rights “guarantee freedom to have various
things that are regarded as necessities” (Kelly 1998, p. 22). This means of
course that they differ with regard to any obligations that are imposed on
citizens. Negative rights impose a duty of forbearance—a moral duty to
refrain from interferingwith others—but positive rights require the econom-
ically active to finance the redistributive transfers that would instantiate
citizenship. Rather than presenting policy-makers with a list of designated
rights—a prevalent feature of the field (Marshall 1950; Doyal and Gough
1991)—libertarians simplify the task of designing and administering citizen-
ship by prohibiting any action that is coercive. It follows that they are highly
critical of designs for public policy that extend beyond this role.
Above all perhaps, the welfare state violates self-ownership by institu-
tionalising paternalistic intrusion in our lives (Skoble 2005). Social insur-
ance systems have responded to demographic ageing by forcing older
workers to disengage from economic activity, with financial support guar-
anteed by tax-payers. But public pensions violate liberty by compelling
people to work for the benefit of others. In his controversial assertion of
the case for the minimal state, Nozick (1974) regards payroll taxes as a
mechanism for inducing “forced labour”, reflecting the time and effort
required to finance social security benefits. In mandating redistributive
income transfers, the characteristic design of the welfare state gives expres-
sion to altruism, a principle of association which regards service to others
as society’s highest ideal (Rand 1967). In effect, it treats each workers’
talents, “initiative, intelligence, dedication to his goals, and all other
qualities that make success possible” as personal liabilities, giving them
compulsory obligations to “those with less ability, initiative, less intelli-
gence, or dedication” (Kelly 1998, p. 99). Reflecting its unwavering
commitment to the primacy of liberty, libertarianism insists that the
legitimate scope of governmental action is indicated by its role in enfor-
cing the negative rights of citizenship. Though these arguments have been
articulated cogently and persuasively, libertarianism is limited by a failure
to acknowledge the importance of a range of barriers to liberty (Dworkin
2000; Rawls 2003) (Chapter 2).
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While utilitarians endorse the role of the minimal state in protecting
negative rights (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962), their reasons for doing so
rest on intense scepticism about its foundation in attributes of human nature.
Some insist that the notion of “natural rights” is vacuous, and unable to supply
determinate criteria by which to evaluate economic and political institutions
(Bentham 1781; Friedman 1989). Others maintain that the requirement to
limit governmental action to the protection of negative rights can generate
sub-optimal distributive outcomes, such as intensified poverty (Hayek 1960;
Shapiro 2007). Naturally, libertarians question the possibility of incompatibil-
ities between liberty and welfare, because each agents’ sovereign preferences
are best satisfied where the state refrains from coercive intrusion. Thus, if
utility is “the general goal of legislation, natural rights are the standard, or rule,
which must be followed if this goal is to be achieved” (Smith 2012, p. 3). But
utilitarians insist that the efficacy of economic and political institutions is an
empirical question, requiring a careful appraisal of appropriate indicators of
welfare, rather than simple statements of moral principle.
Even a cursory glance at the literature of neo-classical economics would
reveal an overwhelming endorsement of liberty, highlighting its role in gen-
erating and diffusing the benefits of economic prosperity (Hayek 1960;
Friedman 1962; Friedman 1989; Conway 1995; Pennington 2010). The
relentless momentum of intense competition on the supply-side of the market
induces action to contain operating costs, including any expenses that are
passed on to workers as management charges (Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
Reflecting its inherent dynamism, a fully funded retirement system requires
“lower contribution rates than a pay-as-you-go system to achieve the same
pension benefits” (World Bank 1994, p. 302). Utilitarian scholars of social
security regard the enviable prosperity of retirees in privately managed pension
arrangements as an artefact of financial market deregulation. Freed from
stultifying regulatory intrusion, pension fund managers characteristically
respond to market forces by optimising portfolio selection and diversification,
generating the highest possible returns for given levels of risk (Tanner 2004).
Moreover, some have formally embraced the egalitarian concerns of social
policy analysis, highlighting the efficacy of the freemarket system as ameans of
sustaining income equality (Kelly 1998; Shapiro 2007). As well as optimising
flows of retirement income to the least-advantaged, fully funded pensions
create a sense of inter-generational justice by giving successive cohorts of
workers the same opportunities for self-reliance and provisioning. Looking
beneath the highly polarised rhetoric of the public debate around privatisation,
it is clear that liberty is vital to economic and social welfare.
CITIZENSHIP AND JUST PENSION DESIGN 91
At first glance, these arguments might suggest that both strands of
classical liberalism share a common vision of citizenship—one that points
in the direction of free markets and voluntary exchange, with governmen-
tal action confined to the protection of negative rights. Yet the centrality
of outcomes to the utilitarian variant gives rise to the possibility of public
responsibility to address “market failure”. Looking at the demand-side of
the pensions market, “myopia” designates a highly prevalent tendency to
deliberate in the present, to pay insufficient attention to the risk of
economic adversity in the future (Hayek 1960). Retirement planning
requires immediate and ongoing savings’ effort, but its consequences
cannot be known until many years have passed, when it may be too late
to take remedial action (Thompson 1998). Utilitarianism manages to
swerve the charge of paternalism by insisting that mandatory pensions
are intended to protect the interests of tax-payers, not to impose a lifestyle
choice on the least advantaged. The justification for governmental action,
“in this case, is not that people should be coerced into doing what is in
their individual interest but that, by neglecting to make such provision
they would become a charge to the public” (Hayek 1960, p. 249).
Turning to the supply-side of the pensions market, utilitarian scholars of
social security question the belief that voluntary exchange consistently
optimises the design and delivery of retirement income protection. Even
if workers could be relied on to act prudently with regard to their own
retirement futures, the pension fund managers responsible for administer-
ing their accumulated financial assets could not—at least not consistently.
Where capital markets are under-developed, the government can minimise
investment risk by imposing quantitative limits on designated financial
securities (Impávido et al. 2010). The possibility of excessive charging in
DC pension markets could justify draconian regulation to control fees and
commissions. And, for some, the prospect of sub-optimal investment
returns could give legitimacy to the imposition of statutory performance
minima. Since it is “the action of the state which makes necessary the
speeding up of developments that would otherwise have proceeded more
slowly, the cost of experimenting with and developing new types of
institutions may be regarded as no less the responsibility of the public”
(Hayek 1960, p. 249). But utilitarian exponents of privatisation are clear
that draconian regulation can only ever be a temporary expedient to
facilitate economic development under exceptional circumstances, and
should be withdrawn once pension markets are able to function in the
beneficial ways that are typical of voluntary exchange.
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These arguments suggest that utilitarianism is highly ambivalent with
regard to citizenship. On the one hand, it is clear that there is a degree of
convergence between both variants of classical liberalism around the
importance of negative rights, since each endorses economic arrangements
that rely on voluntary exchange to produce goods, services, and income
transfers. While quite different in principle, both “frequently lead to the
same conclusion” (Friedman 1989, p. 178). On the other hand, there are
very substantial differences. Each posits a distinctive justification for the
primacy of liberty, with characteristic implications for the nature and scope
of governmental action. For libertarians, negative rights are required to
protect the possibility of sovereign decision making; but for utilitarians,
negative rights are conducive to economic development and prosperity.
To the extent that justice can be regarded as important, it is merely one of
several concerns that direct us towards a “new social security system based
on individually owned, and privately invested retirement accounts”
(Shapiro 2007, p. 2). Libertarians insist that negative rights must always
be protected, irrespective of any other concerns. But utilitarians are clear
that negative rights are important only in-so-far as the liberty that they
protect is able to optimise welfare. Under some “circumstances, rights
violations must be evaluated on their merits rather than conventional
natural rights grounds” (Friedman 1989, p. 173). The utilitarian endorse-
ment of citizenship is clear but highly conditional. While it highlights
concerns that are neglected by libertarians, utilitarianism is limited by its
failure to acknowledge the devastating consequences of untrammelled
markets for the financial well-being of the least advantaged (Hyde and
Borzutzky 2016) (Chapter 2).
Egalitarian Liberalism
Much like scholars of classical liberalism, egalitarian liberals regard the legal
and institutional architecture of citizenship as the means by which the
primacy of liberty can be put into effect. What distinguishes egalitarian
from classical liberal political philosophy is its intense scepticism of laissez
faire, and the capacity of the minimal state to protect individual freedom—
at least equitably and consistently (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 2000;
Vallentyne 2007). As well as giving expression to voluntary exchange,
the market generates enormous reservoirs of economic disadvantage,
curtailing choice for those at the bottom of society, and diminishing
liberty. Seen against the background of these possibilities, citizenship
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requires governmental action to arrange a more symmetrical distribu-
tion of resources and opportunities.
As indicated previously, the prioritarian variant of egalitarian liberal-
ism is exemplified by Rawlsian justice, which requires a highly dirigiste
mode of governance to generate an egalitarian distribution of resources
and opportunities (Shapiro 2007, 2010). To the limited extent that
they have deployed insights from Rawls’ seminal contribution (1971,
2003), scholars of social policy have focussed disproportionately on the
difference principle (Korpi and Palme 1998; Kangas 2000) and, less
prominently, his rebuttal of desert. Far less attention has been directed
towards Rawls’ account as a theory of citizenship, and yet this emphasis
could not be less ambiguous. First and foremost, justice as fairness was
intended to specify the “principles that should govern relations
between free and equal citizens in a democratic polity” (Armstrong
2006, p. 27). Citizenship requires an egalitarian distribution of “pri-
mary goods”, which are defined as the “things needed and required by
[ . . . ] citizens who are fully cooperating members of society” (Rawls
2003, p. 58)—including “rights and liberties, powers and responsibil-
ities, income and wealth”, and the “social bases of self-respect” (Rawls
1971, p. 62). For some, Rawls’ distinctive emphasis on constitutional
citizenship rights confirms his status as the “legitimate heir to the
classical liberal tradition running from John Locke and, especially,
Immanuel Kant, for which the defining feature is the primacy of
liberty” (Lomasky 2005, p. 180). But appearances can be deceptive,
and a close inspection of justice as fairness reveals measures which,
while instantiating its egalitarian mission, are likely to circumscribe
individual freedom.
Most prominently, principle 1 gives each agent an equal right to the
most extensive system of equal basic liberties for everyone. Unlike
classical liberalism, which defines freedom broadly in terms of indivi-
dual sovereignty, Rawls analysis of justice generates a “list” of desig-
nated liberties that the state is morally bound to prioritise. While the
rationale for this approach is unclear, its consequences are not. Rawls
demonstrates salient biases that come into view if we disaggregate
principle 1.
• Political rights. In Rawls account of citizenship, political rights are
intended to ensure that no-one is arbitrarily prevented from partici-
pating in collective decision making, requiring the right to vote, and
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to be eligible for public office. Framed in this way, political freedom
is arguably the most prominent element of principle 1, and for good
reasons. Without these measures, collective decision making will be
dominated by the wealthy elite.1
• Civil rights. Regarded by Rawls as a subsidiary element of collective
decision making in a democratic society, civil rights—“freedom of
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and thought; freedom
from arbitrary arrest—are necessary to ensure that people are able to
express their political interests and preferences without persecution.
• Property rights. Libertarians endorse an unqualified right to exercise
discretionary control over external objects that have been acquired
by legitimate means (Nozick 1974). Rawls, in contrast, gives citizens
the right to hold “personal property” (1971, p. 61). No explanation
of the substance of “personal” is provided, though we may assume
that it is narrower in scope than the libertarian conception.2 On this
note, we should highlight Rawls’ self-affirmed neutrality between
private enterprise (with untrammelled private ownership) and
“democratic socialism” (with extensive public ownership).
All rights listed under principle 1 are regarded by Rawls as “constitutional
essentials”, and are assigned lexical priority over all other principles of justice as
fairness. Reflecting a trenchant critique of distribution according to arbitrary
social contingencies, principle 2a requires material advantages—income,
socio-economic status—to “be attached to offices and positions open to all”
(Rawls 2003, p. 42). While some principle of equality of opportunity is a
constitutional essential—for example, “a principle requiring an open society,
one with careers open to talents [ . . . ]—fair equality of opportunity requires
more than this, and is not counted as a constitutional essential” (Rawls 2003,
p. 49). And reflecting an uncompromising critique of distribution in accor-
dance with arbitrary native endowments, justice as fairness would impose
principle 2b—the difference principle—which requires inequalities of material
advantage to “be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 2003,
p. 43). But while a “social minimum providing for the basic needs of all
citizens is also a constitutional essential” (Rawls 2003, p. 48), the difference
principle is not.
When appraised in terms of the frame of reference set out in Chapter 1,
the strength of Rawlsian citizenship is the priority that is assigned to
individual liberty, and Rawls’ insistence that citizenship requires access
to material resources, for doing anything requires the use of external
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objects. Luck egalitarianism is highly critical of his tendency to prioritise
collective over individual decision making, arguing that it is incompatible
with a maximally free society, where “the good” is shaped only by the
sovereign preferences of free agents (Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000).
Considered as an ideal, any system of justice that prioritises collective
decision making over the private life of people detracts from individual
freedom,3 and for two reasons.
• Self-ownership. As we have noted, any political system that routinely
subjects acts of voluntary exchange to collective approval is likely to
erode self-ownership, the principle that each agent has absolute discre-
tionary control around the self—limited only by the equivalent sover-
eignty of other agents. In principle, a society of free people is “onewhich
leaves each of its members to decide what does and does not happen to
herself.However democratic, a“society cannotbe free if it does not grant
each of its members something like self-ownership” (Van Parijs 1995,
p. 8). Peoplemay of course get some re-assurance that their private plans
matter by Rawls’ insistence on the importance of civil rights.
• Property rights. By extension, collective decision making around the
production and distribution of goods and services could be regarded as
detrimental to liberty, since property rights are integral to voluntary
exchange. How can any of us “possibly be said to be free if she cannot
breath, eat, move, let alone preach or demonstrate without the approval
of the political community which owns everything in the world around
us except ourselves [ . . . ] It is [ . . . ] not just private ownership of oneself,
but also private ownership of external objects that is required in a free
society” (Van Parijs 1995, p. 10). People may not find sufficient reassur-
ance in Rawls’ insistence that they will be permitted to own “personal
property”, or his indifference between the market and collectivism.4
These issues become even more problematic when we turn to consider the
practice of collective decision making that is characteristic of existing liberal
democracies, the context that comes closest to realising the Rawlsian vision
of justice. Lomasky (2005) articulates the dilemma of asymmetrical distribu-
tional conflicts in the public arena as follows.
To be in possession of a full range of political freedoms renders one well-
provisioned in a democratic environment to campaign actively on their
behalf. However, the assurance thereby provided is slim. One’s potential
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opponents are equally graced with democratic freedoms, and if at the end of
the contest they should command a majority, then it will not necessarily be
much consolation to have had one’s day at the polls. If the subjectively
measured costs of the required sacrifice are high, then even those who possess
a firm sense of justice may find themselves reluctant to go along (p. 185).
Our main issue with Rawlsian citizenship, then, is its tendency to prioritise
collective over individual decision making. What is required is an approach
to justice that, while recognising the importance of governmental action
to protect liberty, leaves decisions about the nature of “the good” to
sovereign individuals.
APPROPRIATE PENSION SCHEME DESIGN
In Chapters 2 and 3, it was argued that the pillars of retirement systems are
each associated with a distinctive principle of justice. The first pillar
retirement income protection safety-net is intended to satisfy unmet
need, however defined (Millar 1999; Hyde and Dixon 2009); while the
second pillar should be regarded as a means of redistributing each person’s
earnings across the lifecourse, acknowledging people’s deserts in retire-
ment (Bode 2008; Hyde and Dixon 2009). In contrast, justice as citizen-
ship is concerned with the design and impact of the retirement system as a
whole. Does it afford universality of protection against coercive intrusion,
or are some treated as second class citizens? Going forward, which forms
of state intervention in the retirement system are conducive to first class
travel for all passengers at the end of life’s journey?
In a variety of ways, these questions have been at the heart of the
evolution of existing retirement systems. For much of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the deep attachment of political elites to laissez
faire gave expression to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, particularly
its insistence on the protection of negative liberty (Esping-Andersen 1990;
Bode 2008). “Retirement” was not a salient and universal expectation, yet
citizens all were given the right to save and accumulate assets to disengage
from work. A more familiar conception of citizenship came to prominence
over the course of the twentieth century, emphasising the importance of
statutory income transfers to sustain a minimum standard of living.
Historical narratives suggest that the norm of “social citizenship” became
a prominent feature of European welfare states (Marshall 1950; Blackburn
2002). “Old age” in Western societies was conceived of as a “social
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condition affecting each citizen, and requiring uniform treatment by
society” (Bode 2007, p. 699). Moving on, the late twentieth century
witnessed a substantive shift in the official narrative of citizenship in favour
of designated duties and obligations. According to its neoconservative
authors, the core rationale of governmental action is the protection of
society’s deepest and most cherished customs and values—such as the
family, social order, and the authority of economic and political elites
(Hyde 2014; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). In national jurisdictions
where the rhetoric of communitarianism became influential, social security
systems were recalibrated to emphasise the vital importance of work effort
and self-provisioning (Hyde et al. 1999).
While the direction of travel in retirement policy has been shaped by a
range of perspectives on citizenship, our concerns around pension design
here are more focussed. Reflecting the liberal affirmation of the primacy of
liberty, we confine our attention to the role of retirement systems in
enabling individuals to pursue their own conception of “the good”.
Which particular entitlements are sufficient to protect basic liberties,
such that all agents are treated as first class citizens?
The Right to Retirement
On close inspection, it is difficult to sustain the argument that retirement is
an inherent feature of the good life. Though culturally embedded, and
widely accepted across a range of national jurisdictions, retirement should
be regarded as a social construct—an artefact of state action that has
characteristically forced workers to disengage from economic activity once
they reach some arbitrarily imposed age (Walker 1981; Phillipson 1982). As
presently constituted, retirement is profoundly coercive, but this does not
mean that the “possibility” of retirement should be eliminated, or that
people should be forced to “work until they drop”—a recurring theme of
recent discourses around pension reform (Littlewood 1998). At a normative
level, the balance between work and leisure should be regarded as a private
matter, subject only to each agents’ sovereign preferences. Fundamentally,
no one should be coerced into economic activity, and everyone should be
free to choose disengagement from work, provided that this does not
violate the liberty of other citizens. And yet a consideration of existing
retirement systems would suggest that this possibility has been circum-
scribed in significant ways.
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A Universal Retirement Age?
Perhaps the most obvious is where differentials in the “normal retirement
age” (NRA)5 are permitted and justified in terms of moral criteria that are
irrelevant to citizenship. Given its emphasis on universality of entitlement,
how can it be fair that the NRA in at least half of existing retirement
systems continues to be lower for women, in spite of their greater average
life expectancy? This arrangement has been justified in two ways. One
argument asserts that women are typically expected to shoulder the “dou-
ble burden” of domestic labour and low paid employment, and have thus
“earned” an earlier retirement (Gillion et al. 2000). Similarly, Schokkaert
and Van Parijs (2003) highlight the belief that the persistence of gender
inequalities in the distribution of retirement income easily earns women
“the modest privilege of enjoying their pensions for a longer time”
(p. 257). For both arguments, the preferential treatment of women is
regarded as just compensation for their disproportionate involvement in
reproductive labour.
Although these are important concerns, their relevance to citizenship is
highly questionable. As we have suggested, entitlements that arise from
appropriate desert bases should properly be regarded as the responsibility
of the contributory second pillar pension arrangement. But our focus here
is the universal entitlements that give adequate expression to the principle
of equal regard for the basic liberties of all, not the differential entitlements
that arise from desert claims. Is there anything about the particular cir-
cumstances of women which suggests that their basic liberties can only be
equivalent to those of men if they are permitted to take an earlier retire-
ment? If the answer is negative, the gendered differentials in the NRA that
are prevalent in retirement systems cannot be justified in terms of citizen-
ship per se. Indeed, when this is considered in terms of the “temporal
autonomy” that is permitted by retirement, the reversal of these differen-
tials appears to acquire a greater moral force, as highlighted by Schokkaert
and Van Parijs: “as long as men can expect to live less long, or less long in
reasonably good health, would it not be fair to allow them to retire earlier
than women?” (2003, p. 257). At the very least, the principle of equal
regard for the basic liberties of all requires a uniform NRA (4A, Table 4.1).
This should be distinguished from the moral arguments that have been
deployed to justify differentials in the age at which individuals can access
entitlements from a supplementary retirement scheme (Freeden 1991;
Blackburn 2002). It has been asserted that public “servants” are disadvan-
taged with regard to other aspects of their employment, particularly their
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earnings, reflecting electoral constraints on public expenditure, and pre-
ferential treatment regarding the age at which they are permitted to retire
is a means of making their total compensation package equivalent to that
of employees in the private sector. This is given added impetus by the
contention that public sector employment has as its prime objective the
service that it can render to the community (Wilding 1982). It involves a
moral commitment over and above the pecuniary motivations that typify
individual engagement with private sector employment, justifying some
form of recognition, which has been instantiated through the right to an
early retirement. These arguments could have direct relevance to decisions
regarding the distribution of entitlements under the auspices of the desert
focussed second pillar, and could justify sectoral differences in the con-
tractual retirement age (CRA),6 but they do not contradict our core
intuition that citizenship requires universality of entitlement, including a
uniform NRA.7
A Universal Retirement Income?
A second way that retirement policy may undermine the capacity of agents
to disengage from economic activity concerns the entitlements to
Table 4.1 Citizenship and just pension design
Design feature Justice imperative
4A. Universal Normal Retirement Age
(NRA)
Ensures that all citizens are treated in an
equivalent way with regard to the
opportunity to take retirement.
4B. Universal citizens pension Ensures that all citizens are treated in an
equivalent way with regard to the basic
income that can facilitate individual
sovereignty
4C. Voluntary retirement. The NRA
represents a minimum retirement age, not
an obligation to cease economic activity.
Maintains voluntariness of choice regarding
the decision to disengage from economic
activity.
4D. Wider anti-discrimination legislation,
to prevent workers from being forced out
of their work for arbitrary reasons.
Ensures that the decision to sustain
economic activity, or to disengage, is
voluntary.
4E. Pension design should be neutral
regarding the choice between work and
retirement.
This ensures that individual sovereignty is
not circumscribed by governmental action,
preserving the principle of institutional
neutrality.
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statutory income transfers that are tied to the NRA. In a variety of ways, a
reliance on social assistance may be incompatible with the basic liberties of
the least advantaged. Reflecting a lack of popular support, means-tested
benefits are likely to be parsimonious, deterring those who have the
“choice” from ceasing their employment. Indeed, it is widely acknowl-
edged that the maintenance of incentives to engage with economic activity
is the primary rationale of social assistance programmes, giving expression
to “less eligibility”—“the principle that relief by the state should always be
less attractive than independent wage labour” (Novak 1988, p. 46). Even
where workers may wish to disengage from economic activity, their
diminutive benefit entitlements may translate into financial impoverish-
ment, discouraging retirement.
The administration of social assistance may also give rise to differentials in
entitlements that impact adversely on the liberties of particular segments of the
least advantaged. Where the unit of entitlement is the family, benefits are
typically paid to the “head of household”, reinforcing economic dependence
on a partner, and reducing financial autonomy in retirement. For many
women, the formal right to retirement is contradicted by the expectation
that they will continue to shoulder the burden of responsibility for domestic
labour. Novak (1988) contends that such discrimination has reflected the
centrality of patriarchal assumptions regarding the role and status of women
in the household: the proper role of women “is as wives and mothers rather
than workers; and [ . . . ] the economic status of women should be that of
dependent upon men”. Their maintenance should “be provided either
through their husband’s wage or through his benefit” (p. 153). Although
these assumptions are increasingly at variance with the growing prevalence
of women’s labour force participation, they continue to inform the adminis-
tration of social assistance programmes. The principle of equal regard for the
basic liberties of all thus adds weight to the case for a universal citizens’
pension (4B)—the unit of entitlement is the individual, giving all retirees a
degree of financial independence; while wide population coverage should
contain the possibility of parsimonious benefit entitlements, augmenting
the capacity of older workers to disengage from economic activity (Van
Parijs 1995) (see Chapter 2).
The Right to Work
Yet such entitlements become problematic when they give rise to, or are
associated with, the obligation to cease economic activity. Recall that the
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broad aim of liberal justice is individual sovereignty, where people are able
to pursue their own conception of “the good”, which may include work
participation. This is reinforced by the evidence of cross-national com-
parative research which suggests that a substantial minority of employees
prefer to continue working beyond the NRA (Sargeant 2004). Their
capacity to do so may be impaired by retirement systems in at least three
ways.
Voluntary Retirement?
The most obvious is mandatory retirement, where individuals are forced
by the state to cease their economic activity at some arbitrarily designated
age. In practice, social security and employment law across a range of
national jurisdictions have converged, giving employers the right to dis-
miss workers when they reach the NRA (Sargeant 2004). A conspicuous
exception is the United States which, since 1986, has effectively prohib-
ited mandatory retirement. At the very least, the principle of equal regard
for the basic liberties of all requires the generalisation of this approach to
all national jurisdictions. The NRA should represent an entitlement to
cease economic activity at a defined age, if people want to, not an obliga-
tion to withdraw from work (4C).
Even where retirement is not compulsory, the capacity of individuals to
participate in economic activity may be impaired by the prejudicial atti-
tudes of employers. Sargeant (2004) defines age discrimination as “the
rejection of an older worker because of assumptions about the effect of age
on the worker’s ability to perform, regardless of whether there was any
factual basis for the assumption” (p. 5). There is considerable evidence to
suggest that the negative attitudes that give rise to age discrimination are
widespread. One survey of senior executives in 500 companies sought to
gauge the prevalence of prejudice against older workers by asking respon-
dents to specify the age at which they would dismiss a job applicant as
being “too old” to employ. More than one third regarded applicants aged
50 and over as being unsuitable for employment, while around two thirds
expressed a reluctance to employ applicants who had reached the age of 60
(Sargeant 2004). These attitudes manifest as age discrimination in a
variety of ways, including the misuse of early retirement provisions to
dismiss older workers from their employment. Although early retirement
is legally “voluntary”, corporate restructuring often gives rise to the crea-
tion of pressures for older workers to disengage from their employment
before they reach the NRA, prompting serious questions regarding the
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degree to which the decision to take early retirement is an expression of
sovereign preferences (Walker 1981; Phillipson 1982). Where justice
requires institutions to enable agents to pursue their own conception of
“the good”, including participation in economic activity, these pressures
must be regarded as morally unacceptable. A genuine concern with the
basic liberties of all requires institutional neutrality regarding competing
conceptions of “the good”, highlighting the importance of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation (4D).
Social Security Design
Persisting in our assumption that retirement should be voluntary, the capacity
of agents to participate in economic activity may be further impaired by
perverse incentives created by the social security system. This impacts on
different groups of older people in distinctive ways, depending on the purpose
and design of income transfer programmes. Where social assistance benefits
are parsimonious, the least advantaged may be discouraged from ceasing their
economic activity, as we have acknowledged. But where it is sufficiently
“generous”, social assistance may deter the least advantaged from seeking
and maintaining work, because eligibility requires the absence of alternative
sources of income, which means that benefits are withdrawn as earnings from
employment rise. This is highlighted by Fitzpatrick (1999), who regards the
“unemployment trap” as a “consequence of wage levels which are close
enough to benefit levels to not make it worthwhile for someone to stop
claiming benefits” (p. 57), even if he or she would prefer to do so. This
reinforces the moral case for a universal citizens pension which, because it is
unconditional, confers entitlements irrespective of other income.
Looking beyond the retirement income safety-net, an inspection of
existing second pillar pension arrangements would highlight the possibility
of restrictions on entitlement that incentivise disengagement from eco-
nomic activity (Hyde et al. 2006). For example, “abatement provisions”
discourage labour force participation by arbitrarily reducing pension income
for workers who continue in their employment beyond the NRA.
According to one United Kingdom survey (Sargeant 2004), the impact of
such disincentives has been very substantial indeed. In 2001, more than half
of a sample of workers who were subject to abatement provisions chose to
restrict their own hours of work, or withdrew from economic activity
entirely, when they reached the NRA. If pensions are concerned to facilitate
individual sovereignty around work and retirement, entitlement must be
neutral with regard to labour force participation (4E).
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Non-specific Freedom?
While vitally important, decisions around work and retirement do not
exhaust the scope of individual sovereignty. As well as focussing on specific
ends, liberty is relevant to the “(as yet) unidentified purposes” that people
will pursue across the entire span of their retirement (Carter 1999). Since
agents cannot know all of their future needs and preferences with any
degree of certainty, the scope of individual freedom must be as broad as
possible to permit appropriate action as and when circumstances dictate.
The question is, how and to what extent should we regard the distribution
of material resources as being relevant to non-specific freedom?
Libertarians insist that we should not, for liberty can only be impaired by
coercive intrusion. Where negative rights are adequately enforced, the scope
of non-specific freedom is as wide as it can be—the absence of coercive
restrictions on labour force participation gives retirees the flexibility to
engage with economic activity in the future, if they wish to do so; the
protection of property rights allows people to save with confidence to
address future contingencies, whatever they might be; while the absence of
coercive prohibitions on freedom of association augments the range of
possibilities for agents to engage with meaningful roles and social activities
(Nozick 1974; Skoble 2005). Yet libertarian justice is flawed by its tendency
to equate voluntariness of choice with consent, since people may “choose”
to participate in transactions that are fundamentally coercive. As understood
by libertarians, “voluntary” exchange fails to guarantee an acceptable range
of options for all.
Egalitarian liberals attach considerable importance to the notion of
sovereignty, reflecting the foundational assumption that agents are
ultimately responsible for the consequences of their actions, and the
success or failure of their lives (Dworkin 2000; Vallentyne 2007). The
key role for the public authority, as far as justice is concerned, is to
design economic and political institutions so that the circumstances of
individuals—including those that manifest over the course of their
retirement—are consistently responsive to their sovereign decisions.
While this requires statutory protection against coercion, freedom is
meaningful only if agents are able to access the external objects that
make sovereign decision making and action possible. Agents are “really
free, as opposed to just formally free, to the extent that one possesses
the means, not just the right, to do whatever one might want to do”
(Van Parijs 1995, p. 33). The exchange value of the financial resources
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that individuals have at their disposal indicates the actions that are
possible for those who own them. To simplify matters, financial
resources may be thought of as an appropriate metric of freedom,
since they represent a license to perform actions. This means that
“any gift of money (including welfare benefits) increases the available
set of sets of compossible actions, and any confiscation of money
(including taxation) reduces it” (Carter 1999, p. 235). A genuine
concern with the basic liberties of all retirees requires an egalitarian
distribution of retirement income, such as might be achieved by a
universal tax-financed income transfer programme (Van Parijs 1995).
Individual sovereignty during old age requires both formal freedom
and autonomy, suggesting that the protection of non-specific freedom
(as well as specific freedoms) requires a combination of negative and
positive rights.
CONCLUSION
While the substance and importance of citizenship have been articulated in
very different ways, its emphasis on equality has been embraced by political
philosophers across the ideological spectrum (Marshall 1950; Doyal and
Gough 1991; Miller 1999). As with need, citizenship has a special signifi-
cance for liberalism, reflecting its attachment to the principle of “institu-
tional neutrality” (Kymlicka 2002). Where a wide range of perspectives
regard citizenship as the legal and institutional means of realising some
preferred conception of “the good”, liberals highlight its role in expediting
sovereign decision making (Kelly 1998; Dworkin 2000). The commitment
to universal rights reflects their role in sustaining freedom of choice around
the substance of “the good”, not in shaping it. Looking beneath the veneer
of this apparent consensus, however, there has been enormous disagree-
ment around the nature of the rights that would protect liberty, as well as
the role of the state in enforcing them. By focussing exclusively on protec-
tion against coercion, classical liberals neglect the impact of a range of
impediments to sovereignty. In embracing this challenge, egalitarian liberals
regard citizenship as a means of extending access to a range of goods and
services. While accepting the case for negative rights to protect people
against coercion, they insist on protection against contingencies which,
while impersonal, would serve to diminish liberty. Our analysis of pension
design is premised on this assumption, endorsing a substantial role for the
state in universalising access to financial resources and opportunities.
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The importance of citizenship has been acknowledged by a growing
number of retirement systems, though their success in realising its ideals has
been variable, reflecting a range of issues (Novak 1988; Sargeant 2004;
Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003). Many continue to tie eligibility for social
security transfers to inequalities in the NRA. Where there is no adequate
justification for such disparities, however, they should be eliminated as a
matter of urgency. Most retirement systems have relied substantially on
means-tested social assistance to deliver the retirement income safety-net,
which could deter workers from taking retirement. But a universal citizen’s
pension has the potential to eliminate perverse incentives that might impact
on the decision to disengage from economic activity. Many retirement sys-
tems continue to impose mandatory retirement—where workers are forced to
cease work at some arbitrarily designated age. Even systems where retirement
is “voluntary” include measures that actively discourage workers from
disengaging with economic activity. And yet the message of this chapter is
unambiguous. When considered as a means of expediting individual sover-
eignty, citizenship requires freedom of choice on matters of work and
retirement.
NOTES
1. The liberties specified under principle 1 have implications for distributive
justice independently of principle 2. The worth of political liberties can be
augmented by imposing a minimum set of conditions including universal
education and health care, and a role for the state as employer of last resort
(Armstrong 2006).
2. At this point, we should highlight a fundamental distinction regarding the
means by which property rights are given legitimacy. For libertarians, prop-
erty rights should be regarded as “pre-institutional”, in that their legitimacy
is generated independently of the legal and institutional arrangements cre-
ated to protect them—reflecting, for example, “facts” of human nature
(Nozick 1974; Machan 2006). As libertarians, they start by taking property
rights as given. Rawlsian critics of the market reject this proposition, arguing
that property rights should be regarded as “institutional”—their legitimacy
is an artefact of the public discourses, laws and institutional arrangements
that shape justice as fairness. A distribution of property is just only because
the state says that it is.
3. At the very least, we might object that the “agreement” that is generated by
aggregating people’s political preferences does not, in itself, carry any moral
significance. While people are best placed—intellectually and emotionally—
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to determine their own conception of “the good”, they might struggle to
articulate a coherent account of justice.
4. Conspicuously absent from Rawls list are important economic liberties—for
example, “freedom of contract to buy and sell, to employ and be employed,
or to accumulate and invest” (Lomasky 2005, p. 180). Why should such
liberties be regarded as less important than the opportunity to participate in
collective decision making, as realised by Western liberal democracies?
5. The NRA is the statutory retirement age that is characteristically applied to
the population as a whole, triggering eligibility for social security benefits
(Hyde et al. 2006).
6. The CRA is the retirement age that applies in second pillar retirement
schemes, and is subject to contractual agreement between workers and
their employers, not concerns around citizenship.
7. An exception to this general principle concerns employees in hazardous
occupations. Their higher prevalence of ill-health and diminished longevity
could mean that preferential treatment with regard to the NRA is a necessary
corollary of their basic liberties.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
Abstract Any consideration of the literature of social policy analysis
would highlight a tendency to mischaracterise liberalism as a close
analogue to “neoliberalism”, which endorses laissez faire. This por-
trayal stands in stark contrast to the substance of our analysis of liberal
pensions, which highlights a deep concern for the plight of the least
advantaged, a reservoir of antipathy towards inherited economic and
social advantages, and equal respect for the basic liberties of all citizens.
Alongside these virtues, we note that the critics of liberalism invariably
endorse perspectives that are deeply flawed. Social policy analysis char-
acteristically demonstrates an unacceptable degree of paternalism, pre-
mised on an unjustifiable faith in the capacity of government to act in
the best interests of citizens.
Keywords Liberalism  Neoliberalism  Social policy analysis  Paternalism 
Institutional neutrality
INTRODUCTION
Having considered the legal and institutional architecture of liberal retire-
ment provision at some length, we can return to the themes that were
highlighted in our introduction. In particular, we described how liberalism
has been mischaracterised—indeed, some might say, negatively stereo-
typed—as a close analogue to “neoliberalism”, endorsing free market
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competition as a means of buttressing the wealth, power, and authority of
corporate elites (Esping-Andersen 1990; Minns 2001; Armstrong 2006).
We noted that this portrayal has been applied to all variants of liberalism,
not only classical liberalism. As a philosophical framework, egalitarian
liberalism provides a powerful but misleading justification for the intense
economic inequalities that arise from the operation of unfettered markets
(Anderson 1999; Armstrong 2006). This is the inevitable consequence of
its characteristic individualism—involving the false assertion that income
disparities in a capitalist society arise only from individual differences of
effort and ability. In deploying these arguments, liberals perpetuate social
injustice by diverting attention away from its causes, particularly the vested
interests of political and economic elites. And yet there are considerable
discrepancies between this characterisation of liberalism, and our account
of liberal pensions in previous chapters. Our analysis has highlighted a
deep concern with the adverse circumstances of the least advantaged, and
considerable support for highly redistributive income transfers (Van Parijs
1995; Rawls 2003; Vallentyne 2007). It suggested considerable antipathy
towards inherited economic and social advantages, and support for work-
based systems of income distribution that reward effort and ability
(Olsaretti 2004, 2007). And it brought into view the core belief that all
members of society should be treated with equal dignity and respect,
sustained by universal citizenship entitlements (Rawls 1971; Van Parijs
1995). Alongside the virtues of liberalism, we should note that its critics
characteristically endorse philosophical perspectives that are flawed by a
marked disregard for liberty. Unlike the liberal endorsement of individual
sovereignty, scholars of social policy are highly sceptical about our capa-
cities for rational deliberation and self-provisioning (Rowlingson 2002;
Layard 2005). This translates into support for an unacceptable degree of
paternalism, where decisions around work and retirement are made on
behalf of the governed by “enlightened” public servants (Goodin 1982;
Kymlicka 2002). In hindsight, this reflects an unjustifiable faith in the
capacity of government to act in the best interests of citizens, reliably and
consistently (Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981; Taylor-Gooby 1986).
Chapter 4 addresses these concerns in two ways.
1. First, we articulate a formal response to the mischaracterisation of
liberalism that was highlighted in Chapter 1. On each of their
substantive arguments, we find that the critics have failed to demon-
strate an adequate understanding of liberal political philosophy.
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2. Second, we highlight some of the characteristic flaws of social policy
analysis, a de facto rival to liberalism. We find that its failure to take
individual freedom seriously reinforces our presumption in favour of
“institutional neutrality”, requiring public indifference between
competing conceptions of “the good”.
Overall, Chapter 4 affirms the importance of a core and universal liberal
conviction—the primacy of liberty. Like all other forms of governmental
action, state intrusion in pension markets should aim only to protect
individual capacities for sovereign decision making around “the good”,
including matters of work and retirement (Kelly 1998; Dworkin 2000;
Shapiro 2007; Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
MISCHARACTERISING LIBERALISM
It should be clear from our analysis elsewhere in this monograph that liberal
political philosophy has been marginal to the scholarly field of pension
analysis, as well as deliberation around the design of just retirement systems.
Both have been influenced disproportionately by the social democratic
concerns of social policy analysis (Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990;
Korpi and Palme 1998; Kangas 2000; Trampusch 2007). An important part
of the reason for this marginality has been the way that liberalism has been
mischaracterised by its rivals. “Liberalism” is equated with a highly stylised
notion of “neoliberalism”—an ideological handmaiden to the corporate
sector that is profoundly hostile to egalitarian concerns.1 We can address
this mischaracterisation of liberalism by responding to each of the argu-
ments that were highlighted by our introduction.
Reinforcing Individualism
Liberals would not deny the main thrust of this particular characterisa-
tion, but neither do they regard it as problematic. Where it is possible,
because political institutions have been arranged appropriately, indivi-
dual sovereignty is preferable to paternalism. At this point it would be
helpful to distinguish this normative ideal from resource allocation under
conditions of injustice, which does not characteristically track differen-
tials in sovereign decision making. The egalitarian liberal emphasis on
individualism is not intended to generate a justification for income
inequalities under the corporate capitalist status quo, as the critics seem
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to imply. The belief that it does, so prevalent in the literature of socialist-
collectivism (Armstrong 2003, 2006), merely shows that the critics have
failed to grasp the essence of egalitarian liberal arguments around the
legitimacy of distributive outcomes. The idea of desert suggests that
resource allocation is morally acceptable only to the extent that it tracks
performance for which agents can be regarded as responsible—that is to say,
actions that are not influenced by arbitrarily distributed contingencies, such
as the “structural” properties of social arrangements. This emphasis is
suffused with an egalitarian impetus that is rarely acknowledged by the
critics, if at all. Where it isn’t possible to determine which particular agent
is responsible for performances that generate remuneration, the default
distribution rule could be one of equality (Miller 1999). Egalitarian liberals
are suspicious of the argument that intense concentrations of income and
wealth reflect the deserts of beneficiaries, rather than inherited economic
and social advantages. Many explicitly endorse statutory measures to neu-
tralise the unfair advantages that are conferred by the class system, including
substantial income redistribution through tax-financed transfers. For one
prominent critic of laissez faire, desert cannot be based solely on the
unadjusted value of “what one contributes since this depends on one’s
initial (brute luck) opportunities to contribute. Nor can desert be based
on the unadjusted value of what effort one has made, if one’s ability to make
effort depends in part on one’s initial (brute luck) capacity to make an
effort” (Vallentyne 2007, p. 174). For egalitarian liberals, the term “indivi-
dual responsibility” denotes a particular means by which income distribu-
tion is generated, requiring self-directed performance in the market. It is not
regarded as an ideological device to legitimate inequalities of income and
wealth in an unjust society.
Disparaging the Least-Advantaged
Because it is neutral between different conceptions of the good, egalitarian
liberalism does not rank the differential circumstances that arise from peo-
ple’s sovereign decisions against any particular set of normative values.
Nevertheless, this particular criticism is given a degree of credibility by
egalitarian liberal discourses around the design of statutory income transfer
programmes. Even if liberals do not feel contempt for the financially impo-
verished, some have endorsed social assistance schemes which target parti-
cular groups of the least-advantaged for income transfers. Understandably,
this approach is intended to expedite vertical income redistribution, but
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could foster negative social attitudes towards “beneficiaries” by highlighting
their dependence on the economically active. Where possible, policy deci-
sion makers should try to ensure that the design of statutory income
transfers is non-stigmatising.
Diverting Attention Away from “Social” Injustice
Any explanation of distributive outcomes that focusses on a narrow set of
variables could be regarded as insufficiently comprehensive. Yet the character-
isation of liberalism as focussing exclusively on failures of individual responsi-
bility is unsustainable, for an even-handed exploration of its corpus would
reveal a complex and multi-layered account of poverty causation. While
liberals do not deploy the socialist-collectivist analysis of capitalist exploitation
that is common among their critics (Williams 1990; Armstrong 2003), it is
clear that they have not ignored the “structural” determinants of resource
allocation, though this term is not universally accepted. In a seminal contribu-
tion, Sen (2002) regards human destitution and misery an artefacts of the
failure of capability development caused by the malfunctioning of economic
systems. Van Parijs (1995) has similarly highlighted several attributes of
capitalist economic development that generate unjust asymmetries in the
distribution of material resources. The capacity of professional and unionised
workers to restrict labour market entry can result in excessive remuneration,
and artificially high unemployment, reinforcing economic and social inequal-
ities. Liberty can be circumscribed by the manipulation of preferences, where
the least-advantaged are encouraged to adjust their aspirations to the reality of
financial impoverishment. In a more recent contribution, Hyde and
Borzutzky (2016) highlight the role of political rent-seeking in enabling
pension fund managers to exploit consumers, performing sub-optimally, but
imposing monopoly prices. Considered in this light, it could be argued that
egalitarian liberal accounts of income inequality are more comprehensive than
those of socialist-collectivism.2 Where they focus only on the “structural”
properties of the capitalist political economy, liberals emphasise the impor-
tance of the external and internal contingencies that shape distributive out-
comes. While they emphasise market failure, egalitarian liberals allow for the
possibility of action that is in some way deficient at the level of the individual.
An “undeniable reality of life is that private agents are not equally favoured by
nature. Somemay be handicapped by birth, whereas some others may be born
with favourable natural assets” (Suzumura 1999, p. 133). And, of course,
liberals have drawn our attention to the possibility of “government
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failure”. It would be remiss of any theory of social injustice to ignore the
full range of contingencies that may impact adversely on liberty.
Imposing a Narrow Conception of Human Nature
In reality, a close inspection of the liberal corpus reveals a wide range of
assumptions about the “nature” of human agents—that is, their salient
behavioural and motivational characteristics. This is clear, for example, if
we consider differences in the deliberative method that is deployed to
determine the legitimacy of legal and political arrangements. As we have
noted, liberal accounts of justice that are premised on “natural rights”
typically define human nature in terms of individual capacities for con-
scious deliberation and choice, the salient characteristic that distinguishes
us from other species. For some, the substance of each agent’s engage-
ment with liberty—including its normative properties—is a private matter
and should be expected to manifest in diverse ways (Kymlicka 2002).
What counts is that all agents are given the opportunity to determine
their own conception of “the good”, without intruding on the liberty of
others. This means of course that moral principles such as fraternité, or
individualism, are irrelevant as universal descriptors of human nature.
Others have refined this focus on the capacity for conscious deliberation
by emphasising the importance of rational decision making—where
“rational” is defined objectively as cognition that is consistent with flour-
ishing. It is vital, “from an objective point of view that human lives be
successful rather than wasted” (Dworkin 2000, p. 5). Liberty gives all
human agents the opportunity to realise a salient attribute of their nature
—the potential for rational sovereignty. Naturally, this contradicts the
argument that egalitarian liberalism draws substantially on the repertoire
of neoclassical economics, an approach which defines rationality only in
terms of the satisfaction of subjective preferences (Armstrong 2006).
Contractarians reject notions of natural law and rights, arguing the
case for liberty by emulating the decisions of people under conditions
of anarchy (Rawls 1971; Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000). Participants
in a state of nature are generally understood to be risk-averse, giving
assent to legal and political arrangements that will optimise the mix of
security and liberty. In some formulations (Rawls 1971; Dworkin
2000), each agent is required to deliberate around justice from behind
a “veil of ignorance” in order to neutralise biases arising from personal
and sectional interests. As a real world analogue, Dworkin invites us to
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“look at life through the eyes of a prudent and rational 25-year old
individual” (2000, p. 313). Most likely s/he would endorse a welfare
state safety-net that would reduce exposure to economic misfortune,
but without eliminating choice. Defined as an actively deliberating
concern with liberty and security then, rationality is presumed to be
a salient characteristic of human nature.
A shift in focus from the deliberative method deployed to articulate
justice to its substance would make the argument that liberalism endorses
a distinctive conception of human nature look even weaker. Predominantly,
liberals have endorsed a permissive approach to the norms and values that
are compatible with justice. This is particularly evident in the work of
Nozick (1974), which highlights the opportunities that laissez faire creates
for the emergence of diverse forms of human association. Egalitarian liberals
have similarly advised that people use their freedom wisely to better their
own lives, not to embrace any particular creed, such as values that cohere
around social solidarity. In this respect, Sen (2002) cautions that it is better
to “think and act wisely and judiciously rather than stupidly or impulsively”
(p. 23). This is a far cry from the model of human nature that is endorsed by
neoclassical economics, which regards people as isolated and “atomistic”,
narrowly focussed on the pursuit of pecuniary self-interest, egoism and
competition (Dixon 1999). It would be unwise to read the characteristics
of liberalism from the pronouncements of neoclassical economists, as some
scholars seem to have done.
THE PATERNALIST ALTERNATIVE
In view of these arguments, it is clear that liberalism should not be
regarded as a close analogue to “neoliberalism”, a highly stylised model
of free market economics that seeks to buttress the wealth, power and
authority of corporate elites (Esping-Andersen 1990; Minns 2001;
Armstrong 2006). In reality, our analysis of pension design in
Chapters 2 to 4 suggests that its endorsement of the primacy of liberty is
compatible with a range of egalitarian concerns.
• Need. In Chapter 2, we reported how liberal political philosophers at
various points on the ideological spectrum share a deep concern with
the plight of the least advantaged, endorsing collective action to
ameliorate poverty. Egalitarian liberals endorse “compulsory” col-
lective action to address unsatisfied need by transferring financial
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resources to those at the bottom of society (Rawls 1971; Dworkin
2000). Some reject the Poor Law emphasis on targeting in favour of
a universal retirement income safety-net (Van Parijs 1995). The
evidence of comparative cross-national research suggests that this
model has been highly successful at ameliorating financial impover-
ishment (Korpi and Palme 1998; Meyer et al. 2007).
• Desert. Chapter 3 highlighted the widespread acceptance by liberals
that earnings differentials should track performance at work, not
inherited economic and social advantages (Friedman 1962; Rand
1967; Dworkin 2000). Egalitarian liberals endorse state intrusion
in labour markets to ensure that they distribute remuneration in
accordance with individual merits (Olsaretti 2004, 2007).
Everyone should have a fair opportunity to participate in work-
based systems of reward, which should acknowledge differentials of
ability and effort. Considered in terms of retirement, the desert
principle requires second pillar pensions that can ensure a consistent
relationship between savings’ effort and benefit entitlements. On
reflection, what could be more egalitarian than measures to eliminate
morally arbitrary influences on the distribution of income and
wealth?
• Citizenship. Chapter 4 drew on the liberal conviction that members
of society stand in a relationship of equality with regard to their
shared “human” characteristics. All liberals endorse citizenship as a
means of ensuring access to the resources that would protect indivi-
dual capacities for conscious deliberation, and purposive engagement
with the external environment (Nozick 1974; Machan 2006;
Dworkin 2000). Egalitarian liberals endorse governmental action
to equalise the distribution of designated financial resources and
opportunities, such that all citizens are able to frame and pursue
their own conception of “the good” (Rawls 1971, 2003; Van
Parijs 1995).
Alongside these egalitarian virtues, it is clear that the critics of liberal
political philosophy characteristically endorse perspectives that seek to
impose some conception of “the good”, rather than permitting people
to determine this for themselves (Kymlicka 2002; Hyde 2014). This
applies with particular force to social policy analysis, the disciplinary field
that has been concerned with the adequacy and legitimacy of retirement
systems (Titmuss 1974; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998;
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Kangas 2000; Trampusch 2007). While there have been some prominent
exceptions, the field of social policy is characterised by three salient flaws
that limit its efficacy as a rival to liberalism.
Diminutive Agents?
As emphasised throughout the monograph, liberals of all ideological hues
converge around the principle that state intrusion in the market should be
restricted to the measures that protect liberty. This ultimately rests on
particular assumptions about the capacity of human agents to act in pur-
suit of their own interests, reliably and consistently. Where liberty is
adequately protected, all should be able to determine and act in accor-
dance with their own conception of “the good”. Scholars of social policy
have characteristically expressed scepticism about this proposition, arguing
that the scope of individual autonomy is limited by contingencies that are
beyond people’s conscious control (Titmuss 1974; Williams 1990;
Rowlingson 2002; Ginn 2004).
Most importantly, they maintain that the capacity to act in ways that are
self-sustaining is constrained by attributes of the external environment.
This might include, for example, the binding legal requirements and
distributive flows that are created by policy decision making; the vicissi-
tudes of economic development—such as the peaks and troughs of the
business cycle; or the “oppressive” social relations that shape people’s lives
(Williams 1990; Rowlingson 2002; Ginn 2004). While all are important,
scholars of social policy have paid particular attention to variation in the
design of welfare state services and transfers. For a prominent architect of
social policy’s mainstream (Titmuss 1973), any reliance on the market to
deliver welfare should be expected to intensify economic disadvantage,
because its emphasis on the cash nexus and pecuniary self-interest stifles
the willingness of the economically active to support redistributive income
transfers. This rests on the assumption that the “ways in which society
organises and structures its social institutions [ . . . ] can encourage or
discourage the altruistic in man [sic]” (Titmuss 1973, p. 255).
Alongside the growing prominence of privatisation, scholars of social
policy have highlighted the means by which the public/private mix in
retirement systems can impact on the financial well-being of older people.
As we have noted, privatisation is intensely commodifying, undermining
the possibility of collective action in pursuit of shared interests. The com-
pulsory private element of multi-pillar retirement systems typically carries
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enormous public costs, diverting scarce resources away from income transfer
programmes for the least-advantaged. Private pensions require plan partici-
pants to save for their own retirement, and are “intrinsically unable to
achieve inter-generational risk-sharing” (Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003,
p. 131), leaving people vulnerable to “economic shocks”. The transition
costs of privatisation fall on the economically active, who are expected to
pay for “existing state pension liabilities and their own funded private
pensions” (Ginn 2004, p. 131). This creates pressures to retrench the
publicly administered retirement income safety-net, intensifying the risk of
poverty for those who depend on it (Hyde and Borzutzky 2016).
Fundamentally, for the mainstream of social policy analysis, the scope of
individual sovereignty with regard to retirement is circumscribed by salient
attributes of the external environment, particularly the design of pension
systems. At the same time, it accepts that people’s engagement with
retirement planning may be hampered by defective decision making capa-
cities. In an important contribution to this debate, Rowlingson (2002)
notes how retirement policy in a range of national jurisdictions is increas-
ingly premised on the assumption that people are able to direct their own
retirement futures, and must be given the opportunity to do so. Yet this
emphasis on “do it yourself” social policy is contradicted by the reality of
deficient cognitive capacities, which are incapable of addressing the chal-
lenge of retirement planning. This analysis suggests that people are unable
to contemplate their lives beyond the immediate future, and tend to
regard ageing as a negative prospect. Lacking the skills that are necessary
for long-term financial decision making, they deploy irrelevant heuristics
(inaction because of the possibility of “tempting fate”), and are vulnerable
to peer pressure. Rather than acting as autonomous agents, each person
bases “their aspirations, expectations, and behaviour on the people closest
to them [ . . . ] They do not necessarily have to think actively about what
they might do in the future if they simply follow the general path laid out
for them” (Rowlingson 2002, p. 636). Although internal, each agent’s
decision making capacities should be regarded as a direct corollary of their
socio-economic status.
These arguments highlight a considerable degree of scepticism about
the capacity of human agents to exercise liberty. Even in the unlikely event
that they could be relied upon to articulate reliable and coherent prefer-
ences about the action that is necessary to optimise financial well-being in
retirement, people are confronted by a range of compelling external
obstacles that are beyond their conscious control. As far as retirement is
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concerned, liberty should be sacrificed in order to realise security. This
requires “collective state planning” to engineer a “society working
together for the good of the whole in a spirit which combines both
altruism and self-interest”. In this alternate society, “individuals are taking
collective responsibility for their welfare, rather than individual responsi-
bility” (Rowlingson 2002, p. 637).
Like the mainstream of social policy analysis, egalitarian liberals endorse
the deployment of state power to institute a degree of retirement income
security, but why stop at the measures necessary for altruism or social soli-
darity? Why not take steps to eliminate a range of external barriers to
sovereignty? Vallentyne (2007), for example, highlights several measures
which could ensure that resource allocation is insensitive to arbitrary privi-
leges and inherited advantages. Unlike social policy’s mainstream, egalitarian
liberals also believe that the state can take action to foster internal capacities
for rational decision making, such as those required for long-term financial
planning. Fundamentally, this requires the freedom to learn from voluntary
exchange, because people need to acquire skills and capacities through
purposive engagement with the external environment. Rather than taking a
dismissive view of human capacities, and seeking to engineer old age income
security in a paternalisticway, egalitarian liberals emphasise the importance of
public action that can augment people’s sovereignty with regard to “the
good”, including their own preferences for work and retirement.
A Beneficent State?
In spite of considerable evidence to the contrary, scholars of social policy
tend to regard the state as a beneficent agent that serves primarily to care
for the well-being of its citizens (Layard 2005; Marquand 2004).
Governmental action, they contend, is concerned with the public interest,
denoting the norms, challenges, and objectives that people share in com-
mon. Unrestrained by the public authority, market actors are selfish and
egoistic, concerned only with the pursuit of immediate and narrow
pecuniary self-interest (Titmuss 1974; Kohn 1986). But, in their enthu-
siasm to endorse the deployment of state power, some scholars of social
policy seem oblivious to its potential to generate injustice. When pressed
on Nozick’s warning about its capacity to supress freedom of expression
and association, for example, Armstrong merely says “so what?” (2003,
p. 416), as if these liberties don’t matter. Perhaps they don’t when
considered alongside social democratic principles of justice. While it may
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be coercive, state intrusion is necessary to realise outcomes that can stand up
to scrutiny against some cogently articulated notion of the public interest—
one that gives priority to “other-regarding” norms, such as altruism and
solidarity. In the words of several exponents of governmental restrictions on
liberty, the “state has emerged as the World’s most effective means of
organising society”, and “remains the ultimate guarantor of security,
democracy, welfare, and the rule of law” (Hurrelman et al. 2011, p. xi).
Unlike the market, the state is responsible for a multitude of virtues.
On closer inspection, this public interest-regarding conception of the
state is rendered problematic by the stark discrepancy between its rhetoric,
and consistent evidence of defective policy design and outcomes. Given that
policy decision makers are confronted by imperfect information, and can
deliberate in ways that are less than rational, we might expect the occasional
departure from public interest ideals. Yet the evidence of policy evaluation
suggests that such departures are routine. In applying the techniques and
assumptions of economics to government, public choice theory is highly
critical of models that portray the state as steward of the public interest
(Gunning 2006; Evans 2010). Instead of pursuing the common good, as
the mainstream of social policy analysis suggests, state intrusion in the
market seems intent on satisfying the private interests of preferred indivi-
duals and groups. This analysis is developed with reference to “rent-seek-
ing”—the pursuit of advantages and income streams by manipulating the
economic environment, generating self-serving institutional biases. Rent-
seeking results in the production of economic rents, as represented by
above-market remuneration. Crucially for our analysis here, public choice
theory acknowledges the central role of the state in shaping the distribution
of economic rents, because rent-seeking involves the manipulation of poli-
tical and legal processes with the objective of creating “wealth outside the
normal processes of voluntary market exchange” (Evans 2010, p. 2).
Political rent-seeking consists of actions “that are intended to change laws
such that one individual and/or group gains at the same or greater expense
to another individual or group” (Gunning 2006, p. 348). Rather than
acting primarily to satisfy the requirements of the public interest, the state
is involved in facilitating the distribution of economic rents to preferred
participants in the political process.
Although this analysis of the state as arbiter of private privilege has been
echoed within social policy analysis (Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981; Williams
1990), it has not been characteristic of the discipline. Rather, scholars of
social policy have characteristically expressed a sanguine appraisal of the
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role of governmental actors in arranging social cohesion (Titmuss 1974;
Esping-Andersen 1990; Rowlingson 2002, Marquand 2004). In their
enthusiasm to legitimate the deployment of state power, they have
arguably paid insufficient attention to its capacity to curtail liberty on
behalf of powerful interest groups. One of the salient strengths of liberal-
ism, in contrast, lies in its cautious but well-defined endorsement of state
action to protect liberty.
Unacceptable Paternalism?
Finally, as far as this critique is concerned, it is clear that social policy’s
mainstream endorses what others might regard as unacceptable paternal-
ism (Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000). Inevitably, individual freedom is
abridged where the state chooses to prioritise any particular conception of
“the good”, including norms such as altruism and solidarity. This is
explicitly acknowledged by Goodin (1982), who justifies egalitarian
paternalism in terms of the distinction between “true” and “revealed”
preferences, claiming a special insight into the former, and endorsing
welfare state design that compels agents to act in an ethical manner. A
rule of uniformity “prevents people’s judgements on appropriate levels of
public services from being influenced by particularistic considerations of
how likely they are to have to rely on them” (Goodin 1982, p. 159). By
partitioning our “higher” concerns off from the mundane world of eco-
nomic self-interest in the market, the social democratic welfare state gives
everyone the “freedom” to act on “seriously held moral principles”.
CONCLUSION
Though they do not object to the welfare state per se, egalitarian liberals
regard such paternalism as deeply problematic, and for at least three
reasons. First it fails to acknowledge that freedom manifests as self-direc-
ted activity, not compulsory adherence to particular ends. The importance
of any value or mode of association is something that people should
discover for themselves through voluntary exchange with others, rather
than having it imposed on them by public officials.3 Second, it presumes
that government is a repository of wisdom, able to prescribe appropriate
ends on behalf of the citizenry. There is strong evidence that public policy
decision making is inherently flawed, reflecting problems of incomplete
information, bounded rationality, and the disproportionate influence of
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powerful interest groups (Hyde and Borzutzky 2016). Third, there are
doubts about the capacity of the liberal democratic polity to convert any
such wisdom to well-designed and effective policy outcomes, as high-
lighted by public choice theory (Gunning 2006). For these reasons, and
the primacy of liberty, questions of “the good”—including work and
retirement—should be left to the deliberative effort of free individuals.
Anything else would violate justice.
NOTES
1. Indeed, “neoliberalism” has become something of a term of abuse in recent
decades, a bogeyman that is used to dismiss arguments and policies that
socialist-collectivists disagree with.
2. Indeed, some have argued that it is social policy’s mainstream that lacks a
satisfactory theory of injustice, as well as an adequate conception of the
political transformations that are required to realise a fraternal society
(Taylor-Gooby and Dale 1981; Taylor-Gooby 1986).
3. It might reasonably be suggested that the reality of state coercion in the
socialist-collectivist polity contradicts the notion of “willing” mutual service
(Kukathis 2003).
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